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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to examine why Australian publicly listed companies voluntarily disclose 
employee-related information in their annual report.  The purpose of this study is to research the 
quantity and quality of the voluntary employee-related disclosures present in 2004 Australian 
company annual reports.  Ullmann’s (1985) stakeholder framework is applied comprising three 
dimensions, stakeholder power, strategic posture, and economic performance.  The second 
objective is to investigate the type and nature of employee-related disclosures made by Australian 
companies within their annual reports.  The final objective is to determine whether publicly listed 
companies choose to disclose employee-related information to legitimise their place in society as 
a result of former adverse publicity.  
A number of key explanations are proposed for the provision of voluntary employee-
related disclosures in Australian corporate annual reports.  Companies are placing more 
importance on the human capital in the company over time (Stewart, 1997) and numerous 
researchers argue that the demand from stakeholders for additional disclosure on intellectual 
capital, including information about the company’s employees, is increasing.  Employees are an 
important intangible asset for many companies, therefore another explanation is that there could 
be benefits for the company in acting responsibly to the employees.  Another benefit is attempting 
to be an accountable or responsible company by reporting employee-related practices publicly.  
An alternative reason is that companies voluntarily disclose employee-related information in 
response to adverse publicity from the media to legitimise their relationship with society.   
Companies with a 30 June 2004 balance date are extracted from all of the companies listed 
on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), to create a sample of 970 companies.  This consists of 
649 companies that disclose information about their employees in their annual report, and 321 
companies that do not disclose any employee-related information.  Data was collected to measure 
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components of employee-related disclosure, proxies for Ullmann’s three-dimensional stakeholder 
framework, individual corporate governance variables and threats to legitimacy.  
The results indicate that companies that have greater employee power disclose more 
employee-related information and disclose higher quality employee-related information than 
companies with less employee power.  Specifically this study examines the companies’ propensity 
to provide employee-related information and the quality of voluntary employee-related 
disclosures in relation to employee stakeholder power represented by employee share ownership 
and trade union membership.  Evidence shows that employee share ownership does empower 
employee stakeholders regarding the quantity and quality of corporate employee-related 
disclosures.  In contrast, highly unionised companies disclose less voluntary employee-related 
information in their annual report.    
The results also find that companies displaying a more active strategic posture towards 
employee-related issues disclose more high quality employee-related information than companies 
displaying a less active posture to these issues.  Companies employ strong corporate governance 
best practice systems to strategically manage employees through disclosing quality voluntary 
employee-related information.  Corporate mission statements that recognise employees are also 
evidence of strategic posture, but only for quality of employee-related disclosures.  
Companies with higher past or present economic performance disclose a greater amount 
of high quality employee-related information than companies with lower past or current 
performance.  Economic performance represented by return on assets and Tobin’s Q shows mixed 
results with return on assets marginally associated with the quality of employee reporting, while 
Tobin’s Q is related to the amount of employee-related information a company discloses.  Larger 
companies and companies with higher levels of adverse publicity are significantly associated with 
higher levels of voluntary annual report employee-related disclosures.   
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CHAPTER 1 
  INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
A significant body of literature over the past four decades has researched corporate social 
responsibility disclosures (for example, Bebbington, Larrinaga and Moneva, 2008; Brown and 
Deegan, 1998; Deegan, 2002; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan, 
Rankin and Voght, 2000; Gray, Javad, Power and Sinclair, 2001; Gray, Koury and Lavers, 1995a, 
1995b; Guthrie and Parker, 1989, 1990; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; Trotman, 1979; Ullmann, 1985).  
Social responsibility disclosures consist of information pertaining to the relationship between a 
company and its surrounding physical and social environments (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; 
Guthrie and Parker, 1990).  These disclosures relate to energy production, environmental 
concerns, ethical practices, human resources and community contribution (Deegan, Kent and 
Lyons, 1995; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Gray et al., 1995a; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Milne 
and Adler, 1999; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000).   
Former studies have provided general explanations for social responsibility disclosures 
(for example, Bebbington et al., 2008; Bowman and Haire, 1976; Campbell, 2007; Dierkes and 
Antal, 1985; Roberts, 1992), and environmental disclosures (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Cowen 
and Gadenne, 2005; Deegan, 2002; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Jantadej and Kent, 1999; Milne and Patten, 2002; Neu, Warsame and 
Pedwell, 1998; O’Donovan, 2002; Rockness, 1985; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000).  Numerous 
studies assess the demand and value of social performance reports (Chen, Patten and Roberts, 
2008; Dierkes and Preston, 1977; Estes, 1976), some examine the relationships between social 
and financial performance (Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Anderson and Frankle, 1980; Cochran and 
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Wood, 1984; Murray, Sinclair, Power and Gray, 2006; Preston, 1978; Shane and Spicer, 1983; 
Spicer, 1978a), while others analyse corporate social responsibility within specific countries (De 
Villiers and Van Staden, 2006; Egenhofer, 2007; Freedman and Jaggi, 2004; Islam and Deegan, 
2008; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Li and McConomy, 1999; Makela and Nasi, 2010; Neu et al., 
1998; Okereke, 2007).  Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987) find that different types of disclosure 
are explained by substantially different independent variables.  
This study extends the body of research on corporate social disclosures (Deegan, 2000 and 
2002; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; O’Dwyer, 2002; Roberts, 1992) by focusing on voluntary 
employee-related1
Some companies have attempted to capture the value of their organisational intangible 
resources to cope with the changing business conditions revealed by globalisation, the 
improvement of competition and increasing customer demands (Klein, 1997; Rimmel, 2003).  
Employees are considered to be an intangible resource, along with intellectual property rights, 
manufacturing procedures or organisational structure that become visible to investors within 
corporate reports.  Practitioners and researchers assert that corporate knowledge represents an 
asset in its own right and not simply as an enhancement of other assets (Brooking, 1996; 
Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Klein, 1997; Rimmel, 2003; Roos, Roos, Dragonetti and Edvinsson, 
1998; Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1997). 
 disclosures.  Voluntary employee-related, or ‘human resource’ disclosures, 
include information on occupational health and safety issues, career, community, employee 
relations, training and development, employee share plans, housing, employee welfare and work 
place agreements (Deegan, Rankin and Tobin, 2002; Gray et al., 1995b; Hossain, Khan and 
Yasmin, 2004; Kent and Zunker, 2010; Rimmel, 2003).  
                                                 
1 An employee is a person employed in a calling on wages or piecework rates; or a person whose usual occupation is that of 
an employee in a calling; or a person employed in a calling, even though the person is working under a contract for labour 
only, or substantially for labour only; or the person is a lessee of tools or other implements of production, or of a vehicle used 
to deliver goods; or the person owns, wholly or partly, a vehicle used to transport goods or passengers; or a person who is a 
member of a class of persons declared to be employees under section 275; or each person, being 1 of 4 or more persons who 
are, or claim to be, partners working in association in a calling or business; or for proceedings for payment or recovery of 
amounts—a former employee; or an outworker; or an apprentice or trainee (Industrial Relations Act, 1999). 
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Many academics (Flamholtz, 1999; Gröjer and Johanson, 1996; Guthrie, Petty and 
Johanson, 2001; Mouritsen, 1998; Petty and Guthrie, 2000) communicate that companies state 
that their employees are the company’s most valuable resource, although few companies 
demonstrate the importance of human resources such as making disclosures about them in their 
corporate annual reports.   
The stakeholder conceptual framework developed by Freeman (1984) and Ullmann2
                                                 
2 See Appendix 1 for comparative studies applying Ullmann’s framework. 
 
(1985) is applied in this study, to explain the quality and quantity of voluntary employee-related 
disclosures made by Australian companies in their annual reports.  Freeman (1984) and Ullmann 
(1985) provide a comprehensive theoretical framework that adds to the development of the 
research, and presents the opportunity to predict levels of corporate social disclosure (Roberts, 
1992) for a cross-section of companies.  
Ullmann’s theoretical framework is applied to this study of voluntary employee-related 
disclosures for two reasons.  First, the theory allows researchers to identify key stakeholders 
associated with particular categories of social disclosure rather than focusing on a general range of 
stakeholders.  Second, this theory incorporates an ex ante strategy for companies to manage 
particular stakeholders rather than ex post management after the company has impaired their 
social contract with society.  Ullmann (1985) introduced a three-dimensional framework of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure that incorporated the elements of stakeholder power, 
strategic posture and the past and present economic performance of the company.  Ullmann 
(1985) argued that the fundamental principle of stakeholder theory is that companies use social 
disclosures as a means to manage their relationships with their stakeholders and the external 
environment.   
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Social responsibility reporting is a concept whereby companies consider the interests of 
society by taking responsibility for reporting the impact of their operations on customers, 
suppliers, employees, shareholders, communities and other stakeholders, and the environment.  
This obligation is perceived to extend beyond the statutory requirements to comply with 
legislation, and companies voluntarily agree to report about employee-related information as well 
as the local community and society in general (Deegan et al., 2002). 
The research question to be addressed in the current study is: Why do Australian publicly 
listed companies voluntarily disclose employee-related information in their annual reports?  
Accounting and corporate social responsibility issues, such as employee-related 
disclosures, are influenced by a series of intricate supply and demand forces (Foster, 1986).  
Benefits of disclosing corporate social information are expected to be in excess of costs, and this 
study aims to explain companies' motivations to voluntarily disclose employee information in 
their annual reports (Kent and Ung, 2003).  
1.2.1 DEMAND FORCES (COSTS) 
Stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, customers, competitors, media, and regulatory 
authorities often require more information than is demanded by investors.  The supply forces are 
affected by operational regulation, collection and processing costs, litigation costs, political costs, 
proprietary costs and constraints on managerial behaviour (Boesso and Kumar, 2009; Foster, 
1986; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001).  The final two are particularly important in the 
decision-making process relating to voluntary employee-related disclosures.  
Litigation costs arise when the information disclosed after an event is inaccurate, as users 
of information attempt to recover the losses arising from their reliance on the inaccurate 
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information (Heitzman, Wasley and Zimmerman, 2010; Kent and Chan, 2009; Magness, 2006; 
Skinner, 1997).  Political costs (Adams, Hill and Roberts, 1998; Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 1999; 
Gray et al., 1995a, b; Milne, 2001; Ness and Mirza, 1991) are associated with social disclosures, 
such as employee unions taking advantage of the social information disclosed in annual reports to 
increase demands on the companies (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995).  Employee unions are seen as a 
source of pressure as they are considered to “have a stake in making public almost anything that a 
company may want to hide” (Bauer and Fenn, 1972, p.38, quoted in Tilt, 1994).  Proprietary costs 
have been described as the “friction that prevents full disclosure” (Gigler, 1994, p.225).  If 
competitors use the disclosed information to the company’s detriment, there are possible costs that 
could be imposed on the company (Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Holder-Webb, Cohen, Nath and 
Wood, 2009; Li, Richardson and Thomton, 1997; Lo, 2010). 
Given the existence of costs associated with the disclosure of corporate information and 
that the social reporting environment in Australia is largely unregulated, companies are expected 
to provide voluntary employee-related disclosures when the benefits exceed the direct and indirect 
costs of these disclosures (Depoers, 2000; Lo, 2010; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995).   
1.2.2 SUPPLY FORCES (BENEFITS) 
Numerous underlying principles exist for managers to voluntarily disclose employee-
related information in their annual reports.  One incentive is the desire to comply with legal and 
professional requirements (Jamali, 2008; Van Dongen, 2006).  However, this is not a key 
motivation given the lack of requirements in Australia mandating social disclosures and related 
“verifications” (Deegan, 2000).  “Economic rationality” concerns could be considered another 
important reason for a lack of disclosure.  In particular, there could be benefits for the company in 
appearing to act responsibly to their employees and this could be deemed to be more important 
than acknowledging other social responsibilities of the company (Deegan, 2002; Friedman, 1962).  
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Another benefit of disclosure is the recognition of being an accountable or responsible 
company by reporting information voluntarily.  Managers are likely to consider that stakeholders 
have a right to certain information, and that they should fulfil that entitlement (Deegan, 2002; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman and Reed, 1983; Hasnas, 1998; Wilmhurst and Frost, 
2000) despite the related costs.  Complying with borrowing requirements is another incentive to 
provide voluntary employee-related information.  Corporate lending institutions frequently 
require, as an element of their risk assessment policies, borrowers to regularly supply certain 
information about their social policies and performance.   Managers are also expected to conform 
to community expectations, to appear as though they are complying with the “social contract”, 
and this is reliant upon providing evidence of positive social performance (Abeysekera, 2006; 
Aerts, Cormier and Magnan, 2006; Deegan, 2000, 2002).  
Benefits such as managing particular stakeholder groups (Neu et al., 1998; Roberts, 1992; 
Ullmann, 1985) and the compliance of industry requirements or particular codes of conduct 
(Deegan and Blomquist, 2006) are additional motivations that encourage management to disclose 
social responsibility information.  Many companies also apply to win social reporting awards, 
thus receiving the associated positive publicity those awards generate.  Winning an award could in 
turn have positive implications for the reputation of the company (Bebbington et al., 2008; 
Deegan and Carroll, 1993). 
The desire to legitimise a company’s operations is a theory explaining voluntary social 
disclosures by many researchers (Deegan, 2002).  Many factors are attributable to the reporting 
decision and it is unlikely that one of the above motivations is the overwhelming reason for 
reporting voluntary employee-related information.  
The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) considers from a “public interest 
perspective” whether the costs of supplying specific information exceed the benefits gained from 
its production.  There is no generally accepted method for quantitatively measuring costs and 
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benefits of information presented in annual reports.  The costs of providing voluntary information 
are incurred, predominantly by reporting companies, but extend in various direct and indirect 
ways to the users of general-purpose financial reports.  There is no assurance that the costs are 
borne ultimately by those who receive the benefits (AASB, 2008).   
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The first objective of this thesis is to examine factors that determine the quantity and 
quality of voluntary employee-related disclosures in the annual reports of Australian publicly 
listed companies applying Ullmann’s stakeholder theory.  The second objective is to investigate 
the category type (for example, health and safety) and nature (for example, positive or negative) 
of the employee-related disclosures made by Australian companies within their annual reports.  
The final objective is to determine whether publicly listed companies choose to disclose 
employee-related information to legitimise their place in society as a result of former adverse 
publicity.  Legitimacy theory is integrated into this study as management’s attempt to manage any 
adverse relationships with stakeholders following adverse publicity. 
1.4 MOTIVATION  
This study explores the factors influencing Australian companies to make voluntary 
disclosures of employee-related information in their annual report.  The decision to focus on 
employee-related disclosures rather than social responsibility disclosures in general or one of the 
other categories of disclosure was made for a number of reasons.   
First, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) stress the importance of disclosing employee-related 
information as a governance mechanism for companies.  Employees and other stakeholders play 
an important role in contributing to the long-term success and performance of the company, while 
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governments establish the overall institutional and legal framework for corporate governance.  
The role of each of these participants and their interactions vary widely among OECD countries 
and non-OECD countries.   These relationships are subject to law and regulation, to voluntary 
adaptation and, most importantly, to market forces.  These organisations consider it important to 
recognise these vital stakeholders in their annual reports (GRI, 2002; OECD, 2004). 
Human resources are considered the most important element of a company's competitive 
advantage.  The community, employees and shareholders expect companies to manage and utilise 
human resources not only for the competitive advantage of a company and the public. These 
stakeholders expect companies to disclose information relating to the management of human 
resources in their annual reports (Subbarao and Zeghal, 1997). 
Limited research has been conducted identifying the nature, quantity and quality of 
employee-related disclosures for Australian listed companies.  In Australia, limited legal and 
professional requirements exist mandating social disclosures in annual reports (Deegan, 2000; 
Waddock and Smith, 2000; Whitehouse, 2003).  Employee-related disclosures by Australian 
companies are predominantly carried out on a voluntary basis, with the exception of mandatory 
information relating to employee benefits.  Apart from this requirement the Corporations Law, 
various Accounting Standards and the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) reporting 
requirements (Kent and Chan, 2009) do not command any other type of employee-related 
disclosures3
                                                 
3 There are several general reporting requirements that are relevant to the social environment. For example, “Australian 
companies are required to provide true and fair balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, and to disclose information about 
contingent liabilities and material after balance date events. Such requirements could relate to particular social issues 
associated with a company’s operations. The only specific corporate reporting requirement of an employee nature is that 
Australian companies must recognise a liability when an employee has provided service in exchange for employee benefits to 
be paid in the future, or to recognise an expense when the entity consumes the economic benefits arising from services 
provided by an employee in exchange for employee benefits” (Kent & Zunker, 2010). This requirement is embodied in 
AASB 119 “Employee Benefits” which became effective in April 2007. 
.  However, former studies indicate that Australian companies are continuing to 
provide voluntary employee-related information within their annual reports and the amount of 
disclosure is increasing over time (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Tilt, 2004; Trotman and Bradley, 
1981).   
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In 2006, a Federal Government enquiry into whether corporate social reporting (CSR) 
should be mandatory recommended that CSR remain voluntary and unregulated (The 
Commonwealth Government of Australia, 2006a).  The enquiry further concluded that the current 
Corporations Act gave directors adequate guidance for providing non-financial information such 
as employee related reporting by listed companies (The Commonwealth Government of Australia, 
2006b).  Thus corporate governance plays an important role in the provision of employee 
disclosures by Australian companies. 
Little attention has been given to the role of corporate governance systems, corporate 
mission statements, employee share ownership and union membership associated with voluntary 
employee related disclosures in annual reports despite the importance placed on employees by 
many companies. Several studies have examined eclectic aspects, policies and practices of 
employee disclosures in corporate social responsibility reports with researchers using various 
theoretical and methodological approaches (see Spence, Husillos and Correa-Ruiz, 2010, for an 
extensive critical literature review and Owen, 2008 for a critiqued overview of corporate social 
reporting). 
Deegan and Gordon (1996), Deegan and Rankin (1996), Deegan et al. (2002), Hackson 
and Milne (1996), Islam and Deegan (2008) and Kuasirikun and Sherer (2004) find employee-
related information to be more prevalent than any other category of social disclosure in annual 
reports.  However, a comprehensive study has not been undertaken to identify the nature, quantity 
and quality in Australia for a range of different sized companies despite the importance placed on 
these disclosures by the OECD and GRI. 
Finally, prior research in the social responsibility field has mostly been limited in 
distinguishing the various categories of social responsibility disclosures, other than environmental 
disclosures, and many have explained social responsibility disclosures generally (for example, 
Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Cowen et al., 1987; Menassa, 2010; Roberts, 1992; Sutantoputra, 
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2009).  The limited research on employee-related disclosures presented in recent times provides 
minimal information about the motives for companies to disclose employee information in their 
annual reports. 
An analysis of 970 Australian publicly listed companies as at 30 June 2004, indicated that 
67 per cent of companies are voluntarily disclosing employee-related information in their annual 
reports.  This outcome provides the rationale to better understand why companies are deciding to 
provide this information voluntarily and determine whether there are other factors (such as 
specific corporate governance practices) that influence the amount of information provided, the 
nature of the information and the impact that information has on the company and its 
stakeholders. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS 
Early studies into corporate social responsibility reporting have primarily taken a 
normative approach about how companies should behave and how their performance should be 
evaluated (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Pesqueux and Damak-Ayadi, 2005).  
The literature has since been enhanced by empirical studies that have examined the relationship 
between corporate social responsibility disclosure and numerous characteristics of the disclosing 
companies, such as profitability, industry membership, country of origin and culture, or size (see 
Cowen et al., 1987; Fassin, 2009; Fayers, 1998; Ingram, 1978; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Newson 
and Deegan, 2002; Spicer, 1978; Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Ullmann, 1985).  Capital market 
studies that examine the usefulness of corporate social responsibility disclosures have also been 
an area of interest (for example, Abhayawansa and Abeysekera, 2008; Buzby and Falk, 1978; 
Dierkes and Antal, 1985).  
The first contribution of the study is to extend corporate social responsibility accounting 
research by focusing on employee-related disclosures for all publicly listed companies in 
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Australia.  This is an important contribution due to human resources (employees) are considered 
one of the most important elements of a company’s competitive advantage and a crucial factor to 
the success, or failure, of a company’s operations over time.  The frequency, content and amount 
of disclosure found in annual reports are considered to be associated with the importance 
companies place on human resources (Vuontisjarvi, 2006).  
Voluntary employee-related disclosures have been given little attention in relevant 
literature despite the importance placed on this stakeholder group by many companies.  The field 
providing the most research regarding a company’s human resources is the intellectual capital 
domain.  Intellectual capital research examines structural capital and human capital.  Human 
capital is an intangible asset embedded in the company’s human resources, for example, 
employees and management (Rimmel, 2003).  Numerous researchers (see Eccles, Herz, Keegan 
and Philips, 2001; Lev, 2001; Mouritsen, Larsen, Buhk and Johansen, 2001) argue that demand 
for additional disclosure on intellectual capital is increasing.   
Cowen et al. (1987), Adams, Hill and Roberts (1995b), Deegan et al. (1995), Subbarao 
and Zeghal (1997), Christopher and Siu-Chung Kong (1998), Rimmel (2003) and Hossain et al. 
(2004)4
                                                 
4 See Appendix 3 for a list of the categories of employee disclosure used in past research. 
 are researchers who evaluate aspects of employee-related disclosures.  Cowen et al. 
(1987) analyse the relationships between independent corporate characteristics and various types 
of disclosure (for example, environment, energy, fair business practice, human resources, 
community involvement, products and other disclosures) for a relatively small US sample 
consisting of predominantly large companies.  Deegan et al. (1995) examine the practices and 
policies of large Australian companies in producing special purpose employee reports rather than 
the disclosures present in annual reports.  Christopher and Siu-Chung Kong (1998) study human 
resource-related disclosures made by small Australian mineral mining companies.  Rimmel’s 
(2003) research investigates the relationship between information, providers and users of human 
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resources disclosure in advanced annual reporting practices of two Swedish companies. Hossian 
et al. (2004) analyse the nature of voluntary disclosures on human resources in the annual reports 
of Bangladeshi companies.  The current study analyses voluntary employee-related disclosures for 
all publicly listed companies in Australia with a balance date of 30th June 2004. 
The study also provides descriptive material on the quantity and nature of voluntary 
employee-related disclosures in annual reports for Australian companies.  An understanding of the 
influences on voluntary disclosures can be useful in annual reporting and financial statement 
analysis by allowing the users of this information to make informed judgments as to the quality of 
the information produced (Heitzman et al., 2010; Kent and Chan, 2009; Schuster and O’Connell, 
2006).  
Third, the results of this study assist regulators when considering disclosure regulations, 
by centring their attention on the perceived inadequacies in the current social reporting 
framework.  The need to regulate employee-related disclosure is unnecessary if we find that 
companies are providing high quality disclosures voluntarily (Eng and Mak, 2003; Kent and 
Chan, 2009). 
Fourth, the study provides a measure of quality of employee-related disclosures and 
compares this with a measure of quantity of employee-related disclosures.  This measure is based 
on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) index, specifically, the “Labor Practices and Decent 
Work” indicators.  These indicators act as a dialogue between the company and its employees, 
and the degree to which employees are organised in representative bodies.  This measure of 
quality is important for future researchers when examining other social disclosures in annual 
reports in alternative regulatory frameworks. 
Finally, Ullmann’s three-dimensional framework is applied to the study to analyse 
stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance.  This application of stakeholder 
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theory has not been employed in this context before. 
1.6 DEFINING VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) defines the term ‘voluntary 
disclosure’, as “information, primarily outside the ????????? ???????????? ????? ???? ???? ???????????
required by accounting rules or standards”.  Recent guidelines provided by the FASB have 
recommended companies to make these disclosures in the Management Discussion and Analysis 
section of the annual reports (Boesso and Kumar, 2007).  
Depoers (2000, p.246) conveys that the concept of voluntary information has to be defined 
in relation to the right to information of one or numerous types of stakeholders: 
“An item of information is considered as discretionary whenever it goes beyond the compulsory 
information for shareholders. Compulsory information has to be understood as all the items whose 
publication is duly required but also the items which firms must send to shareholders who ask for 
them (for example, social reporting).  Whether its nature be qualitative, financial or anything else, 
voluntary disclosure covers all data which concern the subsidiaries and the group itself.”  
Voluntary information reported by Australian companies could include accounting and 
other information that managers consider to be significant and meet the needs of various 
stakeholder groups (Boesso, 2002; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995).  
1.7 ANNUAL REPORT AS THE MEDIUM OF DISCLOSURE 
Australian companies can choose to disclose information voluntarily through numerous 
media channels, with many empirical studies analysing the voluntary social disclosure framework 
by examining the incidence or content of the company’s annual reports, company websites, 
separate social, environmental, and special purpose employee reports (Brammer and Pavelin, 
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2004; Campbell, Moore and Shrives, 2006; Gray et al., 1995a, 1995b; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Hackson and Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002a; Robertson and Nicolson, 1996). 
This study focuses on annual reports as the source of employee-related disclosures for the 
following reasons.  First, all listed companies must produce an annual report and statutory 
auditors are required to ensure voluntary information is consistent with the audited financial 
reports, otherwise a modified opinion is given (Australian Government, Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board 2011; Kent and Zunker, 2010).  Second, companies have editorial control over 
the voluntary information published in their annual reports and are less susceptible to the potential 
risk of external media interpretations or falsification, possible through the popular press 
(Campbell, 2000; Guthrie and Parker, 1989).  Third, the annual report is the central source of 
corporate communications to investors and other stakeholders, and is widely used by companies 
for various voluntary social disclosures (Campbell, 2000; Rockness, 1985; Wiseman, 1982). 
Former social reporting research (Cowen et al., 1987; Freeman and Jaggi, 1986; Gray et 
al., 1995b; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 1990; Guthrie, Petty, Yongvanich and Ricceri, 2004; Neu et 
al., 1998; Roberts, 1992; Wiseman, 1982) extensively used the annual report as a major medium 
for communicating social (and environmental) information to the public.  The annual report 
presents a historical account of the activities of a company and its management’s perceptions, in a 
comprehensive and compact format (Niemark, 1995).  O'Donovan's (1999, p.82) data analysis 
suggested that “corporate management believe, to some extent, that the annual report is an 
effective way for informing and educating the public of the corporation's view about certain 
environmental (or social) issues''. 
1.8 ORGANISATION OF THESIS 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter One discusses the research proposal and 
provides an overview of the scholarly developments in social responsibility accounting that 
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encompasses this area of research.  It also summarises core concepts of the study and highlights 
the study’s contributions to knowledge.  Finally, motivations for conducting the research are 
outlined and definitions of terms predominantly used in this thesis are presented.  
Chapter Two reviews past research on corporate social responsibility reporting.  This 
incorporates a discussion on the debate as to the extent to which the company as an institution has 
social responsibilities beyond profit maximisation and an examination of the various conceptual 
frameworks that have been applied in the study of this area including stakeholder theory, 
legitimacy theory, social contract theory, political economic theory, institutional theory, and 
media agenda setting theory. 
Chapter Three explains the development of the hypotheses to be tested in this study, 
drawing on Ullmann’s three-dimensional model to explain the quantity and quality of voluntary 
employee-related disclosures in companies’ annual reports.  It also outlines the selection of the 
constructs to be implemented in the models and the related methodological issues are covered.    
Chapter Four reviews the research method including the sample selection, data collection 
process and measurement of the variables.  Chapter Five involves a discussion of the results and 
sensitivity analysis, and Chapter Six provides a discussion of the conclusions drawn from the 
results, acknowledges the limitations of the study and provides suggestions for further research. 
1.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presents an introduction to the thesis, the background of the research field, a 
brief explanation of important terms within the thesis, and the identification of the research issues 
and objectives.  The motivation driving the research and the contribution of the study are 
discussed with regards to theory, research, and practice.  An overview of the structure of the thesis 
concludes the chapter including a summary of the sections that follow.  The next chapter presents 
the literature pertinent to guiding these research issues. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Employee-related disclosures are one of the categories included in the field of social 
responsibility reporting.  This chapter reviews existing corporate social reporting theories and past 
research in corporate social responsibility and Ullmann’s stakeholder framework.  Prior research 
identifies companies’ motivation to provide employee-related disclosures and develops a 
theoretical framework to guide the exploration of the research issues.   
Several researchers (Gray, Owen and Adams, 1996; Deegan, 2002) apply stakeholder and 
legitimacy theories to explain how the social and environmental reporting practices of companies 
(for example, the disclosure of information in the annual report) respond to certain pressures 
being exerted by particular communities or stakeholder groups.  In addition to these theories, 
other complementary theories have also emerged in the social and environmental accounting 
literature.   
Social contract theory, political economy theory, institutional theory, and media agenda 
setting theory have all been applied to explain social and environmental reporting practices with 
agency and signalling theories also being considered as alternatives. 
This chapter provides an overview of these theories, as they are the basis for the 
examination of corporate social responsibility in subsequent chapters.  Social and political 
theories are the primary theories that are appropriate to the voluntary disclosure of employee-
related information, and are the key focus of this literature review. 
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2.2 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its simplest form contains information reported 
by companies concerning their activities and reporting about companies by third parties; 
information in the annual report and any other form of communication; public and private 
information; or information in any medium (whether it is financial, non-financial, quantitative or 
non-quantitative) (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bhattacharya, Korschun and Sen, 2009; Cormier and 
Magnan, 2010; Gray et al., 1995a).  The World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(2000) proposes a definition for corporate social responsibility as:  
“…the ethical behaviour of a company towards society … management acting responsibly in its 
relationships with other stakeholders who have a legitimate interest in the business.  CSR is the 
continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development 
while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local 
community and society at large” (pp. 2-3).  
For the purpose of this study, corporate social responsibility is viewed as an umbrella 
concept which includes corporate citizenship, corporate sustainability, stakeholder management, 
environmental management, business ethics, competitive advantage and corporate social 
performance.   
There are two distinct views regarding the concept of corporate social responsibility, 
extending from a traditional view of the firm (for example, Friedman, 1962) to a demand for a 
paradigm shift in corporate practice (for example, Carroll, 1991; Carroll, 1999; Dyllick and 
Hockerts, 2002).  However, all views on corporate social responsibility are based on the principle 
that there is a strategic approach to environmental and social issues (Lyon, 2004).  Therefore, 
corporate social responsibility incorporates corporate environmentalism (Dyllick and Hockerts, 
2002).  This leads to the current construct that corporate social responsibility includes any 
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initiative that reduces the environmental impact and/or contributes to the improvement of the 
social conditions beyond the company’s legal obligations (Roome and Wijen, 2006).   
A growing number of scholars take the view that companies are social institutions rather 
than private institutions (Chen et al., 2008; Davis, 1960; Deegan, 2002; Dennis, Neck and 
Goldsby, 1998; Filios, 1984; Frederick, Post and Davis, 1992; Freeman, 1984; Friedman and 
Miles, 2001; Gao and Zhang, 2006; Harrison and Freeman, 1999; Lodge, 1977; Ullmann, 1985) 
and benefits emerging from companies should be shared collectively amongst stakeholders.  This 
idea is similar to the stakeholder model (Freeman, 1984) and asserts that a company is responsible 
to its shareholders (owners) and all other stakeholders (for example, consumers, employees, 
creditors) whose contribution is necessary for a company’s success.  Thus, corporate social 
responsibility means that a company should be held accountable for any of its actions that affect 
people, communities and the environment in which those people or communities live (Frederick et 
al., 1992; Sutantoputra, 2009; De Villers and Van Staden, 2006).  
Stakeholder theory can be regarded as a further refinement of the neoclassical view of the 
firm (Freeman and Liedtka, 1991).  Based on empirical research, Clarkson’s (1995) stakeholder 
view of a company is a structure of primary stakeholder groups, a complex set of relationships 
between and amongst interest groups with different rights, objectives, expectations and 
responsibilities (Clarkson, 1995).  This pragmatic view of the firm indicates the complexity of 
stakeholder management.  
Stakeholder management practices include instrumental approaches that use stakeholder 
relationships strictly as a mechanism to maximise profits, compared to normative approaches, 
where basic principles determine how a company carries out it’s activities, particularly with 
respect to how they regard their stakeholders (Preble, 2005).  
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to explore the reasons behind companies 
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favouring economic objectives over the social objectives, it is understood that there is pressure 
from various interest groups for companies to recognise their responsibility to their investors and 
a broader group of people affected by their continued existence.  The company’s acceptance of its 
ethical and moral accountability to society, and acting on this accountability, is what advocates of 
corporate social responsibility broadly propose (Cragg, 2002). 
2.3 FUNDAMENTAL THEORIES 
Gray et al. (1995a) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on companies social 
(and environmental) disclosures and suggest that the motivations behind these disclosures can be 
classified into three broad theoretical perspectives: (1) studies concentrating on decision-
usefulness explanations, (2) studies derived from economic theory, and (3) those studies based on 
socio-political theories.  These theories interrelate in that they all suggest social disclosures are a 
significant strategic tool in the management of relationships between the company and 
stakeholder groups.  
According to the decision-usefulness approach, corporate disclosures are attempts to 
remove informational asymmetries between the company and external agents, primarily agents in 
the investment community (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004).  Empirical work that takes on this view 
attempts to evaluate the impact disclosures have on stock prices (for example, Shane and Spicer, 
1983; Wood and Jones, 1995), but with largely inconclusive results.  Economic approaches 
propose that social disclosures are used as preventative measures to reduce adverse regulatory or 
governmental pressures in the future.  Managers are motivated to make disclosures of this kind 
because the failure to do so reduces their discretion over future investment opportunities (Watts 
and Zimmermann, 1978; Shane and Spicer, 1983).  The socio-political approaches are those 
located “within a framework of assumptions about ‘political economy’” (Gray et al., 1995a, p. 
52). 
 Tamara Zunker    20 
The decision-usefulness approach (Dierkes and Antal, 1985) to investigating corporate 
social responsibility reporting has limitations.  This results from the theoretical problems with 
“decision-usefulness” itself (see Laughlin and Puxty, 1981).  The main difficulty has been that 
“interest in corporate social responsibility is not motivated predominantly by a concern with the 
needs, wants and whims of financial participants” (Gray et al., 1995a, p. 51) (see Booth, Moores 
and McNamara, 1987; Mathews, 1987; O’Donovan, 2002; Owen, Gray and Maunders, 1987). 
Several empirical studies (for example, Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; Ness and Mirza, 1991; 
Panchapakesan and McKinnon, 1992; Shane and Spicer, 1983; White, Lee and Tower, 2007) have 
directly sought to establish evidence for positive accounting theory as an explanation for 
corporate social responsibility disclosure.  Along with numerous other researchers, Gray et al. 
(1995a) believe the ‘agency theory’ and ‘positive accounting theory’ perspectives are less 
appropriate on the grounds of the underlying assumptions of the theoretical framework (see, for 
example, Ball and Foster, 1982; Puxty, 1986; Tinker, Merino and Neimark, 1982; Tinker and 
Puxty, 1995).    
2.3.1 STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
Stakeholder theory is used by researchers to explain motivations for companies to disclose 
social information.  Since the publication of Freeman’s (1984) work, the idea that companies have 
power over stakeholders has manifested in academic and professional literature.  Stakeholder 
theory suggests that a company’s management is expected to engage in activities that benefit 
specific groups or individuals (stakeholders) who can influence and who are affected by the 
achievement of a company’s objectives (Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Deegan, 2002).  
Stakeholder theory consists of the ethical and managerial branches (Deegan 2000; 2002).  
The ethical branch provides recommendations on how companies should treat their stakeholders.  
This theoretical view emphasises the responsibilities of organisations (see Donaldson and Preston, 
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1995; Freeman and Reed, 1983; Hasnas, 1998).  However, it does not have a direct role in 
predicting managerial behaviour.  By contrast, the managerial branch of stakeholder theory 
highlights the need to manage certain stakeholder groups.  These are predominantly those that are 
deemed to be “powerful'' due to their ability to control resources that are necessary to the 
company’s operations (Ullmann, 1985).   
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory is employed by numerous researchers to 
determine why companies produce social information (Guthrie et al., 2004; Islam and Deegan, 
2008; Reverte, 2009).  Under the managerial branch, the central hypothesis is that corporate social 
disclosure is a management tool for overseeing the information needs of the numerous stakeholder 
groups (Abeysekera, 2006).  Managers use this information to manage, or even manipulate, the 
most powerful stakeholders to gain their support (Gray et al., 1996).  Information is disclosed for 
strategic reasons, rather than on the basis of any perceived responsibilities.  Managers have an 
incentive to disclose information about their various programs and initiatives to particular 
stakeholder groups to indicate that they are conforming to stakeholders’ expectations.  
A stakeholder’s power to influence a company’s management is viewed as a function of 
the stakeholder’s degree of control over resources required by the company.  The greater the 
expectation that stakeholder demands are met, the more significant the stakeholder’s resources are 
to the ongoing success of the company (Gregoric and Debeljak, 2006).  A successful company is 
considered to be one that satisfies the demands of the various stakeholder groups, even if those 
requests are conflicting (Ullmann, 1985).  In exploring stakeholder theory and the role of 
information in managing the actions of significant stakeholders, Gray et al. (1996, p. 45) states:  
“ ... Information is a major element that can be employed by the organisation to manage the 
stakeholder in order to gain their support and approval, or to distract their opposition and 
disapproval. “ 
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Based on this perspective, companies react to the demands of employees when 
unemployment is very low or when there are health and safety issues that need to be addressed.  
Companies use the disclosure of this information as a strategy to gain or maintain the support of 
its powerful stakeholders (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006).  For example, if a powerful stakeholder 
group is concerned about the social performance of a company, that company publicly discloses 
information about social initiatives that it has, or plans to implement, to alleviate any concerns 
held by that particular stakeholder group. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) proposed a classification framework defining aspects of 
stakeholder theory as descriptive, instrumental, and normative.  The ‘descriptive’ branch of 
stakeholder theory explains the past, present, and future activities of companies and their 
stakeholders and generates predictive propositions associated with stakeholder management.  This 
element of theory is used to describe and even justify specific behaviours and characteristics of 
companies.  The ‘instrumental’ approach seeks to examine specific links between stakeholder 
management and company performance.  It explores how management encourages contributions 
from their stakeholders to accomplish the desired goals and objectives of the company.  The 
‘normative’ approach attempts to interpret the establishment of some underlying moral and 
philosophical principles.   
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that the normative aspect of the theory is 
fundamental and is related to categorical issues of what is positive and negative behaviour by 
corporate managers.  That is, there is a normative core in the stakeholder concept that can result in 
managers becoming sensitive to stakeholders' interests because it is morally right. 
FREEMAN’S STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 
Freeman (1984) established an innovative concept identified as the “stakeholder 
approach”, attributable to his belief that the existing theories of the “production view of the firm” 
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were inconsistent with the extent and the nature of changes that were occurring in the corporate 
environment during the 1980’s.  These changes shifted researchers’ focus away from the “family-
dominated business” and firms managed by owners, to non-owner firms that employed non-
family members as employees.  This identified the basic stakeholders as owners, employees, 
suppliers and customers.  In 1984, Freeman made it clear that the existing approaches emphasised 
the fixed nature of companies, and the predictive and relatively certain parts of a company’s 
external environment.  He suggested that a new conceptual framework was required which led to 
the development of the stakeholder view of the firm.  Specifically, Freeman suggested that 
companies should recognise their direct (primary) and indirect (secondary) stakeholders (Carroll, 
1979; Wood, 1991).   
Primary stakeholders are those characterised by high interdependence.  They are the major 
contributors to the company’s resources and without their cooperation or support the company 
cannot survive.  They are identified as the shareholders, creditors, government regulators, 
customers, suppliers and employees.  Secondary stakeholders are those who are not directly 
engaged in transactions with the company, and are not necessary for its survival, but may have the 
capacity to influence public opinion such as lobby groups, the media and other special interest 
groups (Clarkson, 1995). 
Freeman suggested that companies do a value analysis, meaning that a company should 
look for “congruency or fit” (Key, 1999, p. 320) between the company itself and its stakeholders.  
To achieve this, a company needs to distinguish what it is willing to support and defend (Freeman, 
1984).  It encompasses a complete management strategy that has no particular “value” rather than 
identifying traditional ethics.  Once identified and analysed for appropriateness, the key to 
managing stakeholder relationships is “utilitarianism” (Key, 1999).  Explicitly, a company must 
make compromises between its goals and the objectives of its stakeholders and identify the effects 
that stakeholders have on the company, or that the company has on its stakeholders.  Freeman 
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(1984) categorises these effects as economic, technological, social, political, and managerial.  He 
outlines the “stake” that stakeholders have in the company as either equity, economic, or 
influencer and the power that they possess as voting power, economic power, or political power 
(Key, 1999).  
Stakeholder theory has been applied to analytical and empirical analyses of the company 
and environment in which the company operates (Berman, Wicks, Kotha and Jones, 1999; 
Guthrie et al., 2004; Harrison and Freeman, 1999; Lo, 2010; Roberts, 1992; Ruf, Muralidhar, 
Brown, Janney and Paul, 2001; Ullmann, 1985).  Relatively few studies have applied this theory 
by utilising Ullmann’s three-dimensional model as the foundation of their research.  
ULLMANN'S FRAMEWORK  
Extending the stakeholder approach presented by Freeman (1984), Ullmann conducted 
extensive research into the area of corporate social responsibility reporting.  He established a 
three-dimensional framework of corporate social responsibility disclosure, which incorporated the 
elements of stakeholder power, strategic posture and the past and present economic performance 
of the company.  Table 2-1 summarises the results of studies leading up to Ullmann’s paper in 
1985.   
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TABLE 2-1 RESULTS OF STUDIES PRIOR TO ULLMANN  
Database/ 
Relationship  Moskowitz CEP 
Ernst & 
Ernst Other 
Social disclosure / 
Social 
Performance 
Bowman & Haire, 1975: + 
Preston, 1978: 0 
Ingram & Frazier, 1980: 0 
Freedman & Jaggi, 1982a: 0 
Wiseman, 1982: 0 
Rockness, 1985: 0 
Freedman & Wasley, 1990: 0 
Fekrat, Inclan & Petroni, 1996: 0 
Patten, 2002a: - 
Abbott & 
Monsen, 1979: + 
Fry & Hock, 1976: - 
Cowen et al., 1987: 0 
Patten, 1991: 0 
Roberts, 1992: + 
Brammer & Pavelin, 2004: + 
 
Social Disclosure / 
Economic 
Performance 
Mills & Gardner, 1984: + Shane & Spicer, 1983: + Preston, 1978, 
+Abbott & 
Monsen, 1979: + 
Anderson & 
Frankle, 1980: + 
Bowman & Haire, 1975: + 
Belkaoui, 1976: + 
Bowman, 1978: + 
Ingram, 1978: + 
Freedman & Jaggi, 1982a: 0 
Ingram & Frazier, 1983: 0 or - 
Jaggi & Freedman, 1985: + or – 
Social 
Performance / 
Economic 
Performance 
Moskowitz, 1972: + 
Vance, 1975: - 
Sturdivant & Ginter, 1977: 
+ 
Cochran & Wood, 1984: + 
Bragdon & Marlin, 1972: + 
Bowman & Haire, 1975: + 
Fogler & Nutt, 1975: 0 
Spicer, 1978a: + 
Spicer, 1978b: + 
Chen & Metcalf, 1980: 0 
 Parket & Eilbirt, 1975: + 
Vance, 1975: - 
Alexander & Buchholz, 1978: 0 
Kedia & Kuntz, 1981: 0 
Note: + positive correlation, - negative correlation, 0 no correlation. 
SOURCE:   ULLMANN (1985, P.542) 
Numerous studies have investigated the relationship between social disclosure, social 
performance, and economic performance, which were comprehensively examined by Ullmann 
(1985). 
Ullmann’s three-dimensional model partly explains the conflicting results regarding the 
correlations among social disclosure and social and economic performance (Ullmann, 1985).  He 
concluded that the inconsistent results were attributed to the lack of a comprehensive theory of 
corporate social responsibility.  Above all, he argued that the existing models were not fully 
specified because they failed to take into account the element of strategy by a company.  The 
fundamental principle of stakeholder theory is that companies use social disclosures as a means to 
manage their relationships with their stakeholders and the external environment (Ullmann, 1985).  
Ullmann’s framework is useful in explaining associations between social disclosures and 
performance, and economic performance.  He suggested that future research into this field should 
focus on a unifying theory of corporate social responsibility reporting, rather than controlling for 
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an increasing number of variables. 
(I)  STAKEHOLDER POWER 
The first dimension of Ullmann’s model, stakeholder power, is the underlying theoretical 
basis of the framework.  Although implied within legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory explicitly 
refers to matters of stakeholder power and how a stakeholder’s (for example, employee) relative 
power impacts their ability to persuade the company into complying with the stakeholder’s 
demands (Clarkson, 1995; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Roberts, 1992).  Stakeholder demands 
are more likely to be met when more stakeholder resources are deemed to be crucial to the 
ongoing success of the company.  Given that social responsibility activities are seen as an 
effective management strategy for dealing with stakeholders, then it is expected that stakeholder 
power is positively associated with social performance and social disclosure (Roberts, 1992).  
Ullmann proposes that companies with an active strategic posture make deliberate and conscious 
efforts to satisfy stakeholder demands through actual performance and disclosure of information 
about that performance when stakeholder power is high.  Demands of stakeholders are 
predominantly neglected when their stakeholder power is low. 
Within this approach, the accountability of companies extends beyond their ?? ancial and 
market performance.  It is expected, therefore, that companies choose to voluntarily disclose 
information about their stakeholder management efforts beyond mandatory requirements.  The 
more important the stakeholder resources are considered to the continued success of a company, 
the higher the expectations are that the company fulfils the needs of stakeholders and 
communicates it’s efforts through voluntary disclosures and other forms of reporting (Kent and 
Chan, 2009).   
An important issue is to identify the stakeholder groups that management wish to satisfy 
(see Freeman, 1994).  Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) developed a model of stakeholder 
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identification and salience based on stakeholders possessing one or more of the attributes of 
power, legitimacy, and urgency.  This theory produces a comprehensive typology of stakeholders 
based on the normative assumption that these variables define the field of stakeholders whom 
management consider to be important.  
(II)  STRATEGIC POSTURE 
The second dimension of Ullmann’s model is strategic posture.  This clarifies 
management’s reasons for responding to the demands of the stakeholders.  Strategic posture is 
considered to range from active or passive.  An active posture indicates that managers seek to 
influence, and continually monitor the company’s relationship with key stakeholders to achieve 
optimal levels of interdependence and pursue optimal stakeholder strategies (Ullmann, 1985).  For 
example, when management exercises an active strategic posture, and ????????? ???????????? ???
good, a high level of social disclosure is expected if those that demand this disclosure are 
powerful.  In this circumstance, management communicates its success across the entire 
performance spectrum (Ullmann, 1985).  This indicates they disclose more than is required by 
professional or regulatory authorities to promote extensively their social responsibility.  In 
contrast, a passive posture indicates a company fails to actively supervise and seek optimal 
stakeholder management strategies. 
(III)  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
The final dimension of Ullmann’s framework is the company's past and current economic 
performance.   
Economic performance is an important element in the model for two reasons.  First, it 
influences the relative importance of a social demand and determines the significance placed on 
the social demands by decision makers.  Economic demands have priority over social demands in 
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periods when companies have low profitability and high debt (Artiacha, Leea, Nelsonb and 
Walker, 2010; Ullmann, 1985).  Second, a company’s economic performance influences their 
financial capabilities to provide costly voluntary social disclosures to meet the demands of their 
stakeholders (Einhorn and Ziv, 2008; Magness, 2006). 
The cost of obtaining particular information may deter ‘inferior’ companies from 
disclosing this sort of information (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Neu et al., 1998).  Additionally, 
the potential litigation costs of non-disclosure could be higher for successful companies than for 
unsuccessful ones (Skinner, 1994).  
Numerous studies from the past 30 years report either no significant relationship or a 
negative relationship between environmental disclosure and environmental performance (see 
Wiseman, 1982; Rockness, 1985) or economic performance (see Patten, 1991, 1992, 2002a; 
Freedman and Jaggi, 1996; Hughes, Anderson and Golden, 2001).  As a result, Freedman and 
Jaggi (1996) concluded that environmental disclosures cannot be used as a proxy for 
environmental performance.  
Cowen et al. (1987) and Patten (1991) find no relationship to profit in the same period, but 
Roberts (1992) found that social disclosure was related to strong economic performance in the 
previous period when measured by growth in return on equity.  
Freedman and Jaggi (1992) find no long-term relationship between pollution performance 
and ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ver, Russo and Fouts (1997) find 
a positive association of environmental and ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
Freedman and Jaggi (1988) and Neu et al. (1998) find that large companies with lower ?????????
performance provide more social disclosures.  Alternatively, Cormier and Magnan (1999) find 
large companies with good ????????? ???????????? ????? ????? ???????????? ? These inconsistent 
findings and the uncertainty as to management’s objective is an avenue for continued research 
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(Gray et al., 1995a; Magness, 2006).   
Roberts (1992) presents empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that high 
stakeholder power, an active strategic posture, and good ????????????????????????????????????????
social disclosure.  Roberts applies Ullmann’s (1985) model to understand the determinants of 
corporate social responsibility disclosures in general using a disclosure index.  Roberts’ study did 
not differentiate between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, nor did it investigate potential 
interactions among variables.  Both are considered essential in the analysis, given Ullmann’s idea 
that management utilises voluntary disclosures as a way to shape stakeholder demands when 
????????????????????????????? 
Several previous studies have adopted Ullmann’s framework (Kent and Chan, 2009) and 
examined the environmental disclosures from top listed companies.  Kent and Chan (2009) 
evaluated the content of the annual reports for 1995.  They regressed the quality and quantity of 
environmental disclosures against the variables chosen using Ullmann’s three-dimensional 
framework and found numerous support for power and posture, but not past or present economic 
performance.  Their findings enhance our knowledge on how Australian companies manage their 
stakeholders using environmental disclosures.  
Elijido-Ten (2005) used stakeholder theory to examine the determinants of environmental 
disclosures in Malaysian companies.  The regulatory framework in Malaysia has no mandatory 
environmental reporting and the companies’ environmental performance is kept confidential.  The 
findings suggest that the main determinants in providing environmental disclosures is the level of 
environmental concern by top management (a measure of strategic posture) and the government’s 
power to sanction companies (a measure of stakeholder power).  Measures of economic 
performance show no significant relation with the level of environmental disclosure. 
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2.3.2 LEGITIMACY THEORY 
Legitimacy theory is perhaps the most widely used theory to explain environmental and 
social disclosures (see for example, Adams et al., 1998; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989; Milne and Patten, 2002; O'Donovan, 2002; O'Dwyer, 2002; Patten, 1991; 
Wilmhurst and Frost, 2000).  Although other theories are used to explain social disclosure, it 
appears that legitimacy theory has become the dominant explanatory theory in this domain 
(Deegan, 2000).   
Legitimacy theory, regarded as a systems-oriented theory, is closely associated with 
stakeholder theory and political economy theory (Deegan, 2002).  Within a systems-oriented 
perspective, the company is influenced by the society in which it operates.  Corporate disclosure 
policies are considered to represent one important method by which management can influence 
external perceptions about their company’s activities (Deegan et al., 2002; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Woodward, Edwards and Birkin, 2001).  In relation to legitimacy, these strategies include 
directed disclosures, and controlling or working in partnerships with other companies that are 
considered to be legitimate (Fiedler and Deegan, 2002). 
Legitimacy theory is derived from the concept that companies operate in society by means 
of a “social contract” where they seek to satisfy their stakeholders by behaving in a socially 
desirable manner (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Donaldson, 1982; Shocker and Sethi, 1974).  By 
providing relevant and reliable social information companies anticipate that society approves their 
objectives, other incentives, and ultimately their survival (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989).  The social contract is used to represent the large number of expectations that 
society has on how the company should conduct its operations.  These expectations from society 
are not fixed, but change over time.  This compels the company to be more responsive to the 
setting in which it operates (Deegan, 2000).  Historically, legitimacy theory assumes that 
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companies disclose information as a reaction to various economic, social, political, and 
environmental factors, and that these disclosures legitimise the company’s actions (Brown and 
Deegan, 1998; Buhr, 1998; Kotonen, 2009; Lindblom, 1983; Neu et al., 1998; Shocker and Sethi, 
1974).  
Lindblom (1994) distinguishes between legitimacy, which is considered to be a status or 
condition, and legitimation, which she considers to be the process that leads to a company being 
deemed legitimate.  “Threats” to a company’s perceived legitimacy are predicted to lead to 
responsive actions by management who endeavour to minimise the impacts of these legitimacy 
threats.  Within this theory, “legitimacy” is considered to be a resource on which a company is 
dependent for survival (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, O’Donovan, 2002).  It is something that is 
conferred upon the company by society and is something that is desired or sought by the 
company.  However, unlike many other “resources”, it is a resource that the company is 
considered to be able to impact or manipulate through various disclosure-related strategies 
(Woodward, Edwards and Birkin, 1996).  
The insights provided by legitimacy theory suggest that the company must be responsive 
to changing expectations.  Legitimacy theory predicts that when managers perceive that a 
legitimacy gap exists they implement different legitimation strategies (Lindblom, 1994).  First, 
the company seeks to educate and inform its “relevant publics” about changes in the company’s 
performance and social activities.  This response arises when a “legitimacy gap” has developed 
from the poor performance of the company.  Second, the company aims to change the perceptions 
society has of their behaviour rather than the behaviour itself.  This strategy is in response to the 
legitimacy gap that occurs through misperceptions of the stakeholders (Deegan and Blomquist, 
2006).  Third, the company seeks to influence perception by deflecting attention from the issue of 
concern to other related issues through an appeal to, for example, emotive symbols (Brown and 
Deegan, 1998).  This strategy is chosen on the grounds of manipulation.  For example, a company 
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with a legitimacy gap regarding its employee health and safety potentially ignores the problem 
and instead becomes involved in staff activities that promote the company as a socially 
responsible employer.  Fourth, the company seeks to change external expectations of its 
performance.  This strategy is chosen when the company considers that society has unrealistic or 
inaccurate expectations of its responsibilities.  
 Numerous studies have embraced legitimacy theory as the foundation of their 
investigation into the motivations of corporate managers to make social disclosures.  Guthrie and 
Parker (1989) sought to match the disclosure practices of BHP across the period 1885-1985 with a 
historical account of major events relating to BHP.  The argument was that if corporate disclosure 
policies are reactive to major social and environmental events, correspondence should exist 
between points of disclosure and events that are significant in BHP’s history.  Although their 
paper did not provide strong evidence supportive of legitimacy theory, a large number of 
subsequent research studies have used and refined their arguments (see Boesso and Kumar, 2007; 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; Deegan et al., 2002; 
Epstein and Freedman, 1994; Tsang, 1998).  The result has been that corporate social and 
environmental disclosure strategies have been linked to legitimising objectives.  
Deegan (2002) expanded Guthrie and Parker (1989) by investigating the social and 
environmental disclosure policies of BHP for the years 1983-1997.  He investigated whether the 
extent of community concern relating to particular issues associated with BHP’s operations in turn 
extracts certain disclosure reactions from the company.  The measure of “community concern” 
used by Deegan is based on the extent of media attention given to particular issues.  The 
underlying proposition is that changes in social concerns, reflected by changes in terms of print 
media articles, are imitated by changes in the social and environmental matters disclosed and by 
the extent of the disclosure being made.  Supportive of legitimacy theory, the findings show that 
those issues that attracted the largest amount of media attention were also those issues that were 
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associated with the greatest amount of annual report disclosures.  These results provide support to 
legitimation objectives for a company’s social disclosures and also support O’Donovan’s (1999; 
2002) conclusions that managers make annual report disclosures in response to media coverage.  
Deegan et al. (2000) conducted a study indicating companies operating in industries that 
experienced major social incidents provided more social information in their annual reports than 
they did prior to the incident’s occurrence.  These results support the notion that companies utilise 
their annual report as a way of influencing society's perception of their operations and as a means 
of legitimising their ongoing existence (Deegan et al., 2000).  This emphasises the importance of 
companies acting in a manner deemed by the public as socially acceptable behaviour 
(O’Donovan, 2002).  Companies lose their freedom to operate in society by disregarding society’s 
norms and expectations (Kent and Monem, 2008). 
Yongvanich and Guthrie (2007) developed an “extended performance reporting 
framework” which integrates reporting of intellectual capital and environmental and social 
performance elements into a single framework.  Their study employed the framework to analyse 
the voluntary reporting practices of a group of companies in the Australian mining industry.  They 
examined the presence of disclosure, and also the information that companies chose not to report 
in the absence of disclosure.  Legitimacy theory was considered as an explanation for the 
reporting practices observed.  
Other studies directly rely on insights provided by corporate managers or recipients of 
corporate disclosures (Milne and Patten, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2002).  These papers 
are significant in that they indicate an alternative approach to testing corporate motivations.  The 
direct questioning of managers for the purposes of testing legitimacy theory had previously only 
been undertaken by a limited number of researchers (Buhr, 1998; O’Donovan, 1999).  The studies 
by O’Donovan (2002) and Milne and Patten (2002) produce findings that are generally supportive 
of legitimacy theory in explaining annual report social disclosure practices. 
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O’Donovan (2002) explicitly recognises that manager’s legitimising strategies differ 
depending upon whether they are trying to “gain, maintain, or repair” the legitimacy of their 
company.  This can be compared to other studies that only investigate management responses to 
perceived legitimacy threats (O’Dwyer, 2002).  Given the lack of research into corporate 
strategies for acquiring and sustaining legitimacy, O’Donovan (2002) represents an important 
contribution to the literature.  He explains that maintaining legitimacy is expected to be easier 
than gaining or repairing it and recognises that different companies have different “levels” of 
legitimacy to maintain.  Companies that have greater needs to maintain their legitimacy have 
greater reliance on legitimacy for commercial purposes.  Disclosure reactions are also found to 
differ depending upon whether the action was necessary to gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy.  
O’Donovan concentrates on managers’ reactions to particular events using survey responses, 
however there is very little evidence about whether legitimising strategies actually change 
attitudes about an organisation.  
Milne and Patten (2002) investigate the function environmental disclosures play in 
generating a legitimating effect on investors within the chemical industry.  They used an 
experimental investment scenario case, asking a sample of American practicing accountants how 
they would allocate funds across two fictitious chemical companies.  The allocations were made 
under a short and long-term timeline where the disclosures for the companies were manipulated 
so that the poorer social performer had substantially greater exposure than the better performer.  
Results indicated that under the long-term scenario significantly fewer investment funds were 
allocated to the poorer social performer.  Environmental concerns played a major role in the 
decision for the majority of the participants.  Under the short-term scenario the participants 
interpreted higher environmental exposure as a signal of greater risk, therefore allocating more 
funds to the better performer.  This suggests that for long-term investment settings the utilisation 
of legitimising disclosures is a beneficial strategy for companies with other exposures. 
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Evidence also shows that managerial objectives for undertaking legitimising actions are 
dependent upon various contexts that influence the level of public exposure and public 
responsibility attached to a company.  Clarke and Gibson-Sweet (1999) propose that corporate 
disclosure policies are better described as ongoing means of reinforcing corporate legitimacy 
rather than as a crisis management tool.  They demonstrate empirically that managers of larger 
companies, in industries with a high public profile, were inclined to use their annual reports to 
capitalise on their investments in the community by making more disclosures (Adler and Milne, 
1997; Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Gray et al., 1995a, b).  Consistent 
with this, Toms (2000) shows empirically that larger companies from politically sensitive 
industries disclose higher quality information.   
2.3.3 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
Social contract theory, considered a normative theory of business, is closely related to 
stakeholder, legitimacy and political economy theories (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994; Hasnas, 
1998; Moir, 2001).  However, in its most widely accepted form, social contract theory proposes 
that all companies are morally obliged to look after the interests of society by satisfying the 
stakeholders (for example, employee) interests without breach of any general laws of justice 
(Hasnas, 1998).  Social contract theory is based on the traditional concept of a social contract, an 
implicit agreement between society and a company, where society acknowledges the existence of 
the company on the condition that it acts in society’s best interests (Deegan et al., 2002; Shocker 
and Sethi, 1974).  
Gray et al. (1996) suggest that legal requirements provide the explicit terms of the 
contract, while other unregulated societal expectations represent the implicit terms of the contract, 
where companies are provided with the right to exist in return for certain stakeholder benefits.  It 
is expected that management’s perceptions differ greatly in relation to the arrangement of the 
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implicit terms of the “contract”.   
In the corporate social responsibility framework a competing view is that companies will 
perform in a responsible manner because that is how society expects the company to operate.  
Contemporary versions of social contract theory attempt to show that individual and social group 
rights are established on mutually beneficial agreements that are made between members of 
society (Rawls, 1999).  For example, legal restrictions may be imposed, access to financial and 
human resources may be restricted, and demand for products or services can be reduced.  A 
company loses the power to own and use natural resources and to hire employees when the 
stakeholders perceive that a company’s cost is greater than its benefits to society and this 
threatens company survival.  Companies are deemed to achieve greater financial success when 
they manage to successfully communicate that they are acting in accordance with the terms of the 
social contract and contributing more benefits than harm to society.  There is empirical evidence 
that demonstrates that investors are willing to pay a premium for socially responsible corporate 
behaviour (Toms, 2000).   
Hasnas (1998) illustrates that the social contract needs to satisfy the ‘social welfare term’ 
and the ‘justice term’.  The social welfare term acknowledges that society is willing to authorise 
the existence of companies, as long as they receive benefits from the outcome.  Employees can 
benefit from the existence of companies by receiving increased income potential, diffused 
personal legal liability for harmful errors, and the ability to participate in income-allocation 
schemes detached from the unexpected changes of their capacity to produce.  However, 
companies can also have negative effects on their stakeholders (for example, employees).  
Employee’s interests can be harmed when they are separated from the product of their labour, 
suffer from poor working conditions, and are subjected to tedious and de-humanising working 
environments.  These represent the benefits that companies can provide to society and costs that 
companies can impose upon society.  Therefore, the social welfare term of the social contract 
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requires that companies act in a way that benefits employees by increasing their income potential, 
diffusing their personal liability, and facilitating their income allocation.  This is implemented by 
minimising the misuse of political power, worker alienation, lack of control over working 
conditions, and de-humanisation (Hasnas, 1998; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010).  
The justice term recognises that the stakeholders are willing to authorise the existence of 
companies only if companies agree to remain within the general laws of justice.  However, there 
seems to be general agreement that the least they require is that companies avoid fraud and 
deception, show respect for their workers as human beings, and avoid any practice that 
systematically disadvantages the situation of a given group in society (Donaldson, 1989).  In 
general, social contract theory supposes that managers are ethically obligated to abide by the 
social welfare and justice terms of the social contract (Campbell, 2007; Davis, 1973; Hasnas, 
1998; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001).  These terms impose significant social responsibilities on 
the management of companies.  
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) develop ‘Integrated Social Contracts Theory’ as a way for 
managers to make decisions from a moral perspective.  They differentiate between macro-social 
contracts and micro-social contracts.  A macro-social contract in the societal framework is an 
expectation that companies provide some level of support to its stakeholders and the specific form 
of contribution is the micro-social contract.  Therefore, companies that embrace the view of social 
contracts describe their contribution as part of ‘societal expectation’.  However, whilst this 
explains the initial motivation, it might not explain their total involvement.  One of the benefits 
that were identified in the Australian study (CCPA, 2000) was described as ‘license to operate’.  
This might be regarded as part of the commercial benefit of enhanced reputation but also links to 
gaining and maintaining legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).  
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2.3.4 POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY 
Political economy theory provides another interesting and insightful theoretical 
perspective explaining social responsibility reports from social and political theory.  Gray et al 
(1996, p. 47) defines the “political economy” as “the social, political and economic framework 
within which human life takes place''.  Political economy theory clearly recognises the variance in 
power that exists within society and the conflict that transpires between numerous stakeholder 
groups.  The notion embraced in political economy theory and legitimacy theory is that society, 
politics, and economics are closely related and financial issues cannot be examined without 
considering the political, social and institutional framework in which the company operates 
(Deegan, 2002).  Political economy theory provides researchers with a better understanding of the 
issues that impact how a company functions and the type of information it chooses to disclose.   
Therefore, the economic domain cannot be studied in isolation from the political, social, 
and institutional framework within which the economic activity occurs (Abeysekera and Guthrie, 
2005; Deegan, 2002).  This idea appears to be an appropriate way of thinking about voluntary 
social disclosure by companies (Benston, 1982a).  Corporate social responsibility is generally 
predicated on acknowledgment that the economic (or financial) domain is only one element of 
corporate existence and this needs to be supplemented by or associated with recognition of the 
social and political environment (Deegan, 2002).  
In contrast to legitimacy theory, political economy theory argues that companies provide 
disclosure in a manner that sets and shapes the agenda of the social contract, in order to mediate, 
suppress, mystify, and transform the conflict between the company and its social, economic, and 
political environment (Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Tinker and Neimark, 1987).  
Empirical research performed by Guthrie and Parker (1990) and Tinker and Neimark 
(1987) that examines political economy theory (Arnold, 1990; Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, 
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Hughes and Nahaplet, 1980; Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Tinker, 1980) concludes that the annual 
report is a key tool used to publicise a company’s principles on social, economic, and political 
areas.  Whether by actively disclosing information (Adams and Harte, 1998; Neimark, 1992), by 
choosing not to disclose certain information (Chwastiak and Young, 2003), or by using carefully 
worded phrases the annual report legitimises actions that are coordinated from a position of power 
(Tinker and Neimark, 1987).  Social disclosures legitimise companies’ productivity, processes and 
objectives, as well as the economic, social, and political system as a whole (Gray et al., 1995a; 
Gray et al., 1996).  Therefore, when researchers analyse a company’s conduct, specifically when 
they exhibit how companies are seeking to inform, educate or manipulate society using social 
disclosure information, they could be identifying strategies with a broader influence.  This has not 
been explicitly considered in previous social disclosure studies (Archel, Husillos, Larrinaga and 
Spence, 2009).  
Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) make note of the political economic theory perspective in 
their intellectual capital disclosure study of Sri Lanka.  They report that their results differed from 
the findings on social and environmental disclosure in other countries (Hughes et al., 2001) and 
intellectual capital disclosure in other studies.  They conclude that external capital is associated 
with a greater level of disclosure than human capital (Guthrie, 1999; Guthrie, Petty, Ferrier and 
Wells, 1999; Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Hughes et al., 2001).  Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) 
explain that different user groups do not exert any pressure on companies to disclose intellectual 
capital information, as they are not mandated by accounting standards, company law, or other 
regulatory requirements.  Rather, it is in the company’s own interest to disclose this information 
to stakeholders to improve the perceived value of the company.   
Political economic theory appears to provide a more appropriate way of evaluating 
intellectual capital disclosure.  It establishes more extensive, systematic factors into the 
interpretation and justification of intellectual capital disclosure; therefore expanding the 
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researcher’s focus of investigation and introducing this area of research in its broader socio-
economic and political framework (Abeysekera, 2006). 
2.3.5 INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Reflecting the overlapping nature of many theories, the idea of legitimacy is also essential 
to institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Companies change their structure or 
operations to conform to external expectations about what forms or structures are satisfactory.  
Many other companies in an industry have clear governance structures in place and there is likely 
to be “institutional” pressure on a company to also have these structures.  Specifically, there is 
expected to be some form of movement towards ‘conformance’ with other respectable companies 
(Deegan, 2002; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Neville and Menguc, 2006).  
Institutional theory is used to explain existing corporate structures and has been used to 
show that particular operating or reporting policies and structures are employed because of 
pressures from stakeholders who expect to see particular practices in place.  It is also used to 
explain why there is often a degree of association between the institutional practices used within 
different companies (Islam and Deegan, 2008). 
Threats to a company’s survival arise if they fail to undertake this process leading to 
equality, referred to as “isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Two types of isomorphism 
are ‘competitive’ and ‘institutional’.  Companies compete for resources and customers, as well as 
political power and institutional legitimacy, creating greater social and economic capabilities.   
Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman (2004, p. 509) explain that “isomorphism refers to the 
adaptation of an institutional practice by an organisation”.  Companies become more 
homogeneous in structure, environment, and behavioural focus when there is a greater 
dependence between companies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
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The view provided by institutional theory implies that companies are persuaded into 
adopting and maintaining certain practices, including specific reporting practices, by their 
powerful stakeholders.  The apparent adoption of these practices is deemed to provide a company 
with a level of legitimacy that would not otherwise be available if it was to deviate from 
“accepted” corporate structures or policies (Islam and Deegan, 2008). 
Institutionalism, particularly in industries with high levels of cohesiveness, suggests high 
levels of conformity and imitating behaviour leading to isomorphism.  Consequently, within the 
chemicals, oil, and mining industries it is expected that there is less variability in social (and 
environmental) narratives than other industries.  Companies that adopt initiatives and rituals to 
seek legitimacy, as institutionalism predicts, are likely to be similar and consequently this should 
be reflected in corporate communications such as corporate social reports.  Therefore, institutional 
theory provides a basis to examine the nature of corporate messages, the extent to which they 
reflect corporate adaptations, and the extent to which such adaptations approach conformity in 
certain industries (Milne and Patten, 2002). 
Another viewpoint on legitimation emphasises its institutional nature (Suchman, 1995).  
Institutionalists (for example, Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Meyer and Scott, 1983) have a tendency to “downplay” managerial agency and manager-
stakeholder conflict.  In a powerful and confining environment a manager’s decisions are often 
built on the same belief systems that determine stakeholder’s reactions.  Subsequently, rather than 
investigating the strategic legitimation efforts of specific companies, institutionalists highlight the 
entire group (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or entire fields or sectors of corporate life (Suchman, 
1995). 
Much management behaviour, including attempts to legitimise, are controlled by 
institutional pressures rather than managers.  This produces a lack of flexibility and create 
tendencies towards isomorphism within the corporate field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
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However, these pressures may be subtle and pervasive, yet powerful myths of why companies 
ought to exist and how they ought to behave.  Consequently actions and decisions, including 
ceremonies and rituals, may occur with little awareness (Milne and Patten, 2002).   
Limited research has explored whether institutional conditions affect the desire for 
companies to behave in socially responsible ways (Campbell, 2007; Ullmann, 1985).  Waddock 
and Graves (1997) find that an increase in corporate financial performance is positively associated 
with an increase in corporate social responsibility.  Their analysis features a refined 
multidimensional measure of corporate social responsibility.  The independent variables included 
in their analysis, other than measures of corporate financial performance, are company size, 
management’s risk tolerance, and type of industry.  Most studies of the determinants of corporate 
social responsibility examine the effects of various aspects of corporate financial performance but 
little else (for example, Brown and Perry, 1994; Fry, Keim, and Meiners, 1982). 
2.4 SUPPLEMENTARY THEORIES 
Social and political theories (such as stakeholder, legitimacy, social contract and political 
economy) are more extensively used to explain social disclosures than any other set of theories 
(see for example Adams et al., 1998; Clarkson, 1995; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Milne and Patten, 2002; O'Donovan, 2002; O'Dwyer, 
2002; Patten, 1992; Roberts, 1992; Wilmhurst and Frost, 2000).  However, there are numerous 
other theories that can be employed and have been previously used to explain social disclosure.  
They are useful in interpreting incentive employee-related disclosures and are referred to in the 
following section. 
2.4.1 MEDIA AGENDA SETTING THEORY 
Within the legitimacy theory framework, the quantity and quality of social information 
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disclosed is expected to change as a result of the degree of public scrutiny of the company 
(Edelman 1990; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Lee, 2008).  Media agenda setting theory suggests 
a relationship between the relative emphasis given by the media to different topics and the degree 
of importance these topics have for society (Ader, 1995).  Increased media attention is believed to 
lead to increased community concern for a particular issue.  The media are not seen as mirroring 
public priorities, but as shaping them (Brown and Deegan, 1998).  
The intensity of the media coverage is also found to affect the probability that particular 
media coverage impacts the public agenda, although it is not clear what extent of coverage is 
required before an agenda-setting effect is formed (Brosius and Kepplinger, 1990).  The way in 
which the media covers the issue can also affect the likelihood of whether it impacts public 
attitudes.  Dearing and Rogers (1996) establish that an issue presented in a negative light is more 
likely to be regarded by the community as an important concern.  That is, negative media attention 
is more likely to have an effect on the public's salience for a particular issue relative to positive, or 
favourable, attention (Deegan et al., 2002).  
The importance that the public assign to an issue is influenced by the amount of media 
attention it receives (for example, see Ader, 1995; Funkhouser, 1973; McCombs and Shaw, 1972).  
Public concern for an issue increases with the number of media articles between “takeoff'' and 
“tapering'' thresholds.  A certain “critical'' number of articles are required to move an issue to one 
of public concern and the pattern of evolving public awareness varies for different types of issues 
(Neuman, 1990).  The response function varies according to the issue covered, however there is 
consistent evidence of a relationship between the volume of media coverage and the level of 
public concern.  To this point, a shifting pattern of social disclosures across companies, and time, 
has been displayed (for example, see Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Guthrie, 1982; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1990; Pang, 1982).  It is likely that the company undertakes steps to demonstrate its 
legitimacy and relevance to society and so avoid potential limitations and/or penalties when 
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management perceive that, in the opinion of the “relevant publics”, the company is not meeting its 
“social contract” with society.  Research has shown that management consider that the media can 
influence community concern and that management uses the annual report to counteract 
unfavourable media coverage (O'Donovan, 1999).  
 Therefore, media agenda setting theory has its inherent limitations, in that “there is a 
possibility that dominant players strategically plan the timing and format of their disclosures in a 
bid to manipulate or shape community perceptions and concerns” (Brown and Deegan, 1998, 
p.33).  This appears to do nothing more than admit the possibility that political economy theory 
(Guthrie and Parker, 1990) represents the more correct interpretation.  The problem with media 
agenda setting theory is its extremely limited orientation, in that it does not consider alternative 
perspectives of corporate social responsibility.  Thus, media agenda setting theory and 
organisational legitimacy are clearly perceived, not as alternatives, but rather as complementary 
theories. 
Research indicates that the media influences the public's perceived salience for issues 
(Smith, 1987; Brosius and Kepplinger, 1990; Ader, 1995), and that the media agenda typically 
precedes public concern for particular issues (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Funkhouser, 1973; 
Trumbo, 1995; Neuman, 1990).  Research also shows that public concerns and the media agenda 
are not necessarily reflective of “real world'' conditions (Funkhouser, 1973; Ader, 1995).  For 
example, Ader (1995) finds that the amount of media attention devoted to pollution influenced the 
degree of public salience for the issue, but the “real-world'' pollution indicator was negatively 
correlated with the amount of media coverage.   
A review of the literature suggests that a number of variables mediate the relationship 
between media activity and public salience of an issue.  These variables include the obtrusiveness 
of issues, how the issue is framed (positive or negative), and associated time lags.  Brown and 
Deegan (1998) provided a theoretical link between legitimacy theory and the media agenda 
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setting theory with reference to environmental disclosure.  They propose that increased media 
attention is expected to increase public concern for an issue.  Consequently, it could be said that 
the print media can influence public perceptions and create a legitimacy gap.  Their study also 
establishes that the level of environmental disclosure is associated with the level of print media 
coverage given to the environmental implications of the industries and the level of negative print 
media coverage of their environmental impacts. 
Bewley and Li (2000) produced comparable results.  However, instead of considering the 
media coverage within industries, as in Brown and Deegan (1998), the media coverage of the 
environmental consequences of particular companies could be deemed a warning for its particular 
legitimacy gap and, possibly, be more closely related to the managers’ decision to disclose 
environmental information.  
Deegan (2000) looked at whether the degree of media attention given to certain issues 
associated with BHP’s operations eliminates certain disclosure reactions from the company.  The 
underlying principle is that changes in societal concerns, (indicated by changes in terms of print 
media articles), are emulated by changes in the social and environmental matters disclosed, and by 
the extent of the disclosure being made.  Supportive of legitimacy theory, the results demonstrate 
that issues that attracted the largest amount of media publicity were those that were associated 
with the greatest amount of annual report disclosures.  These conclusions support O’Donovan’s 
(1999) findings that managers make annual report disclosures in response to media coverage.  
Prior research has attributed increased social disclosures of companies to general adverse 
media attention or unfavourable publicity due to a significant social event.  A company that has 
adverse media publicity because of its socially unacceptable behaviour is considered to have lost 
its social legitimacy.  This is a rational conclusion because media companies themselves face 
litigation risk and the risk of reputation damage if their publicity is based on false evidence 
(O’Donovan, 2002; Kent and Monem, 2008).  Consequently, adverse media publicity is likely to 
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pressure a company to make specific disclosures to eliminate the impacts of unfavourable 
information available to the public.  Essentially, a company that is perceived to be socially 
undesirable is likely to appear as though they are confessing to negative social activities present in 
their company by disclosing an increased amount of employee information in their annual reports.  
These disclosures aim to create a positive representation of the company that appears to be an 
appropriate strategy because there has been a global increase in public awareness of the adverse 
social impacts of business operations (Kent and Monem, 2008).   
2.4.2 INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
The academic and business literature during the past decade has recognised the growing 
importance of intellectual capital.  However, little progress has been made in accounting for 
intellectual capital in the financial statements of companies (Guthrie and Yongvanich, 2004; 
IFAC, 1998; Kannan and Aulbur, 2004; Lev, 2001).  Academics, standard setting bodies, and the 
corporate community have proposed that traditional accounting standards are inadequate to 
account for intellectual capital.  Accordingly, reporting on intellectual capital has been 
predominantly to account for disclosures in the annual reports of companies (Sonnier, 2008). 
Guthrie and Petty (2000) conducted a cross-sectional content-analysis study of intellectual 
capital reporting practices across Australia’s 20 largest companies and find that reported 
intellectual capital was inconsistently reported.  Their study concludes that there is no established 
and mutually agreed framework for reporting intellectual capital by large Australian companies or 
from the accounting profession.  This lack of consistency in reporting frameworks by Australian 
companies presents a challenge for organisations considering embarking on intellectual capital 
reporting.   
In similar international studies, Bontis (2003a) finds limited reporting of intellectual 
capital from an analysis of 10,000 annual reports in Canada.  Other studies utilising content 
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analysis methods also find corresponding low levels of intellectual capital reporting (Brennan, 
2001; April, Bosma and Deglon, 2003; Ordonez de Pablos, 2003) confirming that this is not a 
phenomenon unique to the Australian reporting environment.  
2.5 CHOICE OF THEORIES 
A shift has occurred by some researchers to use more than one theory to provide an 
explanation for particular managerial actions (Fiedler and Deegan, 2002) because of an overlap 
between a number of theories, and because they provide slightly different and useful insights.  It 
should be noted that a number of theories have been given the broad label of stakeholder theory.  
As Deegan (2000) explains, there is a “normative branch” of stakeholder theory, and a 
“managerial branch”.  The normative branch provides prescriptions in terms of how organisations 
should treat their stakeholders.  This theoretical view emphasises the responsibilities of 
organisations (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman and Reed, 1983; Hasnas, 1998).   
A considerable amount of overlap exists between the managerial branch of stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory.  Gray et al. (1995a; 1995b) state that the different theoretical 
perspectives, namely legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, should not be seen as competitors 
for explaining social disclosure, but as resources to use to interpret the various factors at different 
levels.   Consequently, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory enhance, rather than compete for, 
researcher’s understanding of corporate social disclosure practices. 
As Deegan (2002) reveals, stakeholder and legitimacy theories perceive the company to be 
part of a broader social system where the company affects, and is influenced by, particular groups 
in society.  Although legitimacy theory reviews the expectations of society, stakeholder theory 
provides a more sophisticated solution by referring to the power of specific ‘stakeholder’ groups 
within society.  Fundamentally, stakeholder theory recognises that stakeholder groups have 
different views about how a company should carry out its operations.  Therefore, there is a range 
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of social contracts ‘negotiated’ with different stakeholder groups, rather than one contract with 
society in general.  Stakeholder theory explicitly refers to issues of how a stakeholder’s relative 
power affects their ability to persuade the company into fulfilling the stakeholder’s requirements 
(Cowan and Gadenne, 2005; Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997; Jamali, 2008).  The focus of 
stakeholder theory is therefore less broad than that of legitimacy theory, since legitimacy theory 
considers society in general rather than that of specific stakeholders.  Nevertheless, and as 
indicated above, there is a significant level of overlap between the two theories. 
Deegan et al. (2002) communicates that stakeholder, legitimacy, and institutional theories 
should not be considered as three separate theories.  Rather, they have been developed from a 
similar philosophical background and provide complementary and overlapping perspectives.  All 
three theories see the company as part of a broader social structure in which they are impacted by, 
as well as having the ability to influence the expectations of other stakeholders within a given 
social environment.  Political cost, legitimacy, and stakeholder theories have also been considered 
as overlapping perspectives on the same issue.  These theories differ in terms of their level of 
refinement in resembling the issue of voluntary disclosures, with political cost being the least 
refined and stakeholder theory being the most refined (Gray et al., 1995a, b).  
 Elements of legitimacy theory often address “society”, and compliance with the 
expectations of society.  However, this provides inadequate solutions given that society is 
evidently made up of various stakeholder groups with unequal power or ability to influence the 
activities of other groups.  Stakeholder theory explicitly accepts that different groups have 
different views about how companies should conduct their operations, and have different abilities 
to influence a company.  Lindblom (1994) discussed the concerns of “relevant publics” that are 
changing the focus from society towards particular groups and are employing knowledge from 
stakeholder theory.  The insights provided by stakeholder theory assist in identifying what groups 
are likely to be relevant to particular management decisions and potentially what expectations the 
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company should focus on accomplishing.  It is essential to consider the links legitimacy has with 
other theories, such as stakeholder theory, and the benefits that can accrue from attempting to see 
a particular event through more than one view of the world (Deegan, 2002). 
It is assumed that managers have an ability to modify perceptions of legitimacy, through 
means of disclosures.  In comparison, under institutional theory managers are expected to 
conform to “norms” that are essentially forced upon them (Campbell, 2007; Cormier, Magnan and 
Van Velthoven, 2005; Roome and Wijen, 2004).  Woodward et al. (1996) show that legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory consider a company to be part of the wider social system, 
legitimacy theory looks at society as a whole, whereas stakeholder theory recognises that some 
groups within the society are more powerful than others.   
Gray et al. (1995a, 1995b) employ political economy and stakeholder theories in 
examining the social and environmental disclosures in the UK company annual reports over a 
period of 13 years.  Their analysis indicates that stakeholder, legitimacy, and political economy 
theories are insightful in corporate social responsibility as they are all concerned with “mediation, 
modification and transformation” but from different points of view.  They do believe, however, 
that it is possible to make similar interpretations of evidence from different theoretical 
perspectives.  That is, if interpretations from stakeholder and legitimacy theory are made in a neo-
pluralist manner, with recognition of the relatively limited explanation these can offer, and these 
interpretations are enhanced by wider perceptions from classical political economy, one should 
reach a set of observations which are influential at different levels of resolution (Gray et al., 
1995a). 
Therefore, it is assumed that the alternative theories that are of value to studies of 
corporate disclosure policies focus upon distinct perspectives of the same issue.  Through the 
dissimilar assumptions made and standpoints adopted they offer alternative insights into the 
subject matter.  Thus, it is not possible to isolate a particular framework as a paradigm in the 
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academic arena.  The different theories should not be seen as competing perspectives but rather as 
alternative ways of comprehending and studying company’s decisions to disclose different forms 
of information to the public. 
The theories outlined in this chapter are chosen based on how they relate to a company’s 
decision to voluntarily disclose employee-related information in their annual report.  Stakeholder 
theory is considered to be a comprehensive theory that can be applied directly to this study.  
Specifically, Ullmann’s theoretical framework is applied to this study of voluntary employee-
related disclosures to provide a structure in the development of the hypotheses. 
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Stakeholder theory, and several associated theories act as the theoretical basis of a number 
of the studies referred to in this thesis.  They provide a foundation for understanding how and 
why managers’ use annual reports to benefit an organisation.  A shift has occurred by some 
researchers to use more than one theory to provide an explanation for particular managerial 
behaviours because of an overlap between a number of these theories, and because they provide 
different and valuable insights (Deegan, 2002).  While these currently applied theories are 
considered to be in need of further refinement, papers that follow help other researchers to further 
develop existing theory to explain corporate social reporting practices. 
Ullmann’s (1985) three-dimensional framework of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure incorporates the elements of stakeholder power, strategic posture and the past and 
present economic performance of the company.  Ullmann’s (1985) framework, which is 
operationalised in the following chapter, is useful to examine employee power, economic 
performance and corporate governance best practices in relation to a strategic perspective of 
employee-related disclosures.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One discusses the research proposal and provides an overview of the 
developments in corporate social responsibility reporting that encompasses the area of research.  It 
also defines the core concepts of the study and highlights the study’s contributions to knowledge.  
Chapter Two reviews prior research on corporate social responsibility reporting.  It 
discusses the extent to which the company has social responsibilities beyond profit maximisation 
and examines various conceptual frameworks that have been applied, including stakeholder 
theory, legitimacy theory, social contract theory, political economic theory, institutional theory, 
and media agenda setting theory. 
This chapter draws on Ullmann’s three-dimensional social disclosure model to develop 
testable hypotheses to explain the quantity and quality of voluntary employee-related disclosures 
in companies’ annual reports.  This chapter also illustrates the operationalisation of the constructs 
used to test the hypotheses and justify the inclusion of the independent variables.   
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Few studies have analysed employee-related disclosures in isolation to other corporate 
social responsibility disclosures.  Islam and Deegan (1998) analyse human resource disclosures as 
one of the six categories of social information in their study.  They find that human resource 
disclosures account for the highest proportion of total disclosures in Bangladeshi companies 
across the period of 1987-2005.   
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Rimmel’s (2003) study is concerned with the relationship between information, providers 
and users of human resources disclosure in advanced annual reporting practices for two Swedish 
companies.  The results indicate that when it comes to specific information like disclosures about 
human resources, a gap is found between users’ disclosure demands and the companies’ supply of 
information.  Information users suggest that more detailed voluntary disclosure would be 
beneficial and that a more structured and standardised non-financial disclosure is preferred 
because it increases transparency and comparability of corporate social reporting. 
Vuontisjarvi (2006) explores the extent to which large Finnish companies have adopted 
socially responsible reporting practices with a focus on human resource reporting within corporate 
annual reports.  The results find that human resource disclosures lack overall consistency and 
comparability.  Quantitative indicators are disclosed by few companies in the sample, with further 
concern evident with a lack of attention paid to disclosures relating to equal opportunities, work–
life balance and integration of disadvantaged groups.   
Welford (2005) reports that there has been an increased emphasis on employee and human 
resource issues by European companies, but less focus on employee issues by Asian companies.  
Everaert, Bouten, Van Liedekerke, DeMoor, and Christiaens (2008) identify that Belgian 
companies overwhelmingly report on employee-related issues or labour practices, as did 
Vuontisjarvi’s (2006) analysis of Finnish companies.  
Limited research on employee-related disclosures for Australian companies provides the 
rationale to investigate the voluntary reporting practices of Australian companies specifically 
relating to this category of social disclosure.  The next section operationalises Ullmann’s three-
dimensional framework to better understand why Australian companies are disclosing employee-
related information in their annual reports, what type of employee-related information they are 
disclosing and how much they are voluntarily disclosing. 
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3.3 STAKEHOLDER POWER 
The first dimension of Ullmann’s model, stakeholder power, proposes that a stakeholder’s 
dominance in relation to the company is a factor influencing employee-related disclosure.  Hence, 
employee stakeholder power is specifically examined as a vital key to voluntary employee-related 
disclosures in Australian corporate annual reports.  Stakeholder power is viewed as a function of 
the stakeholders’ degree of control over resources required by the company and how critical these 
resources are to the continued viability of the company (Ullmann, 1985).  Ullmann suggests that if 
the company believes that its stakeholders are concerned with social (and environmental) issues, 
the company is more motivated to perform well and disclose their performance.  Ullmann (1985) 
perceives stakeholder power as influencing the amount and quality of social responsibility 
reported.  It is expected that companies with higher employee-related power report more 
employee-related disclosures than those with lower employee power (Mangos and Lewis, 1995).  
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Companies disclose more employee-related information when the company’s 
employees have greater power. 
H1b: Companies disclose higher quality employee-related information when the 
company’s employees have greater power. 
 Existing definitions of power are drawn from the initial belief that power is the likelihood 
that one party within a social relationship is in a position to carry out their own will despite 
resistance (Reverte, 2009; Roome and Wijen, 2004; Weber, 1947).  Although power appears 
difficult to define, it is not difficult to recognise.  Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) declare that it is the 
ability of those who hold power to exercise that right to deliver the results they desire.  A key 
issue is to identify the method and sources of power.  
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 Essentially, stakeholders desire something from a company. Some want to influence what 
the company does (those stakeholders who want to affect) and others are, or potentially could be, 
concerned with the way they are affected by the company.  To test the first hypotheses, the 
relevant stakeholders must be identified and alternative measures developed to represent the 
construct of employee stakeholder power.   
3.3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF STAKEHOLDERS 
 Where stakeholders are deemed powerful and legitimate their influence in the company is 
guaranteed, since by possessing power with legitimacy they form the "dominant coalition" in the 
company (Cyert and March, 1963).  These stakeholders are characterised as "dominant", with 
respect to the legitimate claims they have upon the company and their ability to act on these 
claims (Mitchell et al., 1997).  Managers deem particular stakeholders to be important based on 
their perceptions of the power and legitimacy of those stakeholders.  Therefore it is likely that 
dominant stakeholders have some formal mechanism in place that acknowledges the importance 
of their relationship with the company signifying that employees could be characterised as 
dominant stakeholders.  For example, most companies have a human resources department that 
acknowledges the importance of the company-employee relationship (Mitchell et al., 1997).   
Companies also produce reports to legitimise powerful stakeholders (for example, employees, 
shareholders and creditors), including annual reports, alternative statements, special purpose 
reports and, increasingly, environmental and social responsibility reports (Debeljak and Gregoric, 
2006; Preble, 2010).  
In strategic analysis, the Mendelow (1983) framework is frequently used to understand the 
influence that each stakeholder has over a company’s objectives and strategy.  This framework 
seeks to establish which stakeholders have the most influence by estimating each stakeholder’s 
individual power and interest in the company’s operation.  The stakeholders with the highest 
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combination of power and interest are likely to be those with the most actual influence over 
objectives of the company.  Power is the stakeholder’s ability to influence objectives (how much 
they can), while interest is the stakeholder’s willingness (how much they care).  Therefore, in 
scientific terms, it could be said that influence is equal to the stakeholder’s power plus their 
interest in the company (Gago and Antolin, 2004; Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Such an approach to the identification of the stakeholders is applied in the current study.  
It is suggested that the important stakeholders for analysis can be identified by applying two 
criteria: (a) the proximity between the potential stakeholder and the company, and (b) the nature 
of the power exercised by the potential stakeholder. 
PROXIMITY OF RELATIONSHIP 
The potential stakeholders can be divided into two groups using Freeman’s (1984) 
definition of stakeholders.  First, the primary stakeholders are those characterised by high 
interdependence and are the main providers of the company’s resources.  Without these 
stakeholders’ continuing support the company could not survive (Clarkson, 1995).  Examples of 
primary stakeholders are shareholders, creditors, customers, suppliers, and employees.   
Secondary or adversarial stakeholders are those not directly engaged in transactions with 
the company and are not essential for its survival, but have the capacity to mobilise public opinion 
in favour of or opposed to the company.  These include environmental lobby groups, government 
regulators, the media, and other special interest groups (Clarkson, 1995).  
NATURE OF THE POWER 
The main stakeholders for analysis can also be identified by reference to the nature of the 
power possessed by the potential stakeholders.  Freeman (1984) considers that stakeholder power 
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could be classified as voting power, economic power, and political power.  Employees can 
exercise voting power if they participate in employee share ownership schemes, political power if 
they are involved in trade union memberships, or economic power indirectly through labour 
power.  Shareholders exercise voting power in proportion to their equity stake in the company.  
Customers, suppliers, and creditors are able to exercise economic power by changing to another 
company, raising prices and the cost of capital, and/or withholding supply.  Regulators and lobby 
groups exercise political power through imposing legal regulation on companies (Kent and Chan, 
2009; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). 
After considering the proximity of the relationship between the stakeholders and the 
company, and the nature of the power that such stakeholders possess, it was decided to limit the 
analysis of stakeholder power to one group of stakeholders - employees.  This is due to the thesis 
being confined to employee-related disclosures and employees are the most crucial non-financial 
asset to the company.  The following section develops measures of employee power to test 
Hypothesis 1.  
EMPLOYEE POWER 
Considering that stakeholder power is a function of the stakeholder’s degree of control 
over resources required by the company, and how critical those resources are to the continued 
viability of the company (Ullmann, 1985), it is more important to meet the demands of employees 
when they have greater power in the company.  Two proxies of employee stakeholder power are 
adopted.  These are the participation in an employee share ownership scheme and trade union 
membership. 
EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP SCHEME  
The presence of an employee share ownership scheme is the first proxy for employee 
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stakeholder power.  Owning shares in the company is an important way of strengthening 
employees' involvement in the development of the company and of bringing together employees 
and shareholders' interests.  The Australian Employee Ownership Association (AEOA) claims that 
the aim of an employee share ownership scheme is to encourage general employee participation in 
share ownership in their employer company and a collective effort towards improved company 
performance thereby increasing shareholder value (AEOA, 2007).  The participation of employees 
in share ownership schemes is considered an important form of involvement within the company 
and a means by which employees can exercise voting power.  Employee commitment is re-
enforced by this participation that leads to increased symmetry between shareholder and employee 
interests.  Share ownership schemes enable employees to participate financially in the affairs of 
the company (Day and Woodward, 2004).   
Employee share ownership schemes are implemented to reduce agency costs because it is 
assumed that managers act in their own interest, especially when managers have fixed salary 
levels (Lenne, Mitchell and Ramsay, 2005).  Theoretically, becoming a shareholder creates an 
extra financial interest in the success of the company and results in an employee being a direct 
decision-maker equal to their level of ownership.  It hypothetically gives them a direct say, at the 
company level, in how that success is defined.  Another example is where managers hold shares in 
the companies they manage.  Managers’ share ownership reduce agency costs between 
shareholders and managers by ensuring that managers bear a share of the wealth consequences of 
their actions (Lenne et al., 2005). 
In 2004, research commissioned by the Department of Workplace Relations’ Employee 
Share Ownership Development Unit found that ten per cent of businesses surveyed had some 
form of employee share ownership (Landau, Mitchell, O’Connell and Ramsay, 2007; Landau and 
Ramsay, 2007).  Only four per cent of businesses surveyed had a broad-based5
                                                 
5 A broad-based employee share option scheme is available to all employees. 
 employee share 
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ownership scheme, which was open to at least 75 per cent of employees.  While only 44 per cent 
of companies with a plan had a broad-based scheme (meaning there are significantly more 
executive share plans than broad-based plans operational in Australia) the majority of plans 
implemented in the period 2003 – 2004 are open to all employees, indicating a move towards 
broad based schemes.  The 2004 ABS data indicates that six per cent of a total 481,300 employees 
held shares as a form of employment benefit (see Figure 3-1). 
Changes to institutions and public policies to protect workers over the last twenty years 
have radically changed since deregulation of the labour market and globalisation.  Employer 
preferences for flexibility have meant that employees carry the responsibility for career 
development. Employees are committed to a particular kind of work rather than a particular 
employer and expect job insecurity.  The once long-term relationship between employer and 
employee has transformed into short-term transactions (Van Buren III and Greenwood, 2008).  
Hence employees have been encouraged to participate in employee share ownership schemes as a 
way to build commitment, increase productivity, and maximise profits (Freeman, 2007).  
Evidence indicates that employee loyalty and willingness to work diligently for the company 
increases when some form of ownership in the company exists (Bryson and Freeman, 2010).  
Employee share ownership also gives workers an opportunity to participate in company decision-
making (Freeman, 2007) thus giving employees more stakeholder power.  
Employees who participate in share ownership schemes have greater power, therefore it 
is expected that companies with employee share ownership schemes are more likely to disclose 
employee-related information in the annual report than companies without these schemes. 
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FIGURE 3-1 PROPORTION OF EMPLOYEES RECEIVING SHARES AS AN 
EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT 
 
SOURCE: ABS, AUSTRALIAN LABOUR MARKET STATISTICS (CAT. NO 6105.0), JULY 2005. 
TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
The level of trade union membership in the company’s industry is the second proxy 
adopted for employee stakeholder power.  A union negotiates the terms and conditions of 
employment for many workers in the industrial world.  Following the definition of the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, a labour union may be defined as “an organisation, consisting predominantly 
of employees, the principal activities of which include the negotiation of pay and conditions of 
employment for its members” or, alternatively, as “an organisation which consists wholly or 
mainly of workers ... and whose principle purposes includes the regulation of relations between 
workers and employers or employer’s associations” (Visser, 2006).  A union member is a person 
who self-defines that they belong to a labour union, employee or staff organisation, or a person 
who pays his or her dues and is recognised as a member by a union organisation.   
Data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2010) shows 
that unionisation rates for 2007 are approximately 10 per cent for the United States, 20 per cent 
for countries such as Germany, Australia and the Netherlands, 30 per cent for Canada, the United 
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Kingdom, and Ireland, and greater than 50 per cent for Norway and Belgium.  Furthermore, 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland have about 70 per cent, or more, of their workers as members of 
unions (Brown and Warren, 2010; Visser, 2006). 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a joint initiative of the Coalition of 
Environmentally Responsible Economies and the United Nations Environment Program. Its aim is 
to provide a global and credible framework for sustainability reporting that can be used by all 
organisations (GRI, 2002; 2006).  The GRI is guided by the International Labour Organisation 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development which identify trade unions as 
an important employee stakeholder group.  This important stakeholder group should positively 
relate to corporate employee-related disclosures to enhance transparency and accountability of 
decent workplace conditions and practices as advised by the GRI (2002). 
Employees can elect to participate in memberships with trade unions or labour unions, 
who represent most of the available work force in a single company.  They use their 
representative power to collectively bargain with management of companies to advance concerns 
and demands of their membership (Brown and Warren, 2010; Ng and Maki, 1994a; 1994b).  This 
suggests that companies operating in industries with greater trade union memberships are more 
likely to disclose employee-related information in the annual report than companies without these 
memberships. 
3.4 STRATEGIC POSTURE  
The second dimension of the model, strategic posture, is incorporated into Ullmann’s 
social disclosure model as an element of strategy.  Ullmann (1985) proposes that companies 
observe different strategies in dealing with stakeholder demands, ranging from an avoidance of 
demands to partial or total compliance with demands.  An active strategic posture is present where 
a company is continually monitoring its relationship with its key stakeholders and seeks to 
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administer that relationship to attain an optimal level of interdependence with its stakeholders.  
Developing social responsibility programs and disclosing their existence is also perceived as part 
of an active stakeholder management strategy.  Alternatively, companies adopting a passive 
strategic posture make no attempt to monitor and manage its relationship with its stakeholders.   
Consequently, companies displaying a more active strategic posture to employees are 
expected to disclose more employee-related information in their annual reports.  This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
H2a: Companies displaying a more active posture towards employee-related issues 
disclose more employee-related information than companies displaying a less 
active posture to these issues.   
H2b: Companies displaying a more active posture towards employee-related issues 
disclose higher quality employee-related information than companies displaying 
a less active posture to these issues.   
Kent and Chan (2009) use two proxies for strategic posture: (1) the recognition of social 
and environmental responsibility in the mission statement, and (2) the presence or absence of 
social and/or environmental committees.  Roberts (1992) also implements two proxies: (1) 
average size of the company’s public affairs staff, and (2) the presence of a corporate sponsored 
philanthropic foundation. 
The following section illustrates two proxies that signify the nature of a company’s 
strategic posture towards voluntary employee-related disclosures.  The first is the 
acknowledgement by the company of employees in the company’s mission statement, the second 
is the companies’ corporate governance practices. 
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3.4.1 MISSION STATEMENT 
Corporate mission statements are used to define and communicate the types of 
relationships a company wishes to establish with each of its major stakeholder groups including 
employees (Bart, 2001; Campbell, 1997).  They are also a key management tool and form the 
foundation for any major strategic planning initiative (Bart, 1996; Bart, Bontis and Tagger, 2001; 
Bartkus, Glassman and McAfee, 2000; Campbell, Stonehouse, and Houston, 2002; Khalifa, 
2011).  They are the basis for setting corporate goals and objectives and drive corporate priorities 
and intellectual capital development (Bontis, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003a; McColl-Kennedy, Kiel, 
Lusch and Lusch, 1992).  Mission statements outline the company’s climate and culture (Van der 
Weyer, 1994), defining the fundamental and unique purpose that sets a business apart from other 
similar companies (David and David, 2003; Pearce and David, 1987). 
Mission statements in practice usually have a strategic and a cultural perspective (Bartkus 
et al., 2000; Campbell, Shrives and Bohmbach-Saager, 2001).  These statements of purpose and 
vision are voluntary and because there is no given method of composition, their content varies 
depending on the nature of the business, size or industry.  Pearce and David (1987) and Stone 
(1996) suggest that mission statements need to have certain characteristics or qualities if they are 
to be effective.  They need to be unique and easy to understand, contain relevant information 
appropriate to the company in terms of its history and culture, discuss goals for survival, growth, 
and profitability, outline the company’s philosophy (i.e. values and beliefs), illustrate public 
image and responsibility to other stakeholders, provide motivation to employees to achieve 
greater levels of performance, provide an ongoing vision, and be appropriate to the target 
audience.  
Recognition within a company’s mission statement of the importance of employees 
indicates an active posture on the part of that company to supply employee-related disclosures 
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(Lamberti and Lettieri, 2009).  For example, the following is extracted from Australia’s largest 
company, BHP Billiton’s, mission statement: 
“...At BHP Billiton our objective is to be the company of choice - creating sustainable value 
for our shareholders, employees, contractors, suppliers, customers, business partners and host 
communities. ...We aspire to Zero Harm to people, our host communities and the 
environment and strive to achieve leading industry practice. Sound principles to govern 
safety, business conduct, social, environmental and economic activities are integral to the 
way we do business.” 
The above statement illustrates the company’s commitment to a range of stakeholders and 
suggests that it has an active posture to these stakeholders.  Previous research indicates that the 
inclusion of references to the environment is associated with improved environmental disclosures 
(Kent and Chan, 2009).  This study focuses on references to employees in the mission statement 
to estimate an active posture to employees given that the specific disclosures examined are 
employee-related disclosures. 
3.4.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 
Another ex ante strategy to manage stakeholders for the voluntary disclosure of employee-
related information in annual reports relies upon the foundation of a company’s corporate 
governance practice.  Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.  The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the company, such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and reveals the rules and procedures for making decisions on 
corporate affairs.  By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company 
objectives are established, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance (Cadbury, 1992).   
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Australia introduced the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, 2003) in 
March 2003.  Ten principles were recommended in the first ASX Corporate Governance Council 
report in 20036
Section 4 of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance relates to the role of 
.  These are: lay solid foundations for management and oversight; structure the 
board to add value, promote ethical and responsible decision-making, safeguard integrity in 
financial reporting, make timely and balanced disclosure, respect the rights of shareholders, 
recognise and manage risk, encourage enhanced performance, remunerate fairly and responsibly 
and recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders.  The principles likely to be associated with 
the disclosure of employee information are: lay solid foundations for management and oversight, 
structure the board to add value, promote ethical and responsible decision-making, make balanced 
disclosure, recognise and manage risk and recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders (Kent 
and Monem, 2008).  Bebbington et al. (2008) propose that corporate social responsibility 
reporting is likely to be associated with an element of reputation risk management, and the 
corporate governance principles clearly identify recommended corporate governance practices as 
being associated with recognising and managing risk (Kent and Zunker, 2010). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of 
Corporate Governance were initially released in May 1999 and revised in 2004.  They have since 
become an international benchmark for regulators, investors, companies and other stakeholders on 
a global scale.  They have enhanced the corporate governance framework and provide companies 
with specific guidelines for legislative and regulatory initiatives.  Employees, along with other 
stakeholders, have been identified as playing an important role in contributing to the long-term 
success and performance of the company (OECD, 2004).   
                                                 
6 The ASX Corporate Governance Council released the first edition of its Principles of Good Corporate Governance Practice 
and Best Practice Recommendations on 31 March 2003.  On 2 August 2007, the Council released the second edition of the 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. 
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stakeholders in corporate governance and states, “The corporate governance framework should 
recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and 
the sustainability of financially sound enterprises” (OECD, 2004, pp. 21).  A good corporate 
governance structure reveals ways to assist various stakeholders of the company to invest optimal 
levels of investment in firm-specific human and physical capital.  The ultimate success of a 
company is the result of teamwork that represents contributions from a range of different 
stakeholders including investors, employees, creditors, and suppliers.  Companies should 
recognise that the contributions of employees comprise a valuable resource for building 
competitive and profitable companies (OECD, 2004).  
Section 5 of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance identify the importance of 
disclosure and transparency as a governance mechanism and encourages companies to provide 
information on key issues relevant to employees and other stakeholders that may significantly 
affect the performance of the company.  It states that: “The corporate governance framework 
should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the 
company” (OECD, 2004, pp. 22, 49).  Section A (7) specifically states that “issues regarding 
employees” should be disclosed (OECD, 2004, pp. 22, 49).  Information may include 
management or employee relations, and relations with other stakeholders such as creditors, 
suppliers, and other members of society.  Human resource policies, such as plans for human 
resource development and training, retention rates of employees and employee share ownership 
plans, can communicate important information on the competitive strengths of companies to 
market participants (OECD, 2004).  
Theory suggests that a strong corporate governance structure should lead to “more 
transparent disclosures” (Beekes and Brown, 2006; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Kent and Stewart, 
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2008).  Adhering to recommended corporate governance practices implies that companies actively 
want to be more transparent and accountable to society, including employees (Kent and Monem, 
2008).  Measures of best practice corporate governance mechanisms including board size and 
structure, the external auditor, and presence of board committees are used to measure strategic 
posture (Rainsbury, Bradbury and Cahan, 2008).   
Disclosures that are more comprehensive are likely to be more informative, therefore it is 
anticipated that there is a positive relationship between the level of voluntary employee 
disclosures and recognised measures of corporate governance (Bassett, Koh and Tutticci, 2007; 
Kent and Zunker, 2010). 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Researchers have established that the board of directors is the principal control 
mechanism existing in companies’ internal governance structure (Brown, Beekes and Verhoeven, 
2010; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kent and Stewart, 2008).  An effective board of directors should 
monitor social and financial decisions and ensure the accounting alternatives made by 
management are appropriate and beneficial to the company (New York Stock Exchange, 2002).   
The first principle in the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations (Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, 
2006) suggests that companies should recognise and disclose the particular roles and 
responsibilities of board and management.  The board of directors is responsible for overseeing 
the company, including its control and accountability systems and approving and monitoring 
financial and other reporting (ASX, 2008).  These responsibilities are related to the company’s 
decision to voluntarily disclose employee-related information in the annual report.  The second 
principle also relates to the board of directors.  It states that companies should “have a board of an 
effective composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge its responsibilities and 
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duties” (ASX, 2008).  
It is expected that board size is related to the directors’ capability to supervise and control 
managers (Jensen, 1993).  A large amount of research indicates that larger boards are more 
efficient in executing their responsibilities.  Further, the ability of directors to control and 
promote value-creating activities is more likely to increase with an increased number of directors 
on the board. With more directors, the collective experience and expertise of the board will 
increase (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009).  Other researchers have found that more directors on boards 
have a negative impact on strategic planning, internal control mechanisms and financial reporting 
quality (Beasley, 1996; Jensen, 1993).   
Recommendation 2.1 from the ASX principles and recommendations suggests the 
majority of the board should be made up of independent directors.  The ability of the board of 
directors to operate as an effective monitoring mechanism is reliant upon its independence from 
management (Beasley, 1996).  From an agency perspective, independent directors are expected to 
provide shareholders superior protection in monitoring management (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985).  This enhanced monitoring ability can be attributed to the incentive to maintain their 
reputation in the external labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Another board characteristic associated with strong corporate governance is the separation 
of the roles of CEO and board chair.  Corporate governance guidelines assume that a board’s 
ability to perform a monitoring role is weakened when the CEO is also the chairperson of the 
board (ASX, 2003).  The appointment of the CEO to the position of chair is expected to lead to a 
concentration of power (Beasley, 1996) and could result in potential conflicts of interest, limiting 
the degree of monitoring.  Forker (1992) finds that separation of the roles of the CEO and board 
chair is positively correlated with the level of voluntary disclosure (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 
2006; Kent and Stewart, 2008).  
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Boards of directors are required to be committed to meeting their corporate governance 
obligation responsibilities.  This is particularly important to guarantee a high quality and 
transparent nature of reporting in annual reports.  Boards that meet frequently are more likely to 
perform their duties thoroughly and effectively (Kent and Stewart, 2008; Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992).  Diligent boards are more likely to ensure that voluntary social disclosures are made to 
meet stakeholders’ demands for information and protect the reputation of the company (Kent and 
Monem, 2008).   
Therefore, board characteristics associated with improved corporate governance include 
board size, the proportion of independent directors, separation of the CEO and chairperson, and 
board meeting frequency. 
BOARD COMMITTEES 
THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COMMITTEE 
The boards of directors assign responsibilities to other board committees to enable them to 
perform their duties more efficiently (Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2005).  A 
company’s strategic posture is confirmed by verifying the presence or absence of specific 
committees, which are established to monitor stakeholder concerns.  Companies are encouraged to 
establish a social responsibility committee for setting corporate policies on sustainable 
development and for dealing with issues such as health and safety, personnel policies, 
environmental protection, and codes of business conduct (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 1992).  The establishment of a social responsibility committee demonstrates a 
company’s active posture towards these important issues.   
While the presence of a social responsibility committee is not identified in the ASX 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations it is a relevant 
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committee likely to assist employee-related disclosures.  The existence of a social responsibility 
committee is likely to be associated with a greater tendency for companies to make voluntary 
disclosures concerning social involvement including employees (Cowen et al., 1987).  This 
indicates that a company having a social responsibility committee displays an increased level of 
commitment towards social responsibility issues including employee-related issues.   
Cowen et al. (1987) find that the presence of a corporate social responsibility committee is 
associated with human resource disclosures.  This suggests that these disclosures, which include 
employee safety, health and training, and other employee-related information, are a major concern 
of social responsibility committees.  Therefore, it is expected that the existence of a social 
responsibility committee is associated with an increased quantity and quality of employee-related 
disclosures. 
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
The establishment of an audit committee is recommended by ASX Corporate Governance 
Best Practices.  The audit function is considered to be an important governance attribute likely to 
assist in the voluntary disclosure of employee-related information (Kent and Zunker, 2010).  The 
audit committee is the primary channel, providing shareholders with the greatest protection in 
maintaining the quality of a company’s financial statements (Davidson et al., 2005; McMullen, 
1996).  The existence of an independent audit committee is recognised by international reporting 
bodies as an important feature of good corporate governance (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; 
OECD, 2004).  
Most previous research has concentrated on the link between audit committees and 
financial performance quality (Beekes and Brown 2006, Kent et al. 2010; Kent and Stewart, 
2009; Koh et al., 2007), with limited research devoted to individual corporate governance 
attributes and the level of voluntary social disclosures such as employee-related disclosures.  
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Many Australian companies require that their audit committee accept responsibility for overall 
business risk, ethical standards, and broader disclosure issues in addition to financial reporting 
responsibilities. (Kent and Monem, 2008).  Kent and Monem (2008) find that audit committees 
play a role in assuring high quality financial reporting and improving disclosure of triple bottom 
line reporting and accountability of the company to society.  
The existence of an independent audit committee is recognised by international reporting 
bodies as an important feature of good corporate governance (OECD, 2004). However, prior 
studies have not found the level of social disclosure to be significantly associated to the presence 
of an audit committee (Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain and Yao, 2009; Kent and Stewart, 2008).  
Characteristics of audit committees with respect to their existence, the independence, 
diligence and size are expected to improve the quality of reporting for voluntary disclosures.  The 
ASX Corporate Governance Council recommends that all listed companies should have an audit 
committee, but ASX Listing Rule 12.7 mandates that only the top 300 listed companies must have 
an audit committee (ASX, 2008; OECD, 2004).   
A brief analysis of this study’s sample determined that 65 percent of the companies fall 
outside the top 300 companies and therefore are not required to have an audit committee.  For 
these companies, the existence of an audit committee indicates a commitment to reliable 
corporate governance and high quality financial reporting.   
THE REMUNERATION COMMITTEE  
The remuneration committee is a monitoring mechanism recommended by the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council (ASX, 2003).  The remuneration committee is established to 
ensure that payment arrangements support the strategic goals of the company and enable the 
recruitment, motivation and retention of senior executives whilst complying with the 
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requirements of regulatory and governance bodies.  Consequently, the company is satisfying the 
expectations of shareholders and remaining consistent with the expectations of the wider 
employee population (Main and Johnston, 1992) by having a remuneration committee.   
Primarily for larger companies, a remuneration committee can be a more efficient 
mechanism than the full board for focusing the company on appropriate remuneration policies 
that are designed to meet the needs of the company and to enhance corporate and individual 
performance (ASX, 2003).  The responsibilities of the remuneration committee include a review 
of and recommendation to the board on executive remuneration and incentive policies, the 
remuneration packages of senior management, the company’s recruitment, retention and 
termination policies and procedures for senior management, incentive schemes, superannuation 
arrangements and the remuneration framework for directors.  Much of the information disclosed 
in the corporate annual report relating to these responsibilities comes under AASB 119 
“Employee Benefits” and is considered to be mandatory disclosure.  However, many companies 
disclose information that relate to employee-related remuneration policies outside of the 
mandated disclosures (ASX, 2003). 
THE NOMINATION COMMITTEE 
The nomination committee is also a monitoring mechanism recommended by the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council (ASX, 2003).  Nomination committees are perceived as an 
essential tool of good corporate governance since they determine the quality of appointed 
directors, which is expected to be associated with improved financial performance (Christensen, 
Kent and Stewart, 2010).  The role of the remuneration committee is to determine and review the 
nature and amount of all compensation for senior executives of the company.  This contributes to 
relieving the agency problem by proposing, constructing and implementing incentive schemes to 
better align the goals between management and shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
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Companies without a nomination committee should have board processes in place which raise the 
issues that would otherwise be considered by the nomination committee (ASX, 2008). 
EXTERNAL AUDITOR 
External auditors play a vital role in ensuring their clients comply with accounting 
standards and other regulations (Lynn, 1996).  They are recommended by an independent audit 
committee of the board or an equivalent body and are appointed either by that committee or by 
the shareholders’ meeting directly (OECD, 2004).  Section 5, Part D of the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance states that external auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and 
owe a duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit (OECD, 
2004).  
Additionally, the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) 
Principles of Auditor Independence and the Role of Corporate Governance in Monitoring an 
Auditor’s Independence states that “standards of auditor independence should establish a 
framework of principles, supported by a combination of prohibitions, restrictions, other policies 
and procedures and disclosures, that addresses at least the following threats to independence: self-
interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation” (OECD, 2004, p. 55).   
Members of the audit committee and board of directors are likely to be unaware of all 
reporting requirements given the increasing change and complexity of accounting regulation over 
recent years.  It is the responsibility of the external auditor to ensure that companies have 
knowledge of new reporting requirements.  Larger audit firms, specifically the ‘Big Four’, usually 
have a greater number of resources and more expertise to ensure they are familiar with the latest 
accounting requirements (Kent and Stewart, 2008).  It is also assumed that large audit firms have 
a greater incentive to protect their reputation because of their larger client base (Francis, Maydew 
and Sparks, 1999).  As a result, they are expected to be more conservative and require a greater 
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level of disclosure (Clarkson et al., 2003).  
Schipper (1981) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) offered the view that preference of 
external auditors is a mechanism that assists in alleviating conflicts of interest between principals 
and agents.  Moreover, DeAngelo (1981) and Chow and Wong-Boren (1986) consider that larger 
audit firms have incentives to maintain independence from clients' pressure for limited disclosure 
because of the economic consequences associated with potential damages to their 'brand name' 
(reputation).  Therefore, they encourage their clients to disclose a greater amount of information 
in the annual report, indicating that the level of voluntary disclosure is likely to be higher for 
companies audited by Big-4 audit firms.  Craswell and Taylor (1992) find a significant positive 
association between type of auditor (i.e., Big-6 or non-Big-6) and voluntary disclosure of oil and 
gas reserves by Australian companies, while McNally, Eng, and Hassledine (1982) find no 
significant association between type of auditor and the extent of discretionary disclosure by New 
Zealand manufacturing companies. 
The signalling literature, which is complementary to agency theory literature (Morris, 
1987), suggests that the choice of an external auditor can serve as a signal of firm value.  For 
example, Bar-Yosef and Livnat (1984) show that entrepreneurs are likely to choose a Big-6 audit 
firm, since such an action signals to investors the expectation of high cash flow.  Similarly, Datar, 
Feltham and Hughes (1991) demonstrate that the selection of an auditor is a signal to the market 
about the quality of a company’s disclosure. 
3.5 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
A company’s past and current economic performance is included in the Ullmann model 
as a third dimension because of its influence on a company’s decision to report employee-related 
information to its stakeholders.  The economic performance of the company is an important factor 
in determining whether employee-related social issues receive the attention of management 
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because substantial additional costs and foregone profit opportunities are associated with being 
socially responsible.  Given certain levels of stakeholder power and strategic posture, companies 
with better economic performance are more likely to have greater social responsibility activities 
and disclosures (Roberts, 1992; Ullmann, 1985).  In periods of depressed economic performance, 
the immediate economic objectives of the company receive priority over social reporting (Kent 
and Chan, 2009; Prado-Lorenzo, ?????????-?????????, Gallego-?????????????????? -Sánchez, 
2009; Roberts, 1992).   
Mills and Gardner (1984) discover that companies are more likely to report social 
responsibility when their financial statements indicate good financial performance.  Cowen et al. 
(1987) does not find support for any relationship between profitability and corporate social 
disclosures.  Belkaoui and Karpik’s (1989) results for this relationship are conflicting with Cowen 
et al.’s (1987) study, reporting a positive and significant pairwise correlation, and a negative non-
significant regression coefficient for return on assets and disclosure.  While Roberts (1992) finds 
evidence for a positive relationship between lagged profits and corporate social disclosures, 
Patten (1991), using multiple measures of profitability including lagged measures, does not find 
any relationship between profitability and corporate social disclosures.   
Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes (2004) provide evidence that supports this 
relationship by undertaking an integrated analysis of the interrelations among environmental 
disclosure, environmental performance, and economic performance.  Based on the rationale that 
management’s overall strategy affects each of these corporate responsibilities, they provide 
evidence that prior literature’s mixed results are attributable to the fact that researchers have not 
considered these functions to be jointly determined.  The authors conclude that economic 
performance affects environmental performance and that environmental performance affects both 
economic performance and disclosure. 
In spite of these mixed results, it is predicted that companies with higher economic 
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performance disclose more employee-related information and higher quality employee-related 
information.  This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Companies with higher past or current economic performance disclose more 
employee-related information than companies with lower past or current 
economic performance. 
H3b: Companies with higher past or current economic performance disclose higher 
quality employee-related information than companies with lower past or current 
economic performance. 
Economic performance can be measured by accounting or market-based constructs 
(Roberts, 1992).  Accounting and market variables look for different aspects of financial 
performance and each is subject to bias (McGuire, Sundgreen, and Schneeweis, 1988), as 
explained below. 
3.5.1 ACCOUNTING-BASED MEASURES 
Accounting-based performance measures are used in the present study as proxies for the 
past and current economic performance of the company.  These measures reflect the historical 
performance of the company and are considered appropriate measures given the focus of the third 
dimension of Ullmann’s model is relating to the past and current performance of the company.  
Accounting measures are better predictors of corporate social responsibility than market-based 
measures because market-based measures are related to systematic movements among all 
companies, whereas accounting-based measures are more likely to capture unsystematic firm 
attributes responsible for corporate social disclosures (McGuire et al., 1988b). 
The principal disadvantages of using accounting-based measures of performance are that 
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they reflect only the historical performance of the company, are subject to manipulation by 
management, involve estimates such as provision accounts and different interpretations of 
reporting standards, and distortions from inflation (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001: Holthausen, 1990; McGuire et al., 1988).  
Measures frequently used in previous studies are return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE) (Moroney, Windsor and Aw, forthcoming).   This study applies ROA as a measure 
of economic performance to examine the existence of a relationship between financial 
performance and employee-related disclosures.  ROA is included in the current study following 
evidence (Chen, Chen and Cheng, 2008; Clarkson, Overell and Chapple, forthcoming) that 
companies with superior earnings forecasts are likely to reveal their ‘good news’.  It is predicted 
that the past and present financial performance of the company are directly related to employee-
related disclosures.  
3.5.2 MARKET-BASED MEASURES 
Market-based measures represent the investors’ perceptions of the future earnings ability 
of the company rather than past performance.  Although short-term stock returns are too volatile 
for a reliable measure of corporate performance, long-term returns capture corporate performance 
(Han and Suk, 1998).  Market-based measures have the limitation that the information content of 
disclosure potentially influences the market price of the company and that confounding events 
make measurement of market based returns unreliable.  Market measures are potentially 
unsuitable to apply to Ullmann’s model as the third dimension is based on the past or current 
economic performance of the company, rather than future performance.  However, market-based 
measures are important in understanding what factors influence employee disclosures and 
therefore, a market-based measure of performance is also included in the study. 
Tobin’s Q is a gauge widely used to measure the valuation of listed companies.  This ratio 
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measures the relationship between a company’s market value and the cost of replacing its assets.  
Research has shown that corporate social responsibility initiatives are positively related to stock 
market returns and to Tobin’s Q, creating a measure of a company’s intangible value (Christensen 
et al., 2010; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). 
Following Tobin (1969), a large amount of literature has been built on the foundation of 
Q-theory (Hubbard, 1998; Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 1996).  Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) 
suggest that Tobin’s Q is an appropriate gauge of managerial performance and use this measure to 
illustrate the relationship between managerial equity ownership and company value.  Furthermore, 
Tobin’s Q ratio is important to test the robustness of reported results to the use of an alternate 
performance measure (Welch, 2003).  Tobin’s Q primarily represents the community of investors 
constrained by their insight, brightness, or doubt (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
The market-based measure of Tobin's Q ratio is adopted in the study.  Tobin’s Q as a 
measure of company performance is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis argument 
(Fama 1976) and is a long-term calculation that takes risk and return dimensions into account 
(Manuel, Carol, Jerry, and Jennigs, 1996), and reflects the company's ability to improve 
performance over time (Caton, Goh, and Donaldson, 2001).  The higher the value of Tobin's Q, 
the more effective the governance mechanisms, and the better the market's perception of the 
company's performance is (Weir, Laing and McKnigh, 2002).   
3.6 CONTROL VARIABLES 
3.6.1 ADVERSE PUBLICITY  
A control variable is included in this thesis to assess whether greater amounts and higher 
quality employee-related information are associated with the amount of bad news published in the 
print media (Brown and Deegan, 1998).  Previous research shows that there is a relationship 
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between adverse publicity and employee-related disclosure (Kent and Zunker, 2010) and triple 
bottom line reporting (Kent and Monem, 2008).  Companies are likely to voluntarily disclose 
employee-related information in their annual report when a company believes that its social 
legitimacy has been threatened by employee-related adverse publicity.   
Mass communications theory assumes that the mass media act as agents of social control 
by providing a value frame through which the public conceive and construct their social reality 
(McQuail, 2000; Yeung, 2002).  By revealing irresponsible social conduct in a negative light, 
adverse publicity sanctions can be expected to lower the company’s social standing in the 
community.  There are at least two assumptions pertaining to the mechanisms through which 
adverse publicity sanctions are considered to operate.  First, companies and individuals care about 
how they are perceived by their peers and the broader community which creates sensitivity to 
adverse publicity.  Second, offending companies believe that their reputations suffer once 
attention is publicly drawn to their irresponsible activity (Yeung, 2002).   
Researchers find that adverse publicity has a direct negative impact on a company's 
profitability and also exploits the sensitivities of corporate management who value prestige and 
autonomy as ends in themselves, not merely as means to profits (Islam and Deegan, 2008; Yeung, 
2002).  Corporate executives are discouraged by adverse publicity because those in highly 
regarded occupations have more to lose in social standing and respectability by having their 
reputations reduced.  Empirical research provides evidence that companies are sensitive to 
adverse publicity.  For example, a number of studies have sought to explore the impact of the 
public announcement of events and whether they have a negative impact on a company's 
reputation for service or quality (see Alexander, 1999; Devine and Halpern, 2001).  In these 
studies, a statistically significant negative impact between adverse publicity and corporate 
performance is typically observed (Alexander, 1999; Rao, 1996). 
Voluntary disclosures are potentially a response to negative media attention or as a result 
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of particular social incidents that threaten the company’s legitimacy (Deegan, 2002).  Where 
managers observe that the company’s operations do not correspond with the social contract, 
corrective strategies are required.  Legitimacy theory is based on perceptions; therefore any 
remedial approaches employed by management must be accompanied by disclosure.  Remedial 
action not publicised is not effective in changing society’s negative perceptions (Cormier and 
Gordon, 2001; Deegan, 2002).  This approach provided by legitimacy and media-agenda setting 
theories highlights the strategic importance and power of corporate disclosures, such as those 
made within the annual reports.  
Adverse publicity is an effective deterrent while simultaneously promoting transparency, 
accountability and a rise in public awareness of regulatory laws and corporate misconduct.  
Alternatively, adverse publicity constitutes a form of impermissible media experiments which 
undermines constitutional rights and values (Yeung, 2002). 
It is expected that company management decide to voluntarily disclose employee-related 
information in their annual report when the company believes that its social legitimacy has been 
threatened by adverse publicity. 
3.6.2 SIZE 
Company size is the most widely used construct to represent political visibility, and is 
related to increased disclosures and political costs, agency costs and capital market incentives 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993).  The size of the company is subject to the view of various political 
interest groups and is measured a number of ways in the literature.  However, company size can 
substitute for many different factors including management expertise and industry (Ball and 
Foster, 1982).  Profit level, total assets and number of employees could all be considered 
indicators of company size in the view of employee interest groups to control for political costs. 
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It is argued that company size is a comprehensive variable that can proxy for several 
corporate characteristics, such as competitive advantage and information production costs (see 
Ball and Foster, 1982; Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman, 1981).  Given 
that the process of providing voluntary disclosure is a costly exercise, it is likely that large 
companies are more able to meet the costs of increased disclosure than smaller companies.  In 
addition, small companies are likely to be reluctant to disclose because it could place them at a 
competitive disadvantage (Cooke, 1989).  As a result small companies are likely to disclose less 
information than a large company (Firth, 1979). 
Another explanation for increased disclosure by large companies is that these companies 
are expected to be more complex.  They are likely to have more employees, be multi-product 
based and operate in a number of geographical areas, including global operations (Patton and 
Zalenka, 1997).  They also tend to employ a wide variety of highly skilled individuals necessary 
to introduce more refined management reporting systems that can provide a wider array of 
corporate information (Buzby, 1972).  Further, complexity requires efficient management 
information systems to meet the needs of managerial control and investors.  There are also likely 
to be greater demands on large companies to provide information for customers, suppliers, and 
analysts and the public in general.  Furthermore, the number of subsidiaries and areas of activity 
tends to grow with the size of the company; this increases the amount of information to be 
processed by managers and the likelihood of it being disclosed voluntarily.   
Lang and Lundholm (1993) and McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) point out that large 
companies tend to have more analyst followings than small companies, and therefore are subject 
to greater demand for information.  They assert that large companies have incentives to 
voluntarily disclose more information than smaller companies in order to enhance firm value 
because non-disclosure could be perceived as bad news by investors.  A positive association has 
been found between company size and the extent of voluntary segment disclosures (Bradbury, 
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1992) and social responsibility disclosure (Cowen et al., 1987).  
Numerous empirical studies in the corporate social responsibility field have indicated 
company size to be a significant factor in a company's decision to voluntarily make social 
responsibility disclosures (for example, Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; Cooke, 1989; Cowen et al., 1987; Hossain, Perara and Rahman, 1994; Hossain, Tan and 
Adams, 1995; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kelly, 1981; McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982; 
Meek et al., 1995; Pang, 1982; Patten, 1991, 1992; Raflournier, 1995; Trotman and Bradley, 
1981).  However, some studies have found no relationship (for example, Davey, 1982; Ng, 1985; 
Roberts, 1992).    
A company that has a larger number of employees considers it to be more important to 
manage the relationship with employees as a stakeholder group.  Gray et al. (1999) employ data 
over eight years to determine if any assumed relationships exists between the number of 
employees (as a proxy for size) and the level of disclosure.  They refine size measures used in 
prior research by considering turnover, capital employed and number of employees as size 
measures.  It is believed that the number of employees is correlated to the importance of those 
employees, together in and as a subject of employment-related disclosure.   
Costs imposed by employees on a company increase in proportion to the dependence on 
employee’s resources in the company, indicating higher stakeholder power.  This increase in cost 
is due to a greater dollar amount involved in employee benefits, a greater bargaining strength due 
to weight of numbers of the employees, and also the nature of government regulations.  
Employees have contact with the general public through family and friends, and more employees 
imply greater public awareness of the company's operations (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995).  
Additionally, a greater number of events and employee-related issues are likely to be present 
within the company with increased employee numbers.  Thus, management has increased needs to 
address employee’s issues whether they are positive or negative in nature.  Consequently, 
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companies with a greater reliance on employee resources have increased motivation to provide 
disclosure about employees in the annual report than companies with fewer employees.  
Companies that employ a large number of staff place a heavy reliance on their employees 
as valuable resources to maintain and grow the business (Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Rimmel, 
2003).  As discussed in the intellectual capital literature, human capital is recognised as the most 
important asset of any company.  There are compelling analytical reasons, as well as policy 
reasons, to care about how boardroom decisions affect employees and how employees can affect 
corporate governance.  The role of employees has mostly been treated as a labour issue and not as 
a central concern of corporate governance (Blair and Roe, 1999).  Employees’ role in corporate 
governance is reflected in their ability to influence corporate decision-making and to control a 
firm’s resources.  Indeed, despite the formal legal equality of employers and employees in the 
labour contract, the substantive asymmetries in power have led to persistent conflicts over 
legitimate managerial authority (Auguilera and Jackson 2003; Young and Thyil, 2008). 
Therefore, the number of employees divided by market capitalisation is a proxy for size in 
this study and is expected to be positively associated with the amount and quality of corporate 
employee-related disclosures. 
3.6.3 SHAREHOLDER POWER (OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE) 
Ownership structure is a major part of the balance of power between managers and 
owners.  Companies are characterised by the separation of ownership from control, which results 
in an agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Where shares are widely held, the 
likelihood of conflict of interest between principals and agents are greater than in narrowly held 
companies.  Since the spread of ownership is an indication of control, agency costs are positively 
related to the level of non-owner management in the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Thus, managers of companies with widely held shareholdings have greater motivation to select 
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accounting policies that mitigate high agency costs (Craswell and Taylor, 1992).  One such policy 
is to voluntarily report additional useful information, as in this case, employee-related 
information.  This allows principals to effectively monitor that their economic interests are 
optimised, and agents can signal that they are acting in the best interest of the owners (Christopher 
and Hassan, 1996). 
The degree of ownership concentration is applied as a control measure in this study; it 
addresses the power of the shareholders, who are key providers of the company’s scarce 
resources.  Prior studies (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Christopher and Hassan, 1996; Craswell 
and Taylor, 1992; El-Gazzar, 1998; Hill and Jones, 1992; Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993) 
suggest that the wider the shareholder dispersion, the greater the likelihood that companies 
disclose more information in the annual report.  It is also presumed that companies with widely 
dispersed ownership are more likely to incorporate good social performance in their strategic 
planning in order to attract investors (Li, 2008).  
The direction of the influence of ownership distribution on the likelihood of the 
production of employee-related information in the annual report is controversial.  One view is that 
as the distribution of ownership of a company becomes less concentrated, the demands placed on 
the company by the shareholders become broader (Keim, 1978, cited in Roberts, 1992, p.601; 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Mitchell, Chia and Loh, 1995; Reverte, 2008; Schadewitz and 
Blevins, 1998).  Accordingly, the prediction is that wider dispersion of ownership leads to higher 
quality or more employee-related disclosures.  This is also supported given that a diffused 
ownership structure produces an asymmetrical distribution of information (Kent and Chan, 2009; 
Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2006).   
A more convincing rationale is that a concentrated ownership structure indicates greater 
shareholder power relative to the company and greater willingness to exercise that power.  
Shareholders voting power is in direct proportion to shares held by that owner.  A concentrated 
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ownership structure indicates key shareholders are more powerful in demanding social 
disclosures.  These key shareholders are also more influential in concealing information they view 
as being private or detrimental to the company (Cormier and Magnan, 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000).  
These shareholders are also more willing to exercise their powers because the number of 
shareholders in a concentrated structure is smaller than that found in a diffused structure.  This 
smaller number of shareholders reduces the company’s costs involved in mobilising the 
shareholders to exercise their voting power (Alchian, 1969).   
In addition, for a shareholder who wishes to exercise their voting power, the expected 
benefits of such action are higher in a company with concentrated ownership than in a company 
with diffused ownership because the smaller number of shareholders in the company reduces the 
prospect of other shareholders “free-riding” on their efforts (Ramsay and Blair, 1993).  Therefore, 
it is predicted that shareholder power is negatively related to voluntary employee-related 
disclosures. 
3.6.4 CREDITOR POWER (LEVERAGE) 
Creditors are important stakeholders whose power should be managed as part of the 
company’s stakeholder strategy (Bruggen, Vergauwen and Dao, 2009; Cornell and Shapiro, 
1987).  The creditors’ stake in a company is to ensure that the company does not undertake risky 
activities that reduce the company’s ability to repay debt (Kent and Chan, 2009; Li and Zhang, 
2010).   
Creditors, as controllers of access to financial resources, are able to exercise their 
economic power by increasing the cost of capital or completely withholding debt finance.  The 
power of the creditors in relation to the company can be measured by the degree to which the 
 Tamara Zunker    85 
company is reliant on debt financing for its activities (Roberts, 1992).  Roberts (1992) finds that 
levels of social disclosure are related to stakeholder power, and in particular an overall corporate 
strategy for managing government stakeholders (measured by political action committee 
contributions) and meeting creditor expectations (measured by the debt to equity ratio).  
Agency costs of debt are higher for companies with proportionally more debt in their 
capital structures (Meek et al., 1995) since potential wealth transfers from bondholders to 
shareholders and managers increase with leverage.  Therefore, voluntary disclosures are expected 
to increase with leverage.  The restrictive covenants included in debt agreements are intended to 
reduce management’s ability to create wealth transfers between shareholders and bondholders 
(Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Smith and Warner, 1979).  Frequently used limitations include limits 
on financial leverage (long-term debt to assets ratio) and limits on payout rates.  The decision to 
disclose social information follows an outlay for a social performance that reduces earnings.  
Therefore, highly leveraged companies have incentives to reduce their cost of capital by 
improving their disclosure levels (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002, Kent and Monem, 2008).   
3.6.5 INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
The nature of a company’s industry is identified as another likely factor associated with 
voluntary social disclosure practices (Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley, 2004).  Dierkes and Preston 
(1977) argue that companies whose economic activities modify the environment, such as 
extractive industries, are more likely to disclose information about their environmental impacts 
than are companies in other industries.  “Consumer-oriented” companies can be expected to 
exhibit greater concern with demonstrating their social responsibility to the community, since this 
is likely to enhance corporate image and influence revenues (Cowen et al., 1987).  In contrast, 
Patten (1991) maintains industry, similar to company size, influences political visibility and this 
encourages disclosure to eliminate any unnecessary pressure and criticism from social activists. 
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Companies with higher levels of industrial volatility are more likely to make deliberate 
efforts to manage the impressions of important stakeholders than those with lower levels of 
volatility (Magness, 2006).  Different companies face distinctive levels of industrial debate.  This 
means that certain companies have more motivation to provide information that reduces actual 
(and potential) adverse publicity relating to their employees.  The disclosure of positive social 
responsibility information enhances the image of the company in the view of its political interest 
groups (Deegan and Gordon, 1993).   
A number of empirical studies have found positive relationships between industry 
classifications and social disclosures (Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Bozzolan, Favotto and Ricceri 
2003; Gray et al., 2001).  Kelly (1981) finds that primary and secondary industry companies are 
more likely to disclose a larger quantity of environmental and energy-related information than 
companies in tertiary industries, whereas a contradictory relationship is found for information 
relating to community interaction.  Cowen et al.’s (1987) US study finds that industry 
classification influences energy and community involvement disclosures.  However, their results 
indicate that the incidence and quantity of disclosure are not associated with industry 
classification (Deegan, 2002).  In contrast, Patten (1991) and Roberts (1992) find positive 
relationships between “high-profile” industries and the quantity of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure.  Davey (1982) and Ng (1985) do not establish an association between industry 
classification, with regards to company size, and social disclosure for New Zealand companies.  
Nonetheless, industry membership is measured in this study despite conflicting results relating to 
social disclosures and industry membership.  
3.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter Three presents and explains the hypotheses that lead to the conceptual framework 
by linking well-established literature streams (see Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 for a summary).  The 
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chapter also develops Ullmann’s stakeholder framework as it is adopted in this study.  
Specifically, the three aspects of Ullmann’s stakeholder theory (stakeholder power, strategic 
posture and economic performance) are operationalised and integrated to form a framework that 
can accommodate both quantitative and qualitative analysis to explain the quantity and quality of 
voluntary employee-related information in annual reports.  
The subsequent chapter identifies the measurement of the variables used in this study, and 
develops the methodology that forms the structure of the analysis. 
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TABLE 3-1 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
 
Ullmann’s 
Framework Hypotheses 
Quality/ 
Quantity Variables to Measure Hypotheses 
Stakeholder 
Power 
1A 
Companies disclose more employee-related 
information when the company’s employees have 
greater power. 
Quantity (1) Employee Share Ownership 
(2) Trade Union Membership 
1B 
Companies disclose higher quality employee-
related information when the company’s 
employees have greater power. 
Quality (1) Employee Share Ownership 
(2) Trade Union Membership 
Strategic 
Posture 
2A 
Companies displaying a more active posture 
towards employee issues disclose more employee-
related information than companies displaying a 
less active posture to these issues.   
Quantity (1) Employee Information in the Mission Statement 
(2) Corporate Governance Score (no. of directors, board 
independence, duality, no. of board meetings, audit 
committee, remuneration committee, nomination 
committee, social committee, auditor) 
2B 
Companies displaying a more active posture 
towards employee issues disclose higher quality 
employee-related information than companies 
displaying a less active posture to these issues.   
Quality (1) Employee Information in the Mission Statement 
(2) Corporate Governance Score (no. of directors, board 
independence, duality, no. of board meetings, audit 
committee, remuneration committee, nomination 
committee, social committee, auditor) 
Economic 
Performance 
3A 
Companies with higher past or current economic 
performance disclose more employee-related 
information than companies with lower past or 
current economic performance. 
Quantity (1) Return on Assets 
(2) Tobin’s Q 
3B 
Companies with higher past or current economic 
performance disclose higher quality employee-related 
information than companies with lower past or current 
economic performance. 
Quality (1) Return on Assets 
(2) Tobin’s Q 
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Model Dependent Variable Quantity/Quality Sample 
Corporate 
Governance 
Measurement 
Independent Variables Control Variables 
Model 1 Presence of employee 
disclosure (EMPD) 
Quantity All companies Corporate governance 
index 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, Corporate Governance Score, 
ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology  
Model 2 Presence of employee 
disclosure (EMPD) 
Quantity All companies Individual corporate 
governance variables 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, No of Directors, Board 
Independence, Duality, No of Board Meetings, Audit 
Committee, Remuneration Committee, Nomination 
Committee, Social Committee, Auditor, ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology  
Model 3 Number of sentences of 
employee-related disclosure 
(QUANTEMPD) 
Quantity All companies Corporate governance 
index 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, Corporate Governance Score, 
ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology  
Model 4 Number of sentences of 
employee-related disclosure 
(QUANTEMPD) 
Quantity All companies Individual corporate 
governance variables 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, No of Directors, Board 
Independence, Duality, No of Board Meetings, Audit 
Committee, Remuneration Committee, Nomination 
Committee, Social Committee, Auditor, ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology  
Model 5 Number of sentences of 
employee-related disclosure 
(QUANTEMPD) 
Quantity Disclosing only 
companies 
Corporate governance 
index 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, Corporate Governance Score, 
ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology  
Model 6 Number of sentences of 
employee-related disclosure 
(QUANTEMPD) 
Quantity Disclosing only 
companies 
Individual corporate 
governance variables 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, No of Directors, Board 
Independence, Duality, No of Board Meetings, Audit 
Committee, Remuneration Committee, Nomination 
Committee, Social Committee, Auditor, ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology  
Model 7 Number of employee 
categories disclosed  
(QUALEMPD) 
Quality All companies Corporate governance 
index 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, Corporate Governance Score, 
ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology  
Model 8 Number of employee 
categories disclosed 
(QUALEMPD) 
Quality All companies Individual corporate 
governance variables 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, No of Directors, Board 
Independence, Duality, No of Board Meetings, Audit 
Committee, Remuneration Committee, Nomination 
Committee, Social Committee, Auditor, ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology 
Model 9 Number of employee 
categories disclosed 
(QUALEMPD) 
Quality Disclosing only 
companies 
Corporate governance 
index 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, Corporate Governance Score, 
ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology  
Model 10 Number of employee 
categories disclosed 
(QUALEMPD) 
Quality Disclosing only 
companies 
Individual corporate 
governance variables 
Employee Share Ownership, Trade Union Membership, 
Employee Mission Statement, No of Directors, Board 
Independence, Duality, No of Board Meetings, Audit 
Committee, Remuneration Committee, Nomination 
Committee, Social Committee, Auditor, ROA, Tobin’s Q. 
Adverse Publicity, Size, Ownership Concentration, 
Leverage, Energy, Telecom, Utility, Finance, Health, 
Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology  
TABLE 3-2  SUMMARY OF VARIABLES 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the research methodology that serves to investigate the quantity and 
quality of employee-related disclosures in corporate annual reports.  Furthermore, Chapter Four 
provides an overview of the research design, describes the sample period, sample selection and 
data collection procedures employed in the research method.  The measurement of the variables 
used to test the hypotheses are illustrated and the statistical techniques to be undertaken in the 
research are examined.  
4.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The study employs a complete sample of listed companies on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) in 2004.  The study was confined to companies with a 30th June 2004 balance 
date, which reduced the sample size from 15277
An important measure of strategic posture is the application of corporate governance 
practices.  The year 2004 was chosen because it is the first year of implementation of the ASX 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in company’s 
 to 1046 companies.  This is done to ensure 
internal validity, cross-sectional generalisability, and sufficient statistical sample size of the study.  
From this sample, companies with zero employees for the year 2004 (for example, trusts or 
companies that use the services of contractors) are excluded from the sample, as they are not 
relevant to the current study on employee-related disclosures.  Therefore, the final sample consists 
of 970 companies, all employing at least one employee. 
                                                 
7 Number of companies listed on the ASX as at 30th June 2004 (ASX, 2010). 
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annual reports.  Therefore, it is the first time publicly listed companies are required to supply 
information on their corporate governance practices and if they are not implementing certain 
practices, they must disclose reasons for non-disclosure.  The change in reporting requirements 
applies to the company’s first financial year commencing after 1st January 2003.  Accordingly, 
where a company’s financial year begins on 1st July, disclosure is required in relation to the 
financial year 1st July 2003 to 30th June 2004 and is made in the annual report published in 2004 
(Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, 2006). 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION 
Content analysis is applied in this study to measure voluntary employee-related 
disclosures present in the 2004 annual reports and negative media attention in mainstream print.  
Content analysis has been implemented on annual reports by a number of researchers within the 
corporate social responsibility field (for example, Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Abeysekera and 
Guthrie, 2005; Aerts and Cormier, 2009; Aribi and Gao, 2010; Ax and Marton, 2009; Bontis, 
2003; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Brennan, 2001; Gray et al., 1995; Guthrie et al., 2004; Guthrie and 
Petty, 2000; Milne and Adler, 1999; Roslender and Fincham, 2004; Tilling and Tilt, 2010; 
Vuontisjarvi, 2006; Whiting and Millar, 2008; Yongvanich and Guthrie, 2007) to evaluate the 
extent of the disclosure (Ernst and Ernst, 1978; Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Guthrie and Parker, 
1990; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990).  In this study, content analysis is 
deemed to be an appropriate research method for the examination of the quantity and quality of 
disclosure regarding information about employees. 
Krippendorff (1980, p. 21) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from data to their context''.  The success of the process depends on 
the reliability and validity of the procedures employed (Deegan et al., 2002). 
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4.4 MEASUREMENT OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
4.4.1    PRESENCE OF DISCLOSURE 
The first, third and fifth hypotheses (1A, 2A and 3A) relate to the amount of disclosure 
associated with employee-related information.  One way of looking at the level of disclosure is to 
see if companies have any employee-related disclosure present. 
Therefore, the first dependent variable measure relates to whether or not a company 
discloses employee-related information in their annual report (denoted as EMPDi).  It is measured 
as a dichotomous variable taking a value of one for a company disclosing information relating to 
their employees in the 2004 annual report, and zero otherwise.  This information is extracted from 
each of the company’s annual reports in 2004.   
The researcher identified the information provided in the annual report that is considered 
to be employee-related information and two independent external research assistants verified this 
following the same criteria.  Specifically, the annual reports of the sampled companies were read 
and passages of text broadly termed as “employee-related disclosures” were identified and 
highlighted by each of the three independent researchers8
4.4.2    AMOUNT OF DISCLOSURE 
.  From this general group of employee-
related disclosures, the researchers were required to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary 
employee-related information.  Only voluntary disclosures are examined in this study. 
The second dependent variable examines the quantity or number of sentences of voluntary 
employee-related disclosures in companies’ annual reports (QUANTEMPDi).  Following the 
above process, individual sentences were identified as amounting to employee-related disclosures 
                                                 
8 See Appendix 5 for examples of employee-related disclosures in annual reports. 
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and were counted to compose the company’s quantity of disclosure score.  A set of decision rules 
was employed to reduce the subjectivity involved in the process of identifying sentences that 
include employee-related information.  This process was used for all of the independent variables.  
Any differences were discussed and a resolution made.  Employing three independent researchers 
to collect the data using the same criteria is a way to achieve consistency and reliability of data 
(see Chapter 6). 
An analysis of other social and environmental content analyses reveals that sentences form 
the basis for most coding decisions.  In content analysis, several alternatives have been proposed 
to measure the amount of social and environmental reporting (Unerman, 1999).  Some studies 
(Garcia-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2001) have used classification schemes to provide a number of 
disclosures (that is, the themes expressed in the analysed text).  However, Gray et al. (1995b) 
suggest that the amount of disclosures (number of words, sentences or pages) provides a richer 
data set and automatically encompasses the number of disclosures (Bozzolan et al., 2003; Cowen 
et al., 1987; Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Guthrie et al., 2006).  
In this study, quantity is measured by the number of sentences of employee-related 
information disclosed in the 2004 annual reports.  As natural units of written English that clearly 
exist between two punctuation marks, sentences are also likely to provide more reliable measures 
of interrater coding than words (Hackson and Milne, 1996; Yongvanich and Guthrie, 2007).  The 
models testing hypotheses 1A, 2A and 3A apply this as the measurement for the amount of space 
allocated to voluntary employee-related information.   
4.4.3    QUALITY OF DISCLOSURE 
The quality of voluntary employee-related disclosures in annual reports (QUALEMPDi) is 
measured using a disclosure index consisting of nine employee-related categories conceptually 
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developed from the GRI 2 (20029
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) unveils Sustainability Reporting Guidelines
) reporting standard for “Labor Practices and Decent Work 
Performance” (see Appendix 2 and 4), and in conjunction with the Horwath Corporate 
Governance Report (2004).   
Adhering to Ullmann’s (1985) theoretical framework for social disclosure, the quality of 
voluntary employee-related disclosures should be associated with employee stakeholder power, 
corporate strategic posture manifested in the mission statement, corporate governance best 
practice and superior economic performance.  
10
All organisations (private, public, or non-profit) are encouraged to report applying the 
Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines whether they are beginners or experienced reporters, and 
regardless of their size, sector, or location.  Reporting can take various forms including web or 
print, stand-alone, or combinations with annual or financial reports.  The first step is to determine 
report content.  Some organisations choose to introduce reporting using the full GRI Reporting 
Framework from the outset, while others prefer to begin with the most feasible and practical 
topics first and phase in reporting on other topics over time.  All reporting organisations should 
, 
which consist of principles for defining report content and ensuring the quality of reported 
information.  The reporting principles of materiality, stakeholder inclusiveness, sustainability 
context, and completeness, along with a brief set of tests are provided for each principle to 
determine what companies should report.  Application of these principles, with the standard 
disclosures determines the categories and indicators to be reported by companies.  Supplementary 
principles of balance, comparability, accuracy, timeliness, reliability, clarity, and the other set of 
tests are used to achieve the appropriate quality of the reported information (Global Reporting 
Index, 2006).   
                                                 
9 2004 reports would have referred to the GRI 2 (2002). 
10 See Appendix 2 for a breakdown of the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines for Labor Practices & Decent Work 
Performance Indicators. 
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describe the scope of their reporting and are encouraged to indicate their plans for expanding their 
reporting over time (GRI, 2006). 
Several studies in the accounting literature have used indexes based on content analysis to 
capture the quality of social or environmental reporting (see Clarkson, Li, Richardson and 
Vasvari, 2008; Clarkson et al., forthcoming; Freedman and Jaggi, 2004; Marston and Shrives, 
1991; Moroney et al., forthcoming; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Stanny and Ely, 2008; White, Lee, 
Yuningsih, Nielsen and Bukh, 2010).   
A disclosure index consists of various items of information that can be disclosed in the 
company’s annual report.  The annual report is examined to determine whether a particular index 
item is disclosed, and the index spreadsheet is completed accordingly.  If each category is 
assigned a score of zero or one (with no weights attached) indicating the absence or presence of 
an index item, the resulting score for a company varies between zero and the number of index 
items.  The validity of an index as a measure of the quality of employee-related disclosure is 
dependent upon the selection of the items to be included in the index.  Cheung, Jiang and Tan 
(2010) developed a “Transparency Index” to measure the quality of disclosure of corporate 
governance practices of Chinese listed companies.  Their transparency index is based on the five 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004).   
Content analysis is employed in this study to measure the quality of employee-related 
disclosures.  A set of coding rules was developed to guide the measurement of quality of 
employee-related disclosures.  The resulting score for a company varies between zero and the 
number of employee-related categories disclosed.   
The GRI 2 “Labor Practices and Decent Work Performance” standard comprises a total of 
14 categories relating to employment, labour/management relations, occupational health and 
safety, training and education, and diversity and equal opportunity (see Table 4-1).  Three 
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independent researchers coded the disclosures according to these 14 categories for a random 
sample of 30 companies to determine the suitability of the index.   
TABLE 4-1 GLOBAL REPORTING INDEX (2002) 
After careful consideration, and following reference to numerous studies that have 
analysed employee-related information (see Appendix 3), nine categories were chosen that 
capture the various types of information disclosed about the employees in the 2004 annual reports 
for Australian companies (see Table 4-2).  The reason for choosing to modify the 14 GRI 2 
Labor Practices and Decent Work Performance Indicators 
Employment LA1  Total workforce by employment type, employment contract, and region. 
 LA2 Total number and rate of employee turnover by age group, gender, and region. 
 LA3 Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to temporary or 
part-time employees, by major operations. 
Labour/ 
Management 
Relations 
LA4 Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
 LA5 Minimum notice period(s) regarding significant operational changes, including 
whether it is specified in collective agreements. 
Occupational 
Health and 
Safety 
LA6 Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint management-worker 
health and safety committees that help monitor and advise on occupational health 
and safety programs. 
 LA7 Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and absenteeism, and total 
number of work-related fatalities by region. 
 LA8 Education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-control programs in place to 
assist workforce members, their families, or community members regarding 
serious diseases. 
LA9 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade unions.  
Training and 
Education 
LA10 Average hours of training per year per employee-by-employee category. 
 LA11 Programs for skills management and lifelong learning that support the continued 
employability of employees and assist them in managing career endings. 
 LA12 Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career development 
reviews. 
Diversity and 
Equal 
Opportunity 
LA13 Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of employees per category 
according to gender, age group, minority group membership, and other indicators 
of diversity. 
 LA14 Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee category. 
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categories into nine employee-related categories is because there are a number of GRI categories 
not present in any of the annual reports analysed (for example, LA5, LA10, LA12, LA14) and 
some disclosures that do not fit into the GRI categories. 
TABLE 4-2 EMPLOYEE-RELATED CATEGORIES  
      Employee categories applied in this study Global Reporting Index (2002) 
1 Employee profiles LA1, LA2, LA12 
2 Employee assistance or benefits LA3 
3 Industrial relations LA4, LA5, LA9 
4 Health and safety LA6, LA7, LA8, LA9 
5 Employee training and development LA8, LA10, LA11, LA12 
6 Employee remuneration LA12 
7 Employment of minorities or women LA13, LA14 
8 Employee morale n/a 
9 Other n/a 
The index is calculated by adding together the categories referred to by companies in their 
annual reports.  Each company obtains a maximum score of one for each category of employee-
related disclosure regardless of how many times that category is mentioned in their annual reports.  
Scores range from one to nine, with a maximum value of nine (companies disclose information 
relating to all nine categories) indicating that these companies have high-quality employee-related 
disclosures.  Companies with a minimum value of zero (possess none of the nine attributes) are 
deemed to have low quality employee-related disclosures.  Therefore, companies with better 
quality employee-related disclosure practices have higher scores. 
4.5  MEASUREMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
4.5.1   EMPLOYEE POWER 
Two proxies of employee stakeholder power are adopted.  These are participation in an 
employee share ownership scheme and trade union membership. 
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EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP SCHEME  
All employee share ownership plans must be fully expensed and disclosed, and justified to 
shareholders in accordance with the Corporations Act (2001) and the Australian Equivalents to 
International Reporting Standards.  The revised standard AASB 1028 ‘Employee Benefits' 
requires detailed disclosure of equity-based compensation schemes effective for financial years 
beginning on or after 1 July 2002 (Kent and Molesworth, 2006).  This standard is relevant for the 
2004 sample applied in this study.  These disclosure requirements include details of employee 
share ownership schemes such as the number of outstanding shares at the beginning and end of a 
reporting period, voting and dividend rights attached to options, and vesting/exercise/expiry dates 
of the options.  Similarly, for options exercised during the reporting period, companies are 
required to disclose the number of options exercised, grant/exercise/expiry dates of the options 
exercised, exercise prices, proceeds from exercise, number of shares issued, and their fair values.  
These changes represent a substantial increase in disclosure requirements from previous years.  
Currently, AASB 2 ‘Share Based Payments’ sets out the accounting and disclosure requirements 
for employee share ownership, and was effective from 1 January 2005 (AASB, 2010).   
Employee share ownership is an independent variable that measures the presence of an 
employee share ownership scheme in the sample of companies as a proxy for employee 
stakeholder power.  Reported information noting the presence of an employee share ownership 
scheme in the 2004 annual reports is included in this study.  This variable is measured as a 
dichotomous variable, taking a value of one for a company with an employee share ownership 
scheme in 2004, and zero otherwise.  A positive relationship is expected between the presence of 
an employee share ownership scheme and employee-related disclosures.  Data for employee share 
ownership scheme participation by industry was also collected from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS, 2004) and could be applied as a continuous variable to measure employee power, 
however, it is a very broad measure, and is not as relevant as collecting information for each 
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individual company. 
TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP  
The presence of trade union membership is the second proxy for employee stakeholder 
power.  This variable is extracted from the “Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union 
Membership” survey conducted throughout Australia in August 2004 as a supplement to the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics monthly Labour Force Survey (LFS) (ABS, 2010).  
 The survey provides statistics on the distribution of weekly earnings of employees, their 
entitlement to paid leave (holiday, sick, long service and maternity/paternity), superannuation 
coverage and trade union membership.  This information can be cross classified by a range of 
personal characteristics such as age, sex and family type, and by characteristics of employment 
such as full-time or part-time status, industry and occupation (ABS, 2004).   
The trade union variable is measured as a dichotomous variable taking a value of one for a 
company in a highly unionised industry in 2004, and zero otherwise.  It is derived from the 
statistics on trade union membership, classified by industry11
                                                 
11 The Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) was released in 1993.  It was produced 
jointly by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and Statistics New Zealand and is presently used in both countries for the 
production and analysis of official industry statistics.  It is also widely used in administrative systems and other statistical 
databases. 
.  These industries were reclassified 
using the GICS industry classification, also used as the industry control variable in this study.  
The classification of either a highly unionised industry or poorly unionised industry is determined 
by the percentage of total employee union memberships by industry category (see Appendix 7).  
The average of 22.7 per cent is used as the cut-off point, meaning that companies in industries 
with more than 22.7 per cent of their workers as members of trade unions are considered to be 
“highly unionised” companies, and companies in industries with less than 22.7 per cent of their 
workers as members of trade unions are considered to be “poorly unionised” companies.  A 
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positive relationship with the dependent variables is anticipated.   
4.5.2 STRATEGIC POSTURE 
 Recall that this study identifies two proxies that indicate the nature of a company’s 
strategic posture toward employee-related disclosures.  The first measure is the acknowledgement 
of employees in the company’s mission statement, and the second is the measurement of the 
company’s corporate governance practices. 
MISSION STATEMENT 
Whilst some companies disclose their mission statement in their annual reports, some do 
not.  Consequently, a company’s mission statement is counted if it is present in either their annual 
report or on the company’s website.  It is expected that companies that acknowledge their 
employees in their mission statement make more employee-related disclosures in their annual 
report, because they deem their employees to be important. 
The employee mission statement variable is coded as one if the corporate mission 
statement refers to the employees of the company, and zero where the mission statement does not 
acknowledge the employees or where no mission statement is included in the company’s 2004 
annual report or on their website.12
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 
  A positive relationship is expected. 
This study applies corporate governance practices as an additional measure of strategic 
posture.  Numerous Australian studies have used a combined measure of corporate governance to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure (for example, 
                                                 
12 See Appendix 6 for examples of company’s mission statements that acknowledge the employees. 
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Clarkson, Ferguson and Hall 2003; Collett and Hrasky, 2005).  O’Sullivan, Percy and Stewart 
(2006) confirmed a correlation existed between a composite corporate governance factor and the 
disclosure of prospective information in company annual reports in 2000 but not in 2002 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2006).  Defond, Hung and Trezevant (2005) use a dichotomous variable for 
strong versus weak corporate governance structures defined by six characteristics examining 
whether the market values financial expertise on audit committees.  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003) use 24 governance rules to construct a “Governance Index” to proxy for the level of 
shareholder rights in approximately 1500 large companies during the 1990s.  
Several studies have investigated just one or two corporate governance mechanisms (see 
Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Cooper and Owen, 2007; Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux and Magnan, 2009; 
Ho and Wong, 2001; Sikka, 2008).  However, a company’s corporate governance score reflects an 
assessment of the company’s corporate governance practices and policies and the extent to which 
these serve the interests of the company’s financial stakeholders, with an emphasis on 
shareholders’ interests.  Corporate governance scores allow the comparison of individual 
companies within a national context as well as comparisons of companies in different jurisdictions 
(Standard and Poor’s Governance Services, 2002).  Given that stronger overall corporate 
governance should lead to improved reporting transparency, it is expected that a stronger 
governance system (reflected in a higher corporate governance score) is associated with increased 
disclosure of employee-related information in annual reports.  
The system being implemented in this study is based on separate governance 
recommended best practice attributes (ASX, 2008) and one incorporated in the Horwath 
Corporate Governance Report (2004).  The Horwath Corporate Governance Report (2004) 
annually rates Australia’s largest 250 companies, and more recently mid-cap listed companies, on 
their corporate governance structures and policies, and assigns them a score (Christensen et al., 
2010).  The corporate governance assessment model developed in the Horwath research is based 
 Tamara Zunker    102 
upon a combination of factors identified in national and international best practice guidelines and 
research studies.  These include the USA Blue Ribbon Committee Report (1999), the UK Hampel 
Report (1999), the OECD Report (2001), the UK Higgs Report (2003), the Australian Ramsay 
Report (2001), Investment and Financial Services Association of Australia Corporate Governance 
Guide (2003) and the ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles and Recommendations 
(2007). 
For purposes of the corporate governance score, corporate governance encompasses the 
interactions between a company’s management and its board of directors, shareholders, and other 
financial stakeholders.  The Horwath Corporate Governance Report (2004) model considers 
objective factors based on publicly disclosed information pertaining to the existence and structure 
of a company’s board of directors and associated committees (audit, remuneration and 
nomination), external auditor independence, disclosures relating to the existence of a code of 
conduct, risk management, and share trading policy.  Finally, the model also considers the clarity 
of the corporate governance disclosures.  The major factors in the model are applied in this study 
and described below.  Non-audit services are replaced by the presence of a social responsibility 
committee, and the existence of a code of conduct, risk management and share trading policy are 
excluded completely. 
Nine individual corporate governance variables are analysed in this study and are summed 
to produce a combined corporate governance score (CORPGOVi).  Those relevant in this study are 
the presence of a social responsibility committee, size of the board of directors, board 
independence, duality of the role of board chair and chief executive officer, number of board 
meetings, identity of external auditor, presence of an audit committee, presence of a remuneration 
committee, and/or presence of a nomination committee.   
 The corporate governance score is constructed by transforming each of the corporate 
governance characteristics into dichotomous variables (see Table 4-3).  Each company is assigned 
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a score of one if they possess that specific attribute, and a score of zero if they do not (see Table 
4-4 for examples).  The size of the board of directors and the number of board meetings are the 
only measures that are continuous variables.  Therefore, a board with more than five directors is 
coded one (signifying a larger board), and a board with less than five directors is coded zero 
(signifying a smaller board).  The cut-off point of five directors is chosen because it is the mean 
average number of directors on the boards of companies in the sample.  A company that holds 
more than ten meetings throughout 2004 is assigned a score of one, with companies holding ten 
meetings or less during 2004 coded zero.  The cut-off point of ten meetings is chosen because it is 
the mean average number of meetings in 2004 for the board of directors of companies in the 
sample.   
Each of the dichotomous variables is summed to produce an overall score measuring the 
effectiveness of each company’s corporate governance structure.  Companies with a maximum 
value of nine (possess all nine attributes) indicate they have strong corporate governance 
practices, whereas companies with a minimum value of zero (possess none of the nine attributes) 
indicate a weak corporate governance structure.    
TABLE 4-3 VARIABLES FOR THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE 
 Corporate Governance Characteristic Details Score Details Score 
1 Social responsibility committee Yes 1 No 0 
2 Size of the board of directors >5 1 =<5 0 
3 Majority of board independent >0.50 1 =<0.50 0 
4 Duality of the role of board chair and chief 
executive officer 
Yes 1 No 0 
5 Number of board meetings >10 1 =<10 0 
6 Identity of external auditor Big 4 1 Non-Big 4 0 
7 Presence of an audit committee Yes 1 No 0 
8 Presence of a remuneration committee Yes 1 No 0 
9 Presence of a nomination committee Yes 1 No 0 
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TABLE 4-4 EXAMPLES OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE 
CALCULATION 
Company Corporate Governance Characteristic Details Score 
Macquarie 
Bank 
Social responsibility committee Yes 1 
Size of the board of directors 11 (>5) 1 
Majority of board independent Yes (0.64) 1 
Duality of the role of board chair and chief executive officer No 0 
Number of board meetings 12 (>11) 1 
Identity of external auditor Big 4 1 
Presence of an audit committee Yes 1 
Presence of a remuneration committee Yes 1 
Presence of a nomination committee Yes 1 
TOTAL Corporate Governance Score 8 
  
  
Company Corporate Governance Characteristic Details Score 
Woolworths Social responsibility committee Yes 1 
Size of the board of directors 7 (>5) 1 
Majority of board independent Yes (0.86) 1 
Duality of the role of board chair and chief executive officer Yes 0 
Number of board meetings 10 (<11) 0 
Identity of external auditor Big 4 1 
Presence of an audit committee Yes 1 
Presence of a remuneration committee No 0 
Presence of a nomination committee No 0 
TOTAL Corporate Governance Score 5 
  
  
Company Corporate Governance Characteristic Details Score 
Lion Energy Social responsibility committee No 0 
Size of the board of directors 3 (<5) 0 
Majority of board independent No (0.33) 0 
Duality of the role of board chair and chief executive officer Yes 0 
Number of board meetings 4 (<11) 0 
Identity of external auditor Non-Big 4 0 
Presence of an audit committee No 0 
Presence of a remuneration committee No 0 
Presence of a nomination committee No 0 
TOTAL Corporate Governance Score 0 
The study also analyses corporate governance attributes individually to allow for the 
identification of the individual governance measures that have either an effective or ineffective 
influence on employee-related disclosures.   
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The following section explains how each of the corporate governance characteristics are 
measured as alternative individual corporate governance variables. 
THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COMMITTEE 
A social responsibility committee is the board committee that oversees social 
responsibility issues and is an indication of the high priority placed upon these issues by the 
company (Cowen et al., 1987; Gray et al., 1995a; International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 1992).  The presence or absence of these committees is ascertained through the 
annual reports of the companies in the sample.  The variable social committee (SOCCOMi) is a 
dichotomous measure and is coded one for companies with an established social responsibility 
committee as part of their company structure in 2004, and zero otherwise.  It is expected to be 
positively associated to the dependent variables.  
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Board size is the number of directors on the board, while board diligence is measured as 
the number of board meetings per year (Kent and Monem, 2008).  Board independence is 
measured as the majority of independent non-executive directors to total directors, with a majority 
of independent directors coded one, and zero otherwise.  A positive relationship is predicted for 
these variables.   
Duality is coded using a dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the roles of the 
chairperson and CEO are separated, and zero otherwise.  A negative relationship is anticipated. 
EXTERNAL AUDITOR 
A dummy variable is used to test the external audit hypothesis, with a value of one 
assigned when the company uses a Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise.  It is expected that a 
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company employing a Big Four auditor makes more disclosures relating to the company’s 
employees and that information is of a higher quality than those companies that use non Big Four 
auditors. 
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
The existence of an audit committee is identified by a dichotomous variable and is coded 
one if the company has an audit committee operating during the year, and zero otherwise.  A 
positive relationship is expected. 
THE REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
The existence of a remuneration committee is identified by a dichotomous variable with a 
value of one if the company has a remuneration committee operating during the year 2004, and 
zero otherwise.  A positive relationship is predicted.   
THE NOMINATION COMMITTEE 
The existence of a nomination committee is coded using a dichotomous variable with a 
value of one if the company has a nomination committee operating during the year 2004, and zero 
otherwise.  A positive relationship is anticipated.   
4.5.3 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recall that economic performance is measured using an accounting-based measure and a 
market-based measure.  Ullmann’s stakeholder framework requires either past or present 
measures of economic performance so both are measured in this study. 
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RETURN ON ASSETS  
Return on assets (ROAi) is calculated by net profit after tax divided by total assets and is 
used as the first proxy of economic performance in this analysis.  The figures to calculate present 
ROA are obtained from the company’s 2004 financial statements.  Past ROA is calculated using 
the average ROA over a period of three years (2002-2004).  A higher ROA indicates the 
management’s ability to utilise companies’ assets efficiently in serving shareholders’ economic 
interests (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010).  A positive association is anticipated. 
TOBIN’S Q 
Tobin’s Q  (TOBINSQi) is calculated by the market value of the company plus preference 
shares plus total debt divided by total assets.  These figures are used to calculate present market-
based economic performance and are obtained from the 2004 financial statements for each of the 
companies in the sample.   Past market-based economic performance is calculated by averaging 
Tobin’s Q for 2002-2004 with the figures obtained from the annual reports. 
This calculation is the same method used by Chung and Pruitt (1994), Christensen et al. 
(2010) and Moroney et al. (forthcoming).  The financial information applied in the formula is 
available from database sources used to obtain other information in this study.  If Tobin’s Q is 
greater than 1.0, then the market value is greater than the value of the company’s recorded assets.  
This suggests that the market value reflects some unmeasured or unrecorded assets of the 
company.   
High Tobin’s Q values encourage companies to invest more in capital because they are 
worth more than the price they paid for them (Christensen et al., 2010).  Therefore, a company’s 
present market-based economic performance is operationalised as the company’s approximate 
Tobin’s Q for 2004.  A positive relationship is predicted. 
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4.6 CONTROL VARIABLES 
4.6.1 ADVERSE PUBLICITY  
 The adverse publicity (ADVPUBLi) variable was collected from the Factiva database for 
each sample company for any published news article from 1st July 2003 to 30th June 2004.  The 
database records editorials from all major Australian and New Zealand newspapers.  A search 
was done on each company in the sample using the database to find any negative information 
about the company and the employees over the one-year period specified.  The items of news 
were read and interpreted to determine whether they constituted adverse publicity (bad news) 
relating to the company’s employees based on the nature and content of the items.  Each article 
meeting the criteria of “bad news” is assigned a score of one.  The companies’ scores are added 
together to obtain a total score of adverse publicity.  Therefore, a company with 21 newspaper 
articles containing negative information relating to their employees in the 12 months leading up to 
30th June 2004 has an adverse publicity score of 21. 
This method was undertaken by three independent researchers to minimise any 
experimental bias and the results are consistent across the sample.  A positive relationship is 
anticipated between the number of adverse newspaper articles and disclosure of employee-related 
information. 
4.6.2 SIZE (EMPLOYEE CONCENTRATION) 
This study measures size by the number of employees divided by market capitalisation13
                                                 
13 Market capitalisation is a measurement of size of a company equal to the 
 
in 2004.  It is predicted that the greater the proportion of employees to the size of the company, 
the more likely the company will make employee-related disclosures in the annual report and the 
share price times the number of shares 
outstanding. 
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greater the amount of employee-related information disclosed.  
4.6.3 SHAREHOLDER POWER (OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION) 
The power of the shareholders within the company is proxied by the distribution of 
ownership of the shares in the company.  Ownership concentration is measured as the percentage 
of outstanding ordinary shares held by shareholders who own 5 per cent or more of the shares, 
otherwise known as block holders (denoted as BLOCKi).  Shareholding information is obtained 
through the 2004 annual report disclosure of the top twenty shareholdings in each of the sampled 
companies.   
4.6.4 CREDITOR POWER (LEVERAGE) 
It is supposed that employee-related disclosures are related to the degree in which the 
company relies upon debt financing.  The stakeholder power of the creditors is measured by the 
debt to asset ratio (LEVERAGEi).  This ratio is chosen to represent creditor power because it 
captures the importance of creditors relative to the total assets held by the company.  Information 
regarding the debt and asset content of the companies is obtained through the sample companies’ 
2004 annual reports.   
4.6.5 INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
The nature of a company’s industry is identified as a possible factor affecting corporate 
social disclosure practices.  Industry membership is coded according to the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) sector, as presented in the table below.  Each industry sector is 
measured as a dichotomous variable, with a value of one if the company belongs to the specific 
industry sector, and a value of zero if the company is not classified as a member of the relevant 
industry.  
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TABLE 4-5 GLOBAL INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION STANDARD CATEGORIES 
 Sector Industry Group 
1 Energy Energy 
2 Materials Materials 
3 Industrial Capital Goods 
  Commercial Services and Supplies 
  Transportation 
4 Consumer Discretionary Automobiles and Components 
  Consumer Durables and Apparel 
  Consumer Services 
  Media 
  Retailing 
5 Consumer Staples Food and Staples 
  Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
  Household and Personal Products 
6 Health Care Health Care Equipment and Services 
  Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life Sciences 
7 Financials  Banks 
  Diversified Financials 
  Insurance 
  Real Estate 
8 Information Technology Software and Services 
  Technology Hardware and Equipment  
  Semiconductors and Semiconductor Equipment 
9 Telecommunication Services Telecommunication Services 
10 Utilities  Utilities 
   SOURCE:   GLOBAL INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION STANDARD (GICS) METHODOLOGY (AUGUST, 2006) 
4.7 TESTS 
The key analyses use binary regression and multiple ordinary least squares regressions for 
the quantity and quality of voluntary employee-related disclosures.  These are also used to 
determine the power of the explanatory variables in predicting the companies that disclose 
employee-related information in their annual reports or otherwise, the level of disclosure and the 
nature of disclosure.  Controls for the associations of adverse publicity, employee concentration, 
shareholder power, creditor power, and industry classification are also included in the regression 
model.  Multiple regression is based on the presumption that no multicollinearity exists between 
the independent variables, suggesting there is no exact linear relationship between the 
independent variables (Gujarati, 1992).  To test whether a relationship exists between the 
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independent variables, Pearson’s bi-variate correlation is performed.  Descriptive statistics are 
also reported for the dependent and independent variables in the models and are covered further in 
Chapter Five. 
4.8 MODELS 
Ten models are used to test the hypotheses.  Five of the models (Models 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9) 
apply the corporate governance score.  The other five models (Models 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10) apply the 
corporate governance characteristics individually in the model and are expressed as follows: 
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Corporate Governance Score Individual Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Binary Logistic Regression – All companies 
Model 
1 
EMPDi = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + b2TRADEUNi 
+ b3EMPMISi + b4CORPGOVi + b5ROAi + 
b6TOBINSQi + b7ADVPUBLi + b8SIZEi + 
b9BLOCKi  + b10LEVERAGEi + b11ENERGYi 
+ b12TELECOMi + b13UTILITYi + 
b14FINANCEi  + b15HEALTHi + 
b16CONSDISi  + b17ITi + e. 
Model 
2 
EMPDi = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + b2TRADEUNi + 
b3EMPMISi + b4iNDIRi + b5BRDINDEPi + b6DUALi + 
b7BRDMEETi + b8AUDITCOMi + b9REMCOMi + 
b10NOMCOMi + b11SOCCOMi + b12AUDITORi  + 
b13ROAi + b14TOBINSQi + b15ADVPUBLi + b16SIZEi + 
b17BLOCKi  + b18LEVERAGEi + b19ENERGYi + 
b20TELECOMi + b21UTILITYi + b22FINANCEi  + 
b23HEALTHi + b24CONSDISi  + b25ITi + e. 
OLS Regression – All companies 
Model 
3 
 
QUANTEMPDi = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + 
b2TRADEUNi + b3EMPMISi + 
b4CORPGOVi + b5ROAi + b6TOBINSQi + 
b7ADVPUBLi + b8SIZEi + b9BLOCKi  + 
b10LEVERAGEi + b11ENERGYi + 
b12TELECOMi + b13UTILITYi + 
b14FINANCEi  + b15HEALTHi + 
b16CONSDISi  + b17ITi + e. 
Model  
4 
QUANTEMPDi = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + b2TRADEUNi + 
b3EMPMISi + b4iNDIRi + b5BRDINDEPi + b6DUALi 
+ b7BRDMEETi + b8AUDITCOMi + b9REMCOMi + 
b10NOMCOMi + b11SOCCOMi + b12AUDITORi  + 
b13ROAi + b14TOBINSQi + b15ADVPUBLi + b16SIZEi 
+ b17BLOCKi  + b18LEVERAGEi + b19ENERGYi + 
b20TELECOMi + b21UTILITYi + b22FINANCEi  + 
b23HEALTHi + b24CONSDISi  + b25ITi + e. 
OLS Regression – Disclosing companies only 
Model 
5 
 
QUANTEMPDi = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + 
b2TRADEUNi + b3EMPMISi + 
b4CORPGOVi + b5ROAi + b6TOBINSQi + 
b7ADVPUBLi + b8SIZEi + b9BLOCKi  + 
b10LEVERAGEi + b11ENERGYi + 
b12TELECOMi + b13UTILITYi + 
b14FINANCEi  + b15HEALTHi + 
b16CONSDISi  + b17ITi + e.. 
Model  
6 
QUANTEMPDi = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + b2TRADEUNi + 
b3EMPMISi + b4iNDIRi + b5BRDINDEPi + b6DUALi 
+ b7BRDMEETi + b8AUDITCOMi + b9REMCOMi + 
b10NOMCOMi + b11SOCCOMi + b12AUDITORi  + 
b13ROAi + b14TOBINSQi + b15ADVPUBLi + b16SIZEi 
+ b17BLOCKi  + b18LEVERAGEi + b19ENERGYi + 
b20TELECOMi + b21UTILITYi + b22FINANCEi  + 
b23HEALTHi + b24CONSDISi  + b25ITi + e. 
OLS Regression – All companies  
Model 
7 
 
QUALEMPDi = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + 
b2TRADEUNi + b3EMPMISi + 
b4CORPGOVi + b5ROAi + b6TOBINSQi + 
b7ADVPUBLi + b8SIZEi + b9BLOCKi  + 
b10LEVERAGEi + b11ENERGYi + 
b12TELECOMi + b13UTILITYi + 
b14FINANCEi  + b15HEALTHi + 
b16CONSDISi  + b17ITi + e. 
Model  
8 
QUALEMPDi  = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + b2TRADEUNi + 
b3EMPMISi + b4iNDIRi + b5BRDINDEPi + b6DUALi 
+ b7BRDMEETi + b8AUDITCOMi + b9REMCOMi + 
b10NOMCOMi + b11SOCCOMi + b12AUDITORi  + 
b13ROAi + b14TOBINSQi + b15ADVPUBLi + b16SIZEi 
+ b17BLOCKi  + b18LEVERAGEi + b19ENERGYi + 
b20TELECOMi + b21UTILITYi + b22FINANCEi  + 
b23HEALTHi + b24CONSDISi  + b25ITi + e. 
OLS Regression – Disclosing companies only 
Model 
9 
 
QUALEMPDi = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + 
b2TRADEUNi + b3EMPMISi + 
b4CORPGOVi + b5ROAi + b6TOBINSQi + 
b7ADVPUBLi + b8SIZEi + b9BLOCKi  + 
b10LEVERAGEi + b11ENERGYi + 
b12TELECOMi + b13UTILITYi + 
b14FINANCEi  + b15HEALTHi + 
b16CONSDISi  + b17ITi + e. 
Model  
10 
QUALEMPDi  = b0 + b1EMPSHRi + b2TRADEUNi + 
b3EMPMISi + b4iNDIRi + b5BRDINDEPi + b6DUALi 
+ b7BRDMEETi + b8AUDITCOMi + b9REMCOMi + 
b10NOMCOMi + b11SOCCOMi + b12AUDITORi  + 
b13ROAi + b14TOBINSQi + b15ADVPUBLi + b16SIZEi 
+ b17BLOCKi  + b18LEVERAGEi + b19ENERGYi + 
b20TELECOMi + b21UTILITYi + b22FINANCEi  + 
b23HEALTHi + b24CONSDISi  + b25ITi + e. 
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Variable Description 
Dependent variables 
EMPDi = 1 if the company discloses employee-related information, and 0 otherwise. 
QUANTEMPDi = number of sentences of employee-related disclosure. 
QUALEMPDi = the number of different types of employee categories disclosed. 
Stakeholder Power variables 
EMPSHRi = 1 if the company has a share ownership scheme in 2004, and 0 otherwise. 
TRADEUNi = 1 if the company is in a highly unionised industry, and 0 otherwise 
Strategic Posture variables 
EMPMISi = 1 if the company discloses employee-related information in the mission 
statement, and 0 otherwise. 
CORPGOVi = corporate governance score out of nine, based on corporate governance 
variables. 
Corporate Governance variables: 
NDIRi = number of directors on the board 
BRDINDEPi = 1 if majority of independent directors on the board, and 0 otherwise. 
DUALi = 1 if the CEO is also the chair, and 0 otherwise. 
BRDMEETi = number of board meetings during 2004. 
AUDITORi = 1 if a Big Four auditor is used, and 0 otherwise.  
AUDITCOMi = 1 if the company has an audit committee, and 0 otherwise. 
REMCOMi = 1 if the company has a remuneration committee, and 0 otherwise. 
NOMCOMi = 1 if the company has a nomination committee, and 0 otherwise. 
SOCCOMi = 1 if the company has a social responsibility committee, and 0 otherwise. 
Economic Performance variables 
ROAi = return of assets at balance date 
TOBINSQi = market value of the company plus preference shares plus total debt divided  
   by total assets. 
Control variables 
ADVPUBLi = number of adverse media publicities in the year prior to 2004. 
SIZEi = percentage of employees to market capitalisation. 
BLOCKi = percentage of outstanding ordinary shares held by shareholders who own  
   5% or more of the shares. 
LEVERAGEi = total debt divided by total assets in 2004. 
MATERIALi = 1 if the company is in the materials industry, and 0 otherwise. 
UTILITYi = 1 if the company is in the utility industry, and 0 otherwise. 
TELECOMi = 1 if the company is in the telecommunications industry, and 0 otherwise. 
INDUSTRIALi = 1 if the company is in the industrial industry, and 0 otherwise. 
HEALTHi = 1 if the company is in the healthcare industry, and 0 otherwise. 
CONSDISi = 1 if the company is in the consumer discretionary industry, and 0 otherwise. 
ITi = 1 if the company is in the information technology industry, and 0 otherwise. 
FINANCEi = 1 if the company is either a bank or an insurance company, and 0 otherwise. 
CONSSTAPi = 1 if the company is in the consumer staples industry, and 0 otherwise. 
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4.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Numerous variables have been examined to explain the voluntary disclosure of social 
information.  Stakeholder theory, along with other complementary theories, as outlined in chapter 
two, identifies corporate governance variables as competing hypotheses and alternative control 
variables in determining the quantity and quality of voluntary employee-related disclosures in 
annual reports.  This study analyses ten models to determine the presence of voluntary employee-
related disclosures (dependent variable = EMPDi), the amount of employee-related information in 
the annual reports (dependent variable = QUANTEMPDi), the quality of the disclosures 
(dependent variable = QUALEMPDi) and the nature of these disclosures (dependent variable = 
NATUREMPDi).  The independent variables included are related to operationalising Ullmann’s 
stakeholder framework, while the control variables are represented by adverse publicity, size, 
blockholders, leverage and industry classification.  
Multivariate tests are used to determine the overall power of the explanatory variables in 
predicting which companies do or do not disclose employee-related information in their annual 
report, the level of disclosure, the quality of disclosure, and the nature of disclosure. 
The following chapter identifies the descriptive statistics and analyses the results, which 
test the hypotheses of the study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first four chapters introduce the research, discuss the literature concerning the 
conceptual framework, and explain the methodologies proposed for analysing the dependent and 
independent variables, and relationships between constructs.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
present the descriptive and empirical results.  It also addresses preliminary data analysis including 
a discussion of the underlying assumptions of multiple regressions.  The results of the hypotheses 
testing are provided and robustness tests are explained. 
5.2 SAMPLE PROFILE 
Table 5-1 shows the industry classification of the 970 sample companies as per the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS).  The largest representation of the sample is from the 
materials industry with a total of 177 companies.  A total of 121 of these companies disclosed 
employee-related information in their 2004 annual report.  This result is not surprising given that 
companies from the materials industry directly affect the natural environment and the surrounding 
areas in which they operate, and their operations are susceptible to accidents involving employees 
(Dierkes and Preston, 1977; IIED, 2002; Yongvanich and Guthrie, 2007).  The smallest 
representation of the sample is from the utilities industry with a total of 13 companies, with 8 of 
these companies disclosing employee-related information. 
Interestingly, the consumer discretionary industry is the largest industry of employee-
related disclosure in relation to the number of companies operating in that industry.  Consumer 
discretionary companies are expected to show further concern indicating their social responsibility 
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to the community, since this is likely to improve their corporate image and influence revenues 
(Cowen et al., 1987).  This sector of the economy relies on consumers to spend their disposable 
income on items that are not necessary for survival.  In many economies, this is the largest 
segment of the economy because it includes automobiles, all retail stores, fast food and media 
companies (ASX, 2010).   
The smallest representation of the disclosure of employee-related information in the 
sample is from the telecommunications industry.  Although these companies are primarily 
serviced-based firms, their employees usually communicate with consumers via media channels 
such as the telephone or internet, rather than face-to-face as with the consumer discretionary 
industry.  It is expected that service-based companies place greater importance on their staff than 
product-based counterparts, as they rely on their employees’ knowledge and expertise to ensure 
the company’s ongoing survival (Magness, 2006; Shocker and Sethi, 1974).  Service firms 
recognise that achieving customer-oriented behaviours from their employees is vital.  Service 
firms utilise their human resource practices to stimulate and reinforce the behaviours needed for 
the successful implementation of greater customer-oriented strategies because these behaviours 
are often different from those exhibited by the employees in the past  (Jackson and Schuler, 1992).  
This point, however, is not reflected in the study. 
TABLE 5-1  INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION OF SAMPLE COMPANIES 
GICS Industry 
Classification 
# of Sample 
Companies 
% of Total 
Sample 
# of Disclosing 
Companies 
% of Sample 
Companies* 
Consumer Discretionary 125 12.89 92 73.60 
Consumer Staples 48 4.95 34 70.83 
Energy 29 2.99 21 72.41 
Financial 173 17.84 105 60.69 
Healthcare 120 12.37 88 73.33 
Industrial 141 14.54 97 68.79 
Information Technology 116 11.96 68 58.62 
Materials 177 18.25 121 68.36 
Telecommunications 28 2.89 15 53.57 
Utility 13 1.34 8 61.54 
Total 970 100 649 66.91 
  * Percentage of companies disclosing employee-related information. 
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Table 5-1 illustrates that 66.91 per cent (649 companies) of the total sample of companies 
are disclosing some type of employee-related information in their 30th June 2004 annual report.   
5.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables in the models are 
shown in the tables below.  The continuous variables are illustrated in Table 5-2 and the binary 
variables in Table 5-3.   
Table 5-2 reveals the number of sentences of employee-related disclosure range from zero 
to 139, with a mean of 9.90.  On average, companies disclose around one to two categories of 
employee-related information out of the nine items developed as the quality measure (see 
Appendix 4).  
The number of employees varies between companies and industry groups, with a total 
sample range of zero to 89,208 and a mean of 1,212 employees.  This illustrates the difference in 
size and disclosure coverage by companies being analysed in this study.  The employee 
concentration variable shows an average ratio of 5.97 indicating an average of 6 million dollars of 
market capitalisation per employee.  The larger the ratio, the greater the market capitalisation of 
the company in relation to its employees, hence the less power the employees have per capita. 
The average percentage of employees who belong to a trade union is 21.81 per cent, with 
the utility industry considered to be the most highly unionised with 52.30 per cent of employees 
belonging to a trade union, and the agriculture, forestry and fishing industry the least unionised 
with only 4.70 per cent of employees belonging to a union14
The total assets differ substantially across the companies in the sample with mean total 
assets of $1.00 billion and median total assets of $30.81 million.  Similarly, the sample companies 
. 
                                                 
14 See Appendix 7 for a summary of trade union membership at the industry level. 
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have diverse net profit levels with the mean being $37.17 million and median $0.52 million, while 
the minimum is a loss of $726.58 million and the maximum is $4.94 billion.  The mean return on 
assets is -0.75 per cent with the median 0.02 per cent, while the average Tobin’s Q is 4.33.  Debt 
to assets averages 0.48 with a median ratio of 0.38. 
An examination of the corporate governance practices illustrates the following 
characteristics amongst the sample companies.  Board size ranges from a minimum of three 
directors to a maximum of 15 directors, with a mean (median) of 5.06 (5) members.  The mean 
(median) number of independent directors on the board is 2.59 (1).  The mean ratio of 
independent directors on the board is 61 per cent.  The sample companies have an average of 
10.53 meetings in the year 2004 with a minimum of one, maximum of 51 and a median of 11 
meetings.  Further analysis indicates that 42 companies (4.30 per cent of total sample) held more 
than 20 meetings during 2004 while 13 companies (1.30 per cent of total sample) held only one 
meeting that year.  It appears that most companies meet approximately once a month. 
Among other corporate governance attributes, 82 per cent of the companies have an audit 
committee, 56 per cent have a remuneration committee, 31 per cent have a nomination 
committee, but only 12 per cent of companies have a social responsibility committee.  This 
indicates that few companies have a formal structure in place for social responsibility practices.  
More than half of the companies in the sample are audited by one of the Big 4 accounting firms, 
and 11 per cent of companies have a dual CEO and chairperson of the board.  Overall, the average 
corporate governance index score is 5.36 out of a possible nine. 
Table 5-3 shows that 98 per cent of the companies disclosing information about the 
employees are disclosing positive information.  It also illustrates that only 37 per cent of 
companies have their mission statement publicly available on either their website or within their 
2004 annual report, and only 19 per cent of companies refer to their employees in their mission 
statement.  Some 54 per cent of companies have an employee share ownership scheme in place, 
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providing their employees with the opportunity to also be shareholders in the company.  
Results in Table 5-4 reveal that 13 per cent of the publicly listed companies as at the 30th 
June 2004 have adverse publicity in major Australian and New Zealand Newspapers in the 
previous year.  The average number of adverse newspaper articles for companies in the sample 
with adverse publicity is 4.08 articles with a range of 1 to 45.  The average is 0.68 with a range of 
0 to 45 when all companies, including non-disclosing companies were included in calculating 
descriptive statistics (see Table 5-2).   
TABLE 5-2  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Number of sentences 0.00 139.00 9.90 2.00 18.12 
Number of employee 
categories 0.00 9.00 1.67 1.00 1.71 
Employee concentration 0.002 437.36 5.97 1.60 19.54 
Trade union membership (%) 4.70 52.30 21.81 17.40 8.05 
Block holders (%) 0.00 99.80 39.18 39.84 22.23 
Debt to total assets 0.00 35.51 0.48 0.38 1.46 
Number of directors on board 3.00 15.00 5.06 5.00 1.79 
Number of independent 
directors 0.00 11.00 2.59 1.00 1.66 
Number of board meetings 0.00 51.00 10.53 11.00 4.98 
Total assets (in millions) 0.0097 305995.00 1004.97 30.81 10567.92 
Log of total assets 9.18 26.45 17.44 17.24 2.27 
Return on assets -595.98 73.50 -0.75 0.02 19.59 
Net profit after tax (in 
millions) -726.58 4939.76 37.17 0.52 277.55 
Tobin’s Q 0.10 400.79 4.33 1.47 22.65 
Number of adverse newspaper 
articles 0.00 45.00 0.68 0.00 3.12 
Corporate governance score 0.00 9.00 5.36 4.00 2.59 
Number of employees 1.00 89208.00 1212.04 49.00 5692.93 
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TABLE 5-3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES 
Variable Yes Number of Companies No 
Number of 
Companies 
Presence of employee-related disclosures 0.67 649 0.33 321 
Positive employee-related disclosures 0.98 633 0.02 16 
Employee share ownership scheme 0.54 519 0.46 451 
Mission statement 0.37 355 0.63 615 
Employee information in mission statement 0.19 184 0.81 171 
Board independence 0.61 583 0.39 387 
Duality of CEO/chair 0.11 109 0.89 861 
Audited by Big 4 0.58 561 0.42 409 
Audit committee 0.82 796 0.18 174 
Remuneration committee 0.56 544 0.44 426 
Nomination committee 0.31 298 0.69 672 
Social committee 0.12 113 0.88 857 
Table 5-4 provides a detailed analysis of adverse publicity.  Panel A shows that 16.33 per 
cent of the 649 companies that disclosed employee-related information received adverse publicity 
during 2003-2004, compared with only 5.61 per cent of the 321 non-disclosing companies in the 
previous year.  When analysing the entire sample, 12.78 per cent of the 970 companies 
experienced some element of adverse publicity during that year.  The only industry that did not 
have any adverse publicity was the utilities industry containing a small sample of only 13 
companies.  
Panel B lists the frequency of adverse publicity reported for the sample companies by 
GICS industry classification.  Different companies face distinctive levels of industrial debate.  
This means that certain companies have more motivation to provide information that reduces 
actual and potential adverse publicity relating to their employees.  Companies with higher levels 
of industrial volatility are more likely to make an effort to manage the impressions of stakeholders 
than those with lower levels of volatility (Magness, 2006).  Corporate responsibility is 
increasingly considered an integral part of core business values and strategy, rather than an 
isolated function within companies dealing with risks of non-compliance or damage to reputation 
from negative publicity or scandals (KPMG, 2005). 
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TABLE 5-4  DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF ADVERSE PUBLICITY 
PANEL A  FREQUENCY OF ADVERSE PUBLICITY BY COMPANIES 
 Disclosing companies 
Non-disclosing 
companies Total 
Number of companies 649 321 970 
Companies with adverse publicity 106 18 124 
Percentage  16.33% (106/649) 5.61%    (18/321) 
12.78% 
(124/970) 
 
PANEL B FREQUENCY OF ADVERSE PUBLICITY BY GICS INDUSTRY 
CLASSIFICATION 
GICS Industry 
Classification 
Frequency of 
Adverse 
Publicity 
Number of 
Companies with 
Adverse Publicity 
Percentage of 
Industry* 
Consumer Discretionary 174 28 22.40  
Industrial  121 24 17.02  
Materials 89 20 11.30  
Financial 99 17 9.83  
Consumer Staples 52 11 22.92 
Healthcare 49 8 6.67  
Information Technology 15 8 6.90  
Telecommunications 55 7 25.00  
Energy 4 1 3.45 
Utilities 0 0 0  
         Note: (*) Percentage refers to the % of companies within the GICS classification that had adverse publicity. 
 
PANEL C  EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE PUBLICITY ITEMS 
  Employees hospitalised   Mining accidents 
  Gas and fire accidents   Pollution  
  Toxic poisoning   Bank closures and loss of jobs 
  Industrial accidents   Remuneration disputes 
  Job cuts   Union activity 
  Lost jobs and objection to executive remuneration   Lawsuit for negligence and damage 
  Safety and environmental concerns  
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Table 5-5 Panel A illustrates the prevalence of the different categories of employee-related 
information present in the samples’ annual reports.  Employee morale is surprisingly the most 
frequently disclosed type of employee-related information (462), followed by industrial relations-
related disclosures (403).  Employment of minorities is by far the least discussed of all the 
categories with only 14 disclosures made over the entire sample.  This result is different to that 
reported by Deegan et al. (2000) who find that health and safety disclosures are the most 
prevalent.  In this study, only 135 employee disclosures relating to health and safety are revealed 
across the sample. 
TABLE 5-5  DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE INFORMATION 
PANEL A  NATURE OF EMPLOYEE DISCLOSURE ITEMS 
 Nature of Employee Disclosures 
Total number of 
disclosures by 
companies 
Percentage (%) 
 Employee morale 462 28.31 
 Industrial relations 403 24.69 
 Employee benefits 360 22.06 
 Occupational health and safety issues 135 8.27 
 Training and development 132 8.09 
 Employee assistance 62 3.80 
 Remuneration 46 2.82 
 Other 18 1.10 
 Employment of minorities 14 0.86 
 Total 1,632 100 
Panel B displays a breakdown of the number of employees in each industry.  The 
consumer staples industry has the highest mean number of employees (4,653) and also the 
largest sized company based on staff, Coles Myer Limited with 89,208 employees recorded 
for 2004.  The information technology sector has the lowest mean number of employees 
(207).  There are 43 companies in the sample who employ only one person. 
  
Tamara Zunker   123 
PANEL B  EMPLOYEE NUMBERS BY INDUSTRY 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
Number of 
Companies 
% of Total 
Companies 
Energy 216.93 8.00 717.16 1 3211 29 2.99 
Telecommunications 3778.04 44.50 15034.82 1 78100 28 2.89 
Utility 306.85 17.00 886.62 1 3239 13 1.34 
Materials 1089.84 14.00 4164.01 1 36468 177 18.25 
Industrial 1905.91 190.00 5386.76 1 33862 141 14.54 
Finance 573.62 32.00 3018.75 1 36296 173 17.84 
Healthcare 644.76 19.50 2107.88 1 12168 120 12.37 
Consumer Discretionary 1391.70 231.00 3490.12 1 31400 125 12.89 
Information Technology 207.30 41.00 769.08 1 7995 116 11.96 
Consumer Staples 4653.38 115.00 16882.57 1 89208 48 4.95 
Total      970 100 
 
5.4 CORRELATIONS 
Tables 5-6A and 5-6B report Pearson’s bi-variate correlation statistics between the 
variables used to test the hypotheses.  Correlations15
The quality of employee-related disclosure variable, measured by the number of 
categories of employee-related information using the GRI index (QUALEMPDi, r = 0.69) is 
positively significantly correlated to the dependent variable, presence of employee-related 
disclosure (EMPDi).  The variables quality of employee-related disclosure (QUALEMPDi, r = 
0.68), the corporate governance score (CORPGOVi, r = 0.42), the number of directors on the 
board (NDIRi, r = 0.41) and the log of total assets (LASSETSi, r = 0.48) are positively significantly 
 are performed to provide an early indication 
of any multicollinearity problems which, if found, might pose a threat to the multivariate analysis 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  Very low tolerance levels (approaching zero) or very high 
variance inflation factors (VIF) suggest that multicollinearity is a concern.   In this study VIF 
scores are well below the VIF value of 10 that indicates a threat of multicollinearity (Pallant, 
2007).  Thus, multicollinearity is not a concern in this study. 
                                                 
15 Only significant correlations with an r > 0.40 and p<= .01 sign level have been discussed.   
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correlated to the dependent variable, quantity of employee-related disclosures (QUANTEMPDi).  
The corporate governance score variable (CORPGOV, r = 0.46), the number of directors on the 
board (NDIRi, r = 0.42) and the log of total assets (LASSETSi, r = 0.48) are positively significantly 
correlated to the quality of employee-related disclosures (QUALEMPDi).  
Additionally, the corporate governance score (CORPGOVi, r = 0.46), the number of 
directors on the board (NDIRi, r = 0.41), the presence of an audit committee  (AUDITCOMi, r = 
0.41), the presence of a nomination committee (NOMCOMi, r = 0.42), big 4 auditor (AUDITORi, r 
= 0.41) and the number of adverse publicity newspaper articles (ADVPUBLi, r = 0.40) are 
positively significantly correlated to the variable log of total assets (LASSETSi).  Return on assets 
(ROAi, r = -0.46) is negatively significantly related to debt to assets (LEVERAGEi), and the utility 
(r = 0.44) industry is positively related and the finance (r = -0.46) industry is negatively 
significantly related to trade union membership (TRADEUNi). 
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TABLE 5-6A           PEARSON’S BI-VARIATE CORRELATION MATRIX – DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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QUANTEMPD .39**                 
QUALEMPD .69** .68**                
EMPSHR .27** .22** .28**               
TRADEUN -.01 .03 .01 .15**              
EMPMIS .08* .21** .20** .10** .05             
CORPGOV .39** .42** .46** .37** .06 .16**            
NDIR .28** .41** .42** .26** .05 .18** .62**           
BRDINDEP .13** .16** .14** .06* .02 .06 .40** .12**          
DUAL -.14** -.11** -.16** -.08* .05 -.09** -.03 -.15** -.07*         
BRDMEET .15** .11** .14** .16** .05 .00 .35** .09** .03 -.05        
AUDITCOM .32** .22** .29** .28** .05 .06 .62** .36** .21** -.18** .20**       
REMCOM .32** .26** .34** .30** .08* .10** .71** .40** .14** -.11** .17** .47**      
NOMCOM .24** .33** .34** .20** -.02 .13** .65** .39** .12** -.07* .12** .29** .52**     
SOCCOM .17** .29** .30** .15** -.01 .14** .38** .31** .05 -.08* .08* .14** .19** .19**    
AUDITOR .23** .26** .27** .28** .04 .10** .54** .36** .10** -.11** .06* .21** .27** .27** .13**   
ROA .08* .13** .12** .06 .06* .08** .14** .12** .03 -.05 .02 .12** .10** .10** .02 .09**  
TOBINSQ -.09** .04 -.04 -.04 .08* .05 -.05 -.05 .00 -.02 -.05 -.06 -.03 -.02 -.03 .02 .02 
? Significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed), ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
EMPDi= 1 if the company discloses employee-related information, and 0 otherwise; QUANTEMPDi = number of sentences of employee-related disclosure; QUALEMPDi = the number of different types of employee categories 
disclosed; EMPSHRi= 1 if the company has a share ownership scheme in 2004, and 0 otherwise; TRADEUNi = 1 if the company is in a highly unionised industry, and 0 otherwise; EMPMISi  = 1 if the company discloses employee-
related information in the mission statement, and 0 otherwise; CORPGOVi = score out of nine, based on corporate governance variables; NDIRi  = number of directors on the board; BRDINDEPi = 1 if majority of independent directors 
on the board, and 0 otherwise; DUALi = 1 if the CEO is also the chair, and 0 otherwise; BRDMEETi  = number of board meetings during 2004; AUDITORi  = 1 if a Big Four auditor is used, and 0 otherwise; AUDITCOMi = 1 if the 
company has an audit committee, and 0 otherwise; REMCOMi = 1 if the company has a remuneration committee, and 0 otherwise; NOMCOMi = 1 if the company has a nomination committee, and 0 otherwise; SOCCOMi = 1 if the 
company has a social committee, and 0 otherwise; TOBINSQi= market value of the company plus preference shares plus total debt divided by total assets; ROAi= return of assets at balance date; ADVPUBLi = number of adverse media 
publicities in the year prior to 30th June 2004; SIZEi = percentage of employees to market capitalisation; BLOCKi= percentage of outstanding ordinary shares held by shareholders who own 5% or more of the shares; LEVERAGEi = total 
debt divided by total assets in 2004; MATERIALi= 1 if the company is in the materials industry, and 0 otherwise; UTILITYi = 1 if the company is in the utility industry, and 0 otherwise; TELECOMi = 1 if the company is in the 
telecommunications industry, and 0 otherwise; INDUSTRIALi = 1 if the company is in the industrial industry, and 0 otherwise; HEALTHi= 1 if the company is in the healthcare industry, and 0 otherwise; CONSDISi= 1 if the company is 
in the consumer discretionary industry, and 0 otherwise; ITi = 1 if the company is in the information technology industry, and 0 otherwise. FINANCEi= 1 if the company is either a bank or an insurance company, and 0 otherwise. 
CONSSTAPi = 1 if the company is in the consumer staples industry, and 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 5-6B  PEARSON’S BI-VARIATE CORRELATION MATRIX – CONTROL VARIABLES 
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ADVPUBL .12** .25** .21** .14** .04 .11** .22** .39** .08* -.06 .05 .09** .11** .12** .23** .15** .04 -.01              
SIZE .02 .05 .02 .02 .03 .08* .00 .00 -.02 .01 .04 .01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .02 -.01 -.04 .07*             
BLOCK -.01 .00 .00 -.02 -.03 .00 .03 .08* -.08* .03 .02 .06 .06 .03 -.01 -.01 .10** .00 .06 .02            
LEVERAGE -.03 -.01 -.02 .00 .04 .02 -.04 -.05 -.01 -.02 .00 -.08* -.04 -.02 .08* -.01 -.46** .31** .02 .05 .00           
LASSETS .32** .48** .48** .23** -.14** .20** .60** .66** .16** -.16** .15** .41** .37** .42** .32** .41** .23** -.23** .40** .06* .08* -.12**          
ENERGY .02 .02 .02 -.02 -.10** -.04 -.03 -.05 .03 .03 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.01 .02 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.11** -.03 .02         
TELECOM -.05 .03 .03 .11** .15** .01 .02 .03 -.01 .04 .00 .05 .03 .02 .01 .02 -.01 -.01 .07* .03 .03 .00 .02 -.03        
UTILITY -.01 .06* .05 -.04 .44** -.03 .02 .10** .02 .02 .02 .01 -.01 -.04 -.04 .03 -.03 .01 .03 -.03 .00 .00 .05 -.02 -.02       
MATERIAL .02 .00 .05 -.08* -.25** .02 -.10** -.07* -.01 -.02 -.11** -.16** -.07* -.08* .04 -.01 .04 -.04 .03 -.05 -.09** -.06 .03 -.08** -.08* .06      
INDUSTRIAL .02 .04 .10** .03 .32** .14** .07* .05 -.01 .01 .04 .07* .08* .03 .08* .02 .09** .02 .02 .12** .02 .00 .07* -.07* -.07* .05 -.20**     
FINANCE -.06 .01 -.07* -.15** -.46** -.06 -.05 .01 .02 -.07* -.05 .01 -.11** .01 -.04 -.01 .05 .00 .02 -.02 .02 -.01 .15** -.08* -.08* .05 -.22** -.19**    
HEALTH .05 .05 .02 .09** .34** -.05 .06* .02 .02 .02 .04 .05 .06 .01 -.04 .04 -.07* .04 .03 -.07* -.12** -.06 -.11** -.07* -.07* .04 -.18** -.16** -.18**   
CONSDIS .06 .01 .02 .03 -.22** -.04 .04 .06 .01 -.02 .05 .04 .08* .06* -.03 -.05 .02 -.04 .09** .03 .18** .01 .07* -.07* -.07* .05 -.18** -.16** -.18** -.15**  
IT -.07* .11** -.14** .08* .31** .01 -.05 -.16** -.01 .07* .04 -.04 -.03 -.01 -.07* -.01 -.14** .05 -.07* .01 .03 .15** -.23** -.07* -.06* .04 -.17** -.15** -.17** -.14** -.14** 
CONSSTAP .02 .03 .05 .00 -.15** .01 .05 .10** -.04 -.02 .04 .03 .02 .02 .08* .01 -.04 -.02 .03 -.02 .03 .01 .10** .04 -.04 -.03 .11** .09** -.11** -.09** -.09** 
*Significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed), ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
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5.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Recall that Ullmann’s (1985) three-dimensional theoretical framework, the relationship 
between voluntary employee-related disclosures and employee stakeholder power, strategic 
posture and economic performance are tested.  The results of the regression analyses are shown in 
Table 5-7 and Table 5-8.     
Model 1 in Table 5-7 and Model 2 in Table 5-8 are binary logistic regressions estimated 
on the sample of 970 companies, consisting of 649 disclosing companies and 321 non-disclosing 
companies.  The dependent variable of these models is the presence of employee-related 
information disclosure (EMPDi), where the variables associated with management’s decision to 
disclose information relating to their employees is examined.   
Model 1 correctly classifies 73.1 per cent of the disclosing and non-disclosing companies 
with a Nagelkerke R-squared of 0.26 and the model is significant at p<0.01.  The coefficient of 
the variable measuring the presence of an employee share ownership scheme (EMPSHRi) is 
positive as expected and statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.75 (p-value <0.01, Wald = 
20.41).  Trade union membership (TRADEUNi) is negatively associated with the presence of 
employee-related disclosure with a coefficient of -0.03 (p-value 0.04, Wald = 2.88).  This result is 
the opposite sign to that expected, which illustrates that more highly unionised companies are less 
likely to disclose employee-related information in their annual reports than the less-unionised 
firms.  These findings partially support hypothesis one, that stakeholder power, in this case, 
employee power, encourages companies to disclose information about their employees in the 
annual report.   
Hypothesis two is partially supported in that the corporate governance index is statically 
significant (p<0.01, Wald = 77.87) with a coefficient of 0.40.  This positive relation suggests that 
companies that use recommended corporate governance practices are more likely to disclose 
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employee-related information in their annual report.  The acknowledgement of employees in the 
mission statement is not significant. 
Tobin’s Q is negatively significant (p = 0.03, Wald = 3.41), with a coefficient of -0.01, 
which is inconsistent with hypothesis three.  Return on assets (ROAi) is not significant.  
Shareholder power (BLOCKi) and creditor power (LEVERAGEi) are not significant in Model 1, 
demonstrating that these stakeholders have little influence on the disclosure of employee-related 
information.  Adverse publicity (ADVPUBLi) is positively significant (p = 0.08, Wald = 2.34) 
with a coefficient of 0.11, and five of the seven industries are not significant in explaining the 
decision to disclose employee-related information.  
Model 2 correctly classifies 74.5 per cent of all companies with a Nagelkerke R-squared 
of 0.29 and the model is also significant at p<0.01.  The presence of an employee share ownership 
scheme (EMPSHRi) is positive as expected and statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.67 
(p-value <0.01, Wald = 15.45).  Trade union membership (TRADEUNi) is negatively associated 
with the presence of employee-related disclosure with a Wald statistic of -0.03 (p-value 0.04, 
Wald = 3.45).  These findings are again partially supportive of hypothesis one.   
The corporate governance variables are analysed individually in the second model.  The 
majority of independent directors on the board (p = 0.05, Wald = 2.69), number of board 
meetings (p = 0.05, Wald = 2.58), presence of an audit committee (p<0.01, Wald = 10.16), 
presence of a remuneration committee (p<0.01, Wald = 8.01), presence of a social responsibility 
committee (p = 0.02, Wald = 4.24) and use of a Big 4 auditor (p = 0.03, Wald = 5.69) are all 
positively statistically significant as expected.  Duality of the CEO and chair is negatively related 
to the presence of employee-related disclosure with a coefficient of -0.37 and a p-value of 0.06 
(Wald = 2.44).  This result is anticipated, as it is preferable that the CEO is not also the chair.   
Present economic performance measured by Tobin’s Q is negatively significant (p = 0.03, 
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Wald = 3.47) and the accounting-based measure, ROA, is not significant.  These results are 
inconsistent with hypothesis three.  Past economic performance, measured by the average Tobin’s 
Q and average ROA are analysed in separate regressions, and they are found to be not significant 
in any of the ten models. They are also significantly correlated with present measures of 
economic performance, therefore are excluded from the remaining results for brevity.   
Adverse publicity, shareholder power (BLOCK) and creditor power (LEVERAGE) are not 
significant in Model 2, and five of the seven industries are not significant in explaining the 
decision to disclose employee-related information.  
The log of total assets, which was initially used as a proxy for size, is highly significant  
(p<0.01) in all models.  This variable has been excluded from the models due to multicollinearity 
concerns with the corporate governance index, various individual corporate governance variables 
and the adverse publicity variable.  The exclusion of LASSETS significantly reduces the R-
squared in all ten models by between 5 and 10 per cent.  An alternative measure of size, employee 
concentration (EMPCONi), is applied to all of the models as a control variable.  It is not 
significant in either Models 1 or 2.  Other non-significant control variables relate to the materials, 
industrial and consumer staples industries.  These are also excluded from the reported analysis for 
brevity.   
The results for Models 3 and 4 using ordinary least squares regressions are estimated on 
the same sample of 970 publicly listed Australian companies as in Models 1 and 2.  The number 
of sentences of employee-related disclosure in the 2004 annual report is the dependent variable in 
these two models.  Non-disclosing companies are included in these models and recorded with a 
zero sentence count.   
Model 3, which applies the corporate governance score, is significant with an adjusted R-
squared of 0.25 (p<0.01).  The results for this model indicate the employee share ownership 
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scheme variable (EMPSHRi) is positive as expected and statistically significant with a coefficient 
of 2.46 (p = 0.02) in support of hypothesis 1A.  The trade union membership variable 
(TRADEUNi) is also significant with a coefficient of -0.23 (p = 0.02), but negatively related to the 
number of sentences of employee-related disclosure, which is opposite to the predicted sign.  This 
suggests that industries with a greater proportion of unionisation tend to disclose less employee-
related information than those industries with proportionally less trade union membership.  A 
possible explanation for this result is that more highly unionised industries receive employee-
related information through communication channels other than the annual report.   
The presence of employee-related information in the company’s mission statement is 
found to be significant at p<0.01 with a coefficient of 5.76.  The corporate governance index also 
confirms hypothesis 2A, with a coefficient of 3.01 (p<0.01).  This suggests that companies with a 
more active strategic posture towards employee issues disclose a greater amount of employee-
related information than companies displaying a less active posture. 
Hypothesis 3A is also supported in Model 3 with both ROAi (p = 0.01) and TOBINSQi (p 
= 0.05) positively significant, indicating companies with higher current economic performance 
disclose more information relating to their employees.  Industry classification variables 
(specifically UTILITYi, p<0.01, HEALTHi, p = 0.07, CONSDISi, p = 0.07 and ITi, p = 0.10) are 
significant at less than the 10 per cent level of significance.  Similar to the first two models, 
neither shareholder power nor creditor power are significant in explaining the quantity of 
employee-related disclosure in the annual report.  Adverse publicity is positively significant with 
a coefficient of 0.88 (p<0.01) illustrating that companies with more adverse publicity in the 
current year disclose a greater amount of employee-related information in their annual report.  
This is consistent with media agenda setting theory. 
Model 4 is statistically significant with an R-squared of 0.29 (p<0.01).  Both the presence 
of an employee share ownership scheme (EMPSHRi) and trade union membership (TRADEUNi) 
 Tamara Zunker   131 
are significant (p = 0.02). EMPSHRi is positively related to employee-related disclosures with a 
coefficient of 3.34 and TRADEUNi is negatively related to information about employees with a 
coefficient of -0.21.  When analysing the company’s strategic posture, the presence of employee 
information in the mission statement is statistically significant with a coefficient of 4.60 (p<0.01).  
The individual corporate governance variables, notably the number of directors, majority of 
independent directors, presence of a nomination committee, presence of a social responsibility 
committee and choice of a high quality external auditor are significant in explaining the number 
of sentences of disclosure (at less than the 1 per cent level of significance) in support of 
hypothesis 2A.  The number of board meetings is also statistically significant (p = 0.06).  These 
variables suggest that the board of directors and other key committees are associated with the 
level of employee-related disclosures in their annual reports.   
As in Model 3, return on assets (p<0.01), Tobin’s Q (p = 0.04), adverse publicity 
(p<0.01), and industry variables, specifically UTILITY (p<0.01) and HEALTH (p = 0.03) are 
positively statistically significant, while CONSDIS (p = 0.10) is negatively significant.  Employee 
concentration is positive and significant as predicted with a coefficient of 0.05 (p = 0.03).  This 
suggests that the greater the market capitalisation of the company in relation to its employees, the 
greater the importance for the company to meet their demands.  It is also assumed that the greater 
number of employees in a company, the greater the amount of employee-related information is 
disclosed in the annual report.  
The second ordinary least squares regression for the fifth and sixth models examine only 
those companies that made employee-related disclosures in their 2004 annual report.  Therefore, 
these models are estimated on the sample of 649 disclosing companies only.  The dependent 
variable for these models is the number of sentences as used in Models 3 and 4.  Model 5 uses the 
corporate governance index score and Model 6 applies the individual corporate governance 
characteristics as in previous models.  Again, any non-significant control variables relating to 
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industry classification were excluded from the reported analysis.   
Model 5 tests the quantity of employee-related information and is significant with an 
adjusted R-squared of 0.24 (p<0.01).  Hypothesis one is not supported in that stakeholder power 
does not provide significant explanatory power other than the proportion of trade union 
membership (p = 0.05, coefficient = -0.24), which is negatively associated with the level of 
employee-related disclosure. 
The second hypothesis is supported at the 1 per cent level of significance for both the 
mission statement (coefficient = 6.92, t = 3.79) and corporate governance index (coefficient = 
3.47, t = 8.17) variables. 
The results of Model 6 (R-squared = 0.29, p<0.01) indicate that the number of directors, 
independence of the directors on the board, presence of a nomination committee and presence of 
a social responsibility committee are significant in explaining the number of sentences of 
disclosure (p<0.01) in support of hypothesis two.  The choice of a high quality external auditor is 
also significant (p = 0.02) as it was in Model 3.  Tobin’s Q (p = 0.02), industry classification, 
specifically UTILITYi (p<0.01), HEALTHi (p = 0.04) and CONSDISi (p = 0.09), and adverse 
publicity (p = 0.09) are also significant in explaining the number of sentences of employee-
related disclosure.   
The composition of the board appears to be an important influence.  Research finds that 
boards that meet frequently are more likely to perform their duties thoroughly and effectively 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Kent and Stewart, 2008).  The percentage of independent directors on 
the board is another important explanatory variable in the regression model for which the 
coefficient is positive (4.42) and statistically significant at <0.01 level.  The result thus suggests 
that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors disclose more voluntary employee-
related information.  
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From the results of the first six models, the industries that appear to be related to the level 
of disclosure are the Utility, Health and Consumer Discretionary industries.  This outcome is 
expected based upon findings from prior literature and statistical analysis conducted throughout 
this study (Deegan et al., 2000).  The Materials, Industrial and Consumer Staples industries are 
excluded from all of the models as they were either found not to be significant or are highly 
correlated with other variables.  The final control variable shown to be significant in this model is 
size, measured by employee concentration, and is generally related to increased disclosures.  
Many studies in this field indicate that size is a significant factor in a company’s decision to make 
social responsibility disclosures and this result confirms this to be true. 
Models 7 and 8 are ordinary least square regressions estimated on the total sample of 970 
companies.  The dependent variable of these models is the quality of employee-related 
information (QUALEMPDi), where the quality index based on the GRI specified by the number 
of categories of employee-related information disclosed in the annual report is examined.  The R-
squared of Model 7 is 0.29 and is significant at p < 0.01.  
The coefficients of the variables employee share ownership scheme (EMPSHRi, p<0.01) 
and trade union membership (TRADEUNi, p = 0.05) are statistically significant with a t-statistic 
of 4.27 and -1.68 respectively.  Trade union membership is expected to be positive, but as 
illustrated in the earlier models, it appears to be negatively associated with the dependent variable 
quality of employee-related disclosure (QUALEMPDi).  Employee concentration is not significant 
(p = 0.38), meaning that the number of employees in relation to the market capitalisation is not 
associated with the quality of the employee-related information disclosed.  Shareholder power 
and creditor power are not significant, consistent with previous reported models.  This potentially 
indicates that shareholder and creditors are not key stakeholder groups that demand employee-
related information in annual reports.   
The second hypothesis (2B) is supported in both Models 7 and 8 with significant results 
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for the mission statement (p<0.01) and corporate governance index (p<0.01).  With respect to the 
third hypothesis (3B), economic performance measured by return on assets (ROAi) is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent confidence interval.  The models that measured the quantity of 
disclosure found that Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQi) is significant as a measure of economic 
performance, however when measuring the quality of disclosure, return on assets (ROAi) is 
significant.  Significant control variables include adverse publicity (p<0.01) and all industry 
variables except the ENERGYi and HEALTHi industries (p<0.05). 
Model 8 is significant (p<0.01) with an R-squared of 0.32.  All variables significant in 
Model 7 are also significant in Model 8.  All individual corporate governance variables are 
significant at the 5 per cent level of significance, indicating an association between ASX 
recommended good corporate governance practices and the quality of employee-related 
information in the annual report. 
The results of Models 9 and 10 illustrate the association between the quality of employee-
related disclosure and the experimental variables, and the control variables for only the disclosing 
companies.  The R-square for Model 9 is 0.23 (p<0.01) and for Model 10, 0.27 (p<0.01) 
respectively.   
The significant variable relating to stakeholder power in these two models is the presence 
of an employee share ownership scheme (p = 0.03, p = 0.04 respectively).  This provides evidence 
that a company discloses higher quality employee-related information when the company’s 
employees have greater power. 
The second hypothesis relating to a company’s strategic posture is again supported by the 
significance of the mission statement and corporate governance variables, both significant at the 1 
per cent level (t = 3.84 and 7.01 respectively).  This result confirms that companies with a more 
active strategic posture disclose higher quality information about their employees, consistent with 
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the GRI index (2002). 
The most significant corporate governance variables in Model 10 are board size (p<0.01), 
duality (p = 0.04), the presence of a nomination committee (p<0.01) and the presence of a social 
responsibility committee (p<0.01).  The coefficient for board size is 0.14 (p<0.01) and positive.  
This result suggests that larger boards are associated with better quality voluntary employee-
related information than smaller boards.   
The study suggests that companies with higher measures using the market-based measure 
Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQi, p = 0.02) tend to have higher quality employee-related disclosures.  This 
supports the third hypothesis, 3B. 
With regard to control variables, Model 9 suggests that companies with more employees 
per market capital, or companies that have had adverse publicity about their employees in the 
prior 12 months (p<0.01), tend to have higher quality employee-related disclosures.  Also, all 
industries other than the TELECOMi and HEALTHi industries are significant at the 5 per cent 
level.  Model 10 suggests that companies with higher economic performance as denoted by ROAi 
(p = 0.03) disclose more quality employee-related information than companies with lower levels 
of economic performance, also in support of the third hypothesis. 
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TABLE 5-7 LOGISTIC AND OLS REGRESSIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
SCORE 
     
 + Binary Logistic Regression # Nagelkerke R-squared 
 
Dependent variables are disclosures scores as indicated by the columns. The expected signs for the variables are presented in brackets. Coefficients estimated by 
OLS regression are presented on the first line for each variable. The significance levels (p-values) are based on Chi-squared statistics (Wald statistic is presented 
in parentheses). ***, **, * represent significance levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
EMPDi= 1 if the company discloses employee-related information, and 0 otherwise; QUANTEMPDi = number of sentences of employee-related disclosure; 
QUALEMPDi = the number of different types of employee categories disclosed; EMPSHRi= 1 if the company has a share ownership scheme in 2004, and 0 
otherwise; TRADEUNi = 1 if the company is in a highly unionised industry, and 0 otherwise; EMPMISi  = 1 if the company discloses employee-related 
information in the mission statement, and 0 otherwise; CORPGOVi = score out of nine, based on corporate governance variables; NDIRi  = number of directors 
on the board; BRDINDEPi = 1 if majority of independent directors on the board, and 0 otherwise; DUALi = 1 if the CEO is also the chair, and 0 otherwise; 
BRDMEETi  = number of board meetings during 2004; AUDITORi  = 1 if a Big Four auditor is used, and 0 otherwise; AUDITCOMi = 1 if the company has an 
audit committee, and 0 otherwise; REMCOMi = 1 if the company has a remuneration committee, and 0 otherwise; NOMCOMi = 1 if the company has a 
nomination committee, and 0 otherwise; SOCCOMi = 1 if the company has a social committee, and 0 otherwise; TOBINSQi= market value of the company plus 
preference shares plus total debt divided by total assets; ROAi= return of assets at balance date; ADVPUBLi = number of adverse media publicities in the year 
prior to 30th June 2004; SIZEi = percentage of employees to market capitalisation; BLOCKi= percentage of outstanding ordinary shares held by shareholders who 
own 5% or more of the shares; LEVERAGEi = total debt divided by total assets in 2004; MATERIALi= 1 if the company is in the materials industry, and 0 
otherwise; UTILITYi = 1 if the company is in the utility industry, and 0 otherwise; TELECOMi = 1 if the company is in the telecommunications industry, and 0 
otherwise; INDUSTRIALi = 1 if the company is in the industrial industry, and 0 otherwise; HEALTHi= 1 if the company is in the healthcare industry, and 0 
otherwise; CONSDISi= 1 if the company is in the consumer discretionary industry, and 0 otherwise; ITi = 1 if the company is in the information technology 
industry, and 0 otherwise. FINANCEi= 1 if the company is either a bank or an insurance company, and 0 otherwise. CONSSTAPi = 1 if the company is in the 
consumer staples industry, and 0 otherwise. 
       DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 EMPD QUANTEMPD QUALEMPD 
 All    Companies All Companies 
Disclosing 
Only All Companies 
Disclosing 
Only 
 (1)+ (3) (5) (7) (9) 
Intercept -.42 
(1.11) 
-.70 
(-.26) 
-.64 
(-.17) 
.61*** 
(2.44) 
1.56*** 
(5.41) 
EMPSHR (+) .75*** 
(20.41) 
2.46** 
(2.17) 
1.49 
(.94) 
.44*** 
(4.27) 
.22** 
(1.88) 
TRADEUN (+) -.03** 
(2.88) 
-.23** 
(-2.17) 
-.24** 
(-1.65) 
-.02** 
(-1.68) 
<.01 
(-.75) 
EMPMIS (+) .15 
(.49) 
5.76*** 
(4.27) 
6.92*** 
(3.79) 
.48*** 
(3.89) 
.52*** 
(3.84) 
CORPGOV (+) .40*** 
(77.87) 
3.01*** 
(10.52) 
3.47*** 
(8.17) 
.31*** 
(11.90) 
.22*** 
(7.01) 
ROA (+) .07 
(.58) 
1.35*** 
(2.22) 
1.44 
(1.13) 
.09** 
(1.66) 
.19** 
(1.99) 
TOBINSQ (+) -.01** 
(3.41) 
.04** 
(1.61) 
.12** 
(2.12) 
<.01 
(-.81) 
<.01 
(-.58) 
ADVPUBL (+) .11* 
(2.34) 
.88*** 
(5.12) 
.70*** 
(3.48) 
.06*** 
(3.59) 
.04*** 
(2.42) 
SIZE (+) <.01 
(.16) 
.04 
(-0.26) 
.04 
(1.13) 
<.01 
(.31) 
<.01 
(-.09) 
BLOCK (-/+) -.03 
(.98) 
<.01 
(-.26) 
.02 
(.45) 
<.01 
(-.29) 
<.01 
(.81) 
LEVERAGE (+) .04 
(.38) 
.41 
(.96) 
.41 
(.34) 
.05 
(1.22) 
.08 
(.87) 
TELECOM -1.06** 
(5.58) 
1.31 
(.41) 
8.19* 
(1.64) 
-.77*** 
(-2.61) 
-.40 
(-1.09) 
UTILITY .45 
(.32) 
17.73*** 
(3.18) 
26.54*** 
(3.36) 
1.12** 
(2.19) 
1.53*** 
(2.61) 
FINANCE -.43* 
(2.96) 
-1.50 
(-.90) 
-1.43 
(-.59) 
-.49*** 
(-3.19) 
-.55*** 
(-3.03) 
HEALTH .22 
(.55) 
3.41* 
(1.80) 
4.38* 
(1.70) 
-.13 
(-.76) 
-.28 
(-1.48) 
CONSDIS <-.01 
(.00) 
-3.15* 
(-1.81) 
-4.70** 
(-2.00) 
-.37** 
(-2.31) 
-.58*** 
(-3.33) 
IT -.30 
(.27) 
-3.17* 
(-1.67) 
-4.50* 
(-1.64) 
-.71*** 
(-4.09) 
-.94*** 
(-4.59) 
R2 .266# .245 .236 .286 .227 
Correct classification 73.1% - - - - 
N = no of companies 970 970 649 970 649 
Model  p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
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TABLE 5-8 LOGISTIC AND OLS REGRESSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
+ Binary Logistic Regression   
# Nagelkerke R-squared 
Dependent variables are disclosures scores as indicated by the columns. The expected signs for the variables are presented in brackets. 
Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions are shown on the first line for each variable. The significance levels (p-values) are based on t-
statistics (presented in parentheses).  ***, **, * represent significance levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
        DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 EMPD QUANTEMPD QUALEMPD 
 All Companies 
All 
Companies 
Disclosing 
Only 
All 
Companies 
Disclosing 
Only 
 (2)+ (4) (6) (8) (10) 
Intercept -.68* 
(1.98) 
-5.42* 
(-1.75) 
-5.72 
(-1.24) 
.28 
(.97) 
1.31*** 
(3.81) 
EMPSHR (+) .67*** 
(15.45) 
3.34** 
(2.08) 
1.47 
(.94) 
.39*** 
(3.80) 
.21** 
(1.80) 
TRADEUN (+) -.03** 
(3.45) 
-.21** 
(-2.05) 
-.20* 
(-1.39) 
-.02** 
(-1.73) 
<.01 
(-.59) 
EMPMIS (+) .11 
(.25) 
4.60*** 
(3.47) 
5.57*** 
(3.10) 
.39*** 
(3.22) 
.42*** 
(3.15) 
NDIR (+) .08 
(1.47) 
1.82*** 
(4.91) 
2.15*** 
(4.28) 
.14*** 
(4.20) 
.14*** 
(3.81) 
BRDINDEP (+) .26** 
(2.69) 
3.19*** 
(3.03) 
4.42*** 
(2.92) 
.15* 
(1.57) 
.10 
(.91) 
DUAL (-) -.37* 
(2.44) 
-1.12 
(-.69) 
-.61 
(-.24) 
-.33*** 
(-2.19) 
-.34** 
(-1.77) 
BRDMEET (+) .03** 
(2.58) 
.16** 
(1.59) 
.13 
(.89) 
.02** 
(1.88) 
<.01 
(.50) 
AUDITCOM (+) .70*** 
(10.16) 
.52 
(.33) 
.36 
(.13) 
.33*** 
(2.26) 
.16 
(.77) 
REMCOM (+) .56*** 
(8.01) 
-.61 
(-.46) 
-2.01 
(-1.09) 
.21** 
(1.70) 
-.03 
(-.22) 
NOMCOM (+) .25 
(1.23) 
6.66*** 
(5.04) 
7.34*** 
(4.27) 
.46*** 
(3.82) 
.48*** 
(3.76) 
SOCCOM (+) .72** 
(4.24) 
7.80*** 
(4.62) 
7.47*** 
(3.61) 
.73*** 
(4.71) 
.55*** 
(3.59) 
AUDITOR (+) .40*** 
(5.69) 
2.50*** 
(2.22) 
3.37** 
(2.09) 
.20** 
(1.91) 
.07 
(.54) 
ROA (+) .06 
(.50) 
1.31*** 
(2.22) 
1.57 
(1.26) 
.09* 
(1.58) 
.18** 
(1.89) 
TOBINSQ (+) <.01** 
(3.47) 
.04** 
(1.72) 
.12*** 
(2.09) 
<.01 
(-.72) 
<.01 
(-.49) 
ADVPUBL (+) .08 
(1.50) 
.49*** 
(2.71) 
.29* 
(1.36) 
.03** 
(1.70) 
.01 
(.62) 
SIZE (+) <.01 
(.16) 
.05** 
(1.87) 
.05* 
(1.53) 
<.01 
(.56) 
<.01 
(.31) 
BLOCK (-/+) <.01 
(.80) 
<.01 
(-.05) 
.02 
(.59) 
<.01 
(-.31) 
<.01 
(.74) 
LEVERAGE (+) .03 
(.23) 
.25 
(.59) 
.29 
(.25) 
.03 
(.87) 
.07 
(.80) 
TELECOM -1.10** 
(5.84) 
1.78 
(.56) 
6.73 
(1.38) 
-.72*** 
(-2.50) 
-.55 
(-1.51) 
UTILITY .58 
(.50) 
16.45*** 
(3.00) 
22.73*** 
(2.90) 
1.11** 
(2.20) 
1.31** 
(2.24) 
FINANCE -.47* 
(3.32) 
-1.80 
(-1.09) 
-1.69 
(-.70) 
-.51*** 
(-3.38) 
-.58*** 
(-3.23) 
HEALTH .27 
(.83) 
4.16** 
(2.24) 
5.11** 
(2.02) 
-.06 
(-.33) 
-.23 
(-1.20) 
CONSDIS -.02 
(.01) 
-2.79* 
(-1.63) 
-3.91* 
(-1.68) 
-.36** 
(-2.26) 
-.54*** 
(-3.14) 
IT -.22 
(.63) 
-2.02 
(-1.08) 
-3.44 
(-1.27) 
-.58*** 
(-3.37) 
-.83*** 
(-4.12) 
R2 .287# .289 .285 .322 .272 
Correct classification 74.5% - - - - 
N = no of companies 970 970 649 970 649 
Model  p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
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TABLE 5-9 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 Dependent Variable Quantity/Quality Sample Corporate Governance Measurement Hypothesis Result 
Model 1 Presence of employee 
disclosure  
(EMPDISC) 
Quantity All companies Corporate governance index H1a: Partially supported  
H2a: Partially supported 
H3a: Partially supported 
Model 2 Presence of employee 
disclosure  
(EMPDISC) 
Quantity All companies Individual corporate 
governance variables 
H1a: Partially supported  
H2a: Partially supported 
H3a: Partially supported 
Model 3 Number of sentences of 
employee disclosure 
(NOSENT) 
Quantity All companies Corporate governance index H1a: Supported  
H2a: Supported 
H3a: Supported 
Model 4 Number of sentences of 
employee disclosure 
(NOSENT) 
Quantity All companies Individual corporate 
governance variables 
H1a: Supported  
H2a: Supported 
H3a: Supported 
Model 5 Number of sentences of 
employee disclosure 
(NOSENT) 
Quantity Disclosing only 
companies 
Corporate governance index H1a: Partially supported  
H2a: Supported 
H3a: Partially supported  
Model 6 Number of sentences of 
employee disclosure 
(NOSENT) 
Quantity Disclosing only 
companies 
Individual corporate 
governance variables 
H1a: Partially supported  
H2a: Supported 
H3a: Partially supported  
Model 7 Number of employee 
categories disclosed 
(NOEMPC) 
Quality All companies Corporate governance index H1b: Partially supported  
H2b: Supported  
H3b: Partially supported  
Model 8 Number of employee 
categories disclosed 
(NOEMPC) 
Quality All companies Individual corporate 
governance variables 
H1b: Partially supported  
H2b: Supported  
H3b: Partially supported  
Model 9 Number of employee 
categories disclosed 
(NOEMPC) 
Quality Disclosing only 
companies 
Corporate governance index H1b: Partially supported  
H2b: Supported  
H3b: Partially supported  
Model 10 Number of employee 
categories disclosed 
(NOEMPC) 
Quality Disclosing only 
companies 
Individual corporate 
governance variables 
H1b: Partially supported  
H2b: Supported  
H3b: Partially supported  
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Table 5-10 illustrates that when analysing the corporate governance variables relating to 
the presence of employee-related information, the presence of an audit committee, presence of a 
remuneration committee and choice of auditor are all important corporate governance practices.  
Model 8 reports the highest R-squared out of the ten models, and it shows that every corporate 
governance variable is significant at the 10 per cent level of significance or less.  Five of the nine 
corporate governance variables in this model are significant at less than 1 per cent. 
These propositions are confirmed with the acknowledgement of employees in the 
companies mission statement (EMPMIS) and the corporate governance index score (CORPGOV) 
being significant at less than 1 per cent in each of the models measuring quantity and quality of 
employee-related information.  
TABLE 5-10 LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
 EMPD QUANTEMPD QUALEMPD 
 All 
Companies 
All 
Companies 
Disclosing 
Only 
All 
Companies 
Disclosing 
Only 
 Model 2 Model 4 Model 6 Model 8 Model 10 
R-squared 28.7% 28.9% 28.5% 32.2% 27.2% 
NDIR n/s 1% 1% 1% 1% 
BRDINDEP 5% 1% 1% 10% n/s 
DUAL 10% n/s n/s 1% 5% 
BRDMEET 5% 5% n/s 5% n/s 
AUDITCOM 1% n/s n/s 1% n/s 
REMCOM 1% n/s n/s 5% n/s 
NOMCOM n/s 1% 1% 1% 1% 
SOCCOM 5% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
AUDITOR 1% 1% 5% 5% n/s 
1% significance 3 5 4 5 3 
5% significance 3 1 1 3 1 
10% significance 1 0 0 1 0 
Not significant 2 3 4 0 5 
n/s = not significant 
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5.6 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Econometric issues such as normality of the error term, multicollinearity, autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity are tested, and appropriate remedies are employed.   
Two occasions where parametric testing methods are not appropriate is where the data is 
not normally distributed or is of a classificatory type (Siegel 1956).  There are two ways of 
establishing the normality of a data distribution.  These are to examine the degree of skewness 
and the extent to which kurtosis is present (Foster, 1986) and to plot the data on a graph.  
Skewness indicates the extent to which the distribution of the data varies from a normal 
distribution.  Kurtosis is a measure of the extent to which a distribution is more or less fat-tailed 
than would typically be expected for a normal distribution (Foster, 1986).    
In this study, the possible effect of outliers was tested by omitting extreme values and 
winsorising extreme values for some variables.  In all cases, the reported results are robust to 
these changes in the models. 
Since this study is concerned with the individual effect of the explanatory variables on the 
extent of voluntary employee-related disclosure, the presence of multicollinearity is also tested 
using the correlation matrix.  The Pearson correlation analysis reported in Tables 5-6A and 5-6B 
suggests that there were no correlation coefficients greater than the threshold level of 0.8016
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), another effective method of testing the 
multicollinearity in the regression model is also applied.  The VIF results of all the independent 
variables are below 2.0 and 2.5 except for firm size, proxied by log of total assets (LASSETS), 
which exceeds the threshold VIF value of 10.  Both correlation and VIF results support the 
presence of multicollinearity in this control variable.  The regression tests are conducted by 
.   
                                                 
16 As a rule of thumb, correlation between explanatory variables in excess of 0.8 suggests that multicollinearity is a serious 
problem (Gujarati, 1995). 
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excluding this variable from the models to reduce the problem of multicollinearity.  The existence 
of multicollinearity in the log of assets variable provided a threat to the results obtained in the 
regression equation.  Consequently, the log of assets control variable is excluded from all of the 
regression models in this study.  For cross-sectional studies, serial correlation issues are checked 
via Durbin-Watson statistics.   
Heteroskedasticity is determined via the White heteroskedastic test.  Autocorrelation of 
errors is corrected via the introduction of autoregressive processes or rearranging the ordering of 
observations.  The data had neither heteroskedasticity problems nor autocorrelation of errors. 
Several additional tests are performed to confirm the robustness of the results.  Some 
companies in the sample do not differentiate between independent and non-executive directors.  
Similar results are obtained when models are analysed with directors identified as independent 
and those identified as non-executive.  Additionally, alternative measures of performance are 
used including return on equity and net profit after tax, again with no material change to the 
reported results. 
5.7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Numerous measures are used in the models to determine stakeholder power.  Two 
measures of employee power are adopted and these are the presence of an employee ownership 
scheme and level of industry trade union membership.  These measures provide different elements 
of employee power, which is important given they are the main stakeholders of interest in the 
study.   
Alternative measures of trade union membership are tested in this study.  Firstly, trade 
union membership is measured using absolute values of proportionate membership to the trade 
unions by industry membership (see Appendix 7).  The second proxy applied, TRADEUNDi is a 
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dichotomous variable constructed from the continuous variable.  It ranks the company as either 
belonging to a highly unionised industry (=1) or a poorly unionised industry (=0), with the 
average level of unionisation applied as the cut-off point.  The second proxy is not significant in 
any of the models and therefore, the first proxy TRADEUNi is applied.  This variable is found to 
be significant in eight of the ten models. 
Shareholder power (denoted as BLOCKi in the models) does not have significant results in 
any of the ten models.  Initially, block holders are measured as the proportion of shareholders who 
own 5 per cent or more of the shares in the company.  This variable is also tested using 10 and 20 
per cent cut offs, rather than 5 per cent.  These modifications to shareholder power do not modify 
the results of any of the models.  Finally, creditor power is measured using two proxies, debt to 
assets (LEVERAGEi) and debt to equity.  Neither are significant in any of the models. 
 Strategic posture is measured using two proxies.  Firstly, the acknowledgement of the 
employees in the mission statement, and secondly, the company’s corporate governance practices.  
All five models are analysed two ways.  First, as illustrated in Models 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, the 
corporate governance index score is applied.  Secondly, as illustrated in Models 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, 
the individual corporate governance characteristics are applied to determine their individual 
contribution.  The existence of an audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination 
committee and social committee are tested, but the specific characteristics of each committee are 
not examined in this study.  Other indicators of committee effectiveness are measured by the 
number of directors assigned to the committee and the number of committee meetings held during 
the year.  These additional variables are not found to be significant and are excluded from the 
study.  It is not expected that the size of the committee or the frequency of committee meetings 
have any impact on the quantity or quality of employee-related disclosures.  Therefore, only the 
presence of each of these committees is reported in the models.    
 Return on assets (ROAi) and Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQi) are the two proxies used for 
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economic performance.  The third element of Ullmann’s stakeholder framework suggests past 
and present economic performance be applied as explanatory variables, not just the current year.  
Therefore, an average is taken over three years (2002-2004) for both ROA and Tobin’s Q to see 
whether past economic performance is significant in explaining the quantity and quality of 
employee-related disclosures.  The results are not significant.  An alternative measure of past 
economic performance, measuring just the year prior to 2004 (2003) also shows non-significant 
results.  Therefore, current rather than past economic performance is a better measure for 
explaining the quantity and quality of employee-related information.  Other measures such as 
return on equity and net profit after tax are also applied as alternative measures, however they do 
not have any additional explanatory power. 
Three measures for company size are applied to the models.  Firstly, log of total assets 
(LASSETSi) is applied, consistent with past research on corporate social responsibility.  This 
variable is statistically significant in all models at p<0.01, however it is highly correlated with 
numerous other variables in the models.  Therefore, alternative measures of size are tested.  The 
number of employees is included in each of the models and is significant in three of the models 
(relating to the quantity of employee-related disclosures).  Finally, employee concentration 
(EMPCONi) is included in each of the models, and although only significant in two of the ten 
models, it satisfies two of the three criteria set out in the GRI index and the Corporations Act 
2001 as an appropriate measure for size.   
The industry classification variables are all initially included in each of the ten models.  
The MATERIALSi, INDUSTRIALi and CONSSTAPi variables are not significant in any of the 
models and are not reported.  The results are robust to these changes.  Adverse publicity is 
reported to be significant in eight out of the ten models, revealing the importance of this variable 
on the level and quality of employee-related disclosures. 
An additional model was run with the dependent variable NATUREMPDi, measuring the 
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nature of the employee-related information disclosed.  Some 98 per cent of the information 
disclosed by companies in 2004 about their employees is of a positive nature.  This model, due to 
the extremely high prevalence of positive information disclosure, does not add any explanatory 
power to the study and is not reported in the analysis. 
This result, however, is consistent with prior research illustrating that companies disclose 
predominantly positive information in their annual reports.  As noted earlier, legitimacy is 
considered to be a resource on which a company is dependent for survival (Dowling and Pfeffer, 
1975).  However, it is a source that the company also can impact or manipulate (Woodward et al., 
2001).  The disclosure of positive information in the annual report does not indicate that 
companies do not possess any adverse publicity regarding their operations.  It is often difficult to 
comprehend that with a given level of negative publicity, a company can disclose any positive 
information at all.  It appears that many companies with moderate to high levels of adverse 
publicity focus on disclosing information about the implementation or improvement of health and 
safety agendas, or other precautionary systems within their company, to minimise the impact of 
future adverse publicity.  These disclosures frequently compensate perceptions of the company’s 
social responsibility activities.    
5.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Empirical evidence in this study seeks to provide support for Ullmann’s stakeholder 
framework and suggests superior corporate governance practices as explanations for the voluntary 
disclosure of employee-related information in annual reports by Australian companies (Kent and 
Zunker, 2010).  Results of the regression analyses provide evidence of a positive relationship 
between Ullmann’s three-dimensional framework (stakeholder power, strategic posture and 
economic performance) and the level of employee-related disclosure.  They also provide evidence 
of a positive relationship between Ullmann’s framework and the quality of employee-related 
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disclosure.   
Other variables shown to have significant influence on the quantity and quality of 
employee-related disclosure are the number of adverse publicity articles in Australian and New 
Zealand newspapers, employee concentration, industry classification, number of board directors, 
proportion of independent directors on the board, number of board meetings per year, lack of 
duality of CEO and Chair, existence of an audit committee, existence of a nomination committee, 
existence of a social responsibility committee and choice of external auditor.  This indicates that 
the board of directors play a key role in assuring high quality reporting and improving disclosure 
and accountability of the company to society.  These company attributes signal good corporate 
governance practices.  Thus, threat to legitimacy and good corporate governance practice both 
contribute to the voluntary employee-related disclosures in annual reports in Australia. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the findings, discuss theoretical, research, and 
managerial implications of the results, identify limitations in the research, and provide 
recommendations for future research.   
6.2 DISCUSSION 
The objective of this research is to investigate the application of Ullmann’s three-
dimensional stakeholder theory in explaining the quantity and quality of employee-related 
disclosures in company’s annual reports.  This study provides a theoretical framework that is 
supportive of and improves existing research in this area, and finds empirical verification for this 
framework.  The research asks the question: Why do Australian publicly listed companies 
voluntarily disclose employee-related information in their annual reports?  
Voluntary disclosures are expected to decrease the “information asymmetry” between 
managers and other stakeholders, and supply information about the long-term growth and success 
of the company, which may concern various stakeholder groups (Abhayawansa and Abeysekera, 
2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Bassett et al., 2007; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Coff, 1997).   
The first contribution of the study is to extend corporate social responsibility accounting 
research by focusing on employee-related disclosures for all publicly listed companies in 
Australia with a 30th June 2004 balance date.  The frequency, content and amount of disclosure 
found in annual reports are associated with the importance companies place on human resources.  
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This is evident with the significance of the stakeholder variables in each of the ten models, 
specifically the proxies for employee power, strategic posture and economic performance. 
With limited legal and professional requirements existing in Australia mandating social 
disclosures in annual reports (Deegan, 2000; Waddock and Smith, 2000; Whitehouse, 2003), it is 
interesting to note that 67 per cent of Australian listed companies in the sample are carrying out 
employee-related disclosures on a voluntary basis.  This study, in accordance with former studies, 
indicate that Australian companies are continuing to provide voluntary social information within 
their annual reports and the amount of disclosure is increasing over time (Brown and Deegan, 
1998; Tilt, 2004; Trotman and Bradley, 1981).   
Secondly, the study provides descriptive material on the quantity and quality of voluntary 
employee-related disclosures in annual reports for Australian companies.  Descriptive statistics on 
employee numbers, adverse publicity and industry classification are also provided.  The results 
reveal that the Consumer Discretionary industry has the highest proportion of companies that 
disclose employee-related information, with the Telecommunications industry having the least 
number of companies making employee-related disclosures.   
Understanding the influences on voluntary employee-related disclosures can be useful in 
annual report and financial statement analysis by allowing the users of this information to make 
informed judgments as to the reliability of the information produced.  The information collected 
in this study demonstrates that a large number of Australian listed companies are disclosing 
employee-related information in their annual report.  Although some companies only disclose a 
few sentences, there are many companies that are allocating entire sections of their annual report 
to their employees and social responsibility activities. 
The results of this study will assist regulators when considering disclosure regulations, by 
centring their attention on the perceived inadequacies in the current social reporting framework.  
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The need to regulate employee-related disclosure is unnecessary if companies are already 
providing high quality disclosures voluntarily (Eng and Mak, 2003; Kent and Chan, 2009).  From 
this research, most companies can improve their disclosure practices relating to employee 
information in annual reports equally in the quantity and quality of the information provided. 
 Voluntary disclosures about a company’s employees consist of predominantly positive 
news, with only 2 per cent of disclosures discussing negative information associated with the 
company’s employees.  Examples associated with negative employee-related disclosures include 
disclosing statistics about accidents involving employees, reporting on strikes, industrial action 
negotiations, losses in time and productivity of staff, poor working conditions, closing down of 
any part of the company, or staff redundancies.17
By incorporating disclosure practices from the Global Reporting Initiative (2002), 
companies reporting numerous categories of employee-related information ensure they have 
thorough and high quality exposure of social responsibility practices.  The GRI Guidelines have 
shown its global acceptance as a standard for reporting corporate social responsibility practices 
given that it helps companies to decide on what to report and how to report the corporate social 
responsibility information.  Companies that produce these types of voluntary disclosures within 
their annual report have chosen to differentiate themselves by enhancing the amount of corporate 
information provided to their stakeholders.  Effective voluntary disclosures can provide more 
transparency and understanding about the company to investors, creditors, and other interested 
parties.  Stakeholders use this information to better understand a company’s strategy and provide 
them with the necessary tools to take advantage of future prospects, and minimise the level of risk 
associated with those decisions.  It is likely to assist them in determining critical success factors 
that are imperative to the company’s accomplishment of goals, understand the competitive 
environment which the company operates in and the company’s decision making framework.  
   
                                                 
17 Refer to Appendix 5 for a list of examples of employee disclosures found in the annual reports of companies in this study. 
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From a social responsibility perspective, these stakeholders want to see that the company is taking 
steps to ensure sustainable results now and into the future (Steering Committee Report, 2001). 
Explanations were investigated for companies that voluntarily disclosed information about 
their employees in their annual reports.  This study proposed three explanations for the disclosure 
of this information in Australia.  On the premise of Ullmann’s stakeholder theory, it was 
hypothesised that increased stakeholder power, an active strategic posture and higher past or 
present economic performance encourages them to disclose more information about their 
employees in their annual report.  Second, it was proposed that companies with increased 
stakeholder power, an active strategic posture, and higher economic performance disclose higher 
quality information about their employees than those with weaker structures.   
The results show that employee share ownership schemes provided by companies 
empowers employees as stakeholders (Ullmann, 1985) providing incentives for employees to 
purchase shares.  Companies introduce share ownership plans in the expectation that ownership 
aligns employee and employer objectives to increase productivity and profits.  Surveys indicate 
that many employees want some form of ownership in the company where they work and it 
should be an incentive to increase their loyalty and willingness to work diligently for their 
employer.  The financial incentives for share ownership are greater when companies subsidise the 
purchase of shares through a share ownership plan makes (Bryson and Freeman, 2009).  Research 
also confirms that employee ownership leads to increased firm productivity, profitability, and 
longevity.  Additionally, evidence indicates that combining employee ownership with increased 
employee participation is likely to generate large returns on investment (Freeman, 2007).   
This study has provided evidence on the positive relationship between employee share 
ownership as a proxy for employee stakeholder power in relation to a company’s propensity to 
disclose employee-related information.  Further, this study finds employee share ownership is 
associated with the quality of that information.  Hypothesis 1B indicates that employee share 
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ownership positively relates to the quality of employee-related disclosures in company annual 
reports.  This result supports the notion that companies are more likely to provide quality 
information about various employee categories (see Appendix 4), thus empowering employee 
stakeholders with more and better information about their workplace. 
The power of the employees is positively associated with the quantity and quality of 
employee-related disclosure.  This indicates that management considers the demands of their 
employees when deciding whether to disclose information about them, how much to disclose, and 
what type of information to disclose.   
Trade union membership was expected to play a positive role in empowering employee 
stakeholders.  Instead the results of H1A, the quantity of voluntary employee-related disclosure 
related to employee power and H1B, the quality of that information are significantly but 
negatively related to trade union membership.  An explanation for these unexpected results is that 
the Australian trade union movement has effectively campaigned against further deregulation of 
the labour market.  A prominent example in the 2007 Federal election was that the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions actively campaigned against “Work Choices Act” introduced in 2005 by 
the relevant Government to further deregulate the labour market.  Earlier legislation in 1996 was 
the “Workplace Relations Act” that weakened unions in favour of employers (Cooper and Ellam, 
2008; Buchanan and Considine, 2007).  The Australian union movement first supported easing of 
labour regulations during 1980’s but subsequent loss of working conditions, reduced real wages 
and job insecurity exacerbated by privatisation and outsourcing made labour deregulation 
unattractive to many ordinary workers (Buchanan and Watson, 2001; Cooper and Ellam, 2008).  
Hence the union movement actively and successfully campaigned for the repeal of the “Work 
Choices Act” in favour of the “Fair Work Act” in 2007 that provided more worker protections 
and re-introduced the Industrial Relations Commission as a forum for unions to stand up to 
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corporate employers.  Managers pointed out the impact of the regulatory changes in response to a 
survey about the “Fair Work Act” stating that, 
“Managers are spending a considerable amount of time reviewing employment contracts in light of 
award modernisation to ensure they meet the regulations. Some employers have had to introduce 
awards to employees who were previously award-free while others have had to spend much time 
transferring employees from one contract to another. The introduction of flexible work practices 
has resulted in many organisations dealing with increased requests as well as the need to introduce 
policies and procedures to cover these areas. Compliance with the new unfair dismissal legislation 
was also noted as having significant impact.” (Abbot, Hearn Mackinnon, Morris and Saville, 2010 
p. 39). 
This evidence indicates that managers respond to increased regulation in the “Fair Work 
Act” as a result of union activism.  The results of hypotheses 1a and 1b in relation to trade union 
membership suggest that companies are directly reporting to unions and therefore have less need 
to manage this stakeholder power by disclosing employee-related information in annual reports.  
The corporate mission statement acknowledging employees is positively related to the 
quality of employee-related disclosures (hypothesis 2B) but not significant regarding the quantity 
of company employee-related disclosures (hypothesis 2A).  This result shows that companies 
providing more and better employee-related information use mission statements recognising 
employees as a strategic posture (Ullmann, 1985).  In 2004, only 52 per cent of the publicly 
available mission statements mentioned the company’s employees.   
Additionally, the corporate governance index score, constructed from the individual 
corporate governance variables, shows that the average score in the sample is five out of the nine 
corporate governance characteristics.  This result suggests the corporate governance structure is 
important regarding employee-related disclosures.   
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Hypotheses 2A and 2B confirm the strategic role of corporate governance that supports 
the notion of corporate strategic posture (Ullmann, 1985).  The predicted positive association 
between elements of corporate governance best practice systems and the quantity and quality of 
company employee-related disclosures indicates boards are aware of the importance of good 
employee relations for productivity and profits.  Corporate governance elements tested in this 
study are based on the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (2003).  These elements comprise the number of directors on the board, board 
independence, the existence of dual CEO and chair position, the number of board meetings, the 
presence of audit, nomination, remuneration and social committees, and the audit (or not) by a 
Big 4 auditor.  Hypothesis 2A was partially confirmed with the nominations committee 
insignificant.  Hypothesis 2B indicates higher significance for all of the elements of strong 
corporate governance systems, including the nomination committee.  This result finds that 
corporate governance best practice systems enhance more and better employee-related 
information supporting the notion of strategic posture (Ullmann, 1985; Wright, 1996).  
Interestingly, the social responsibility committee is more highly significant (p<.01) in relation to 
the quality of employee-related disclosures than the quantity of employee-related disclosures 
(p<.05) indicating that this committee is key to more and better employee-related information. 
The relations between economic performance and the quantity and quality of voluntary 
employee-related information disclosed is partially supported and mixed as shown by hypotheses 
3A and 3B results.  Return on assets is marginally positive (p<.10) in relation to the quantity of 
company employee-related reporting and not significant regarding quality of employee-related 
information.  Tobin’s Q on the other hand is significantly related to the quantity of employee-
related disclosure but insignificant regarding the quality of employee reporting.  These results 
possibly indicate that investors (the market) are interested in employee-related disclosures but are 
not concerned about the quality of these disclosures. 
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Many researchers (Kent and Chan, 2009; McGuire et al., 1988; Mills and Gardner, 1984; 
Roberts, 1992; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000) have tested for a relationship between financial 
performance and social performance to determine whether this relationship is of a positive or 
negative nature.  The current study found no significant relations between past financial 
performance and the dependent variables.  However, current economic performance proxied by 
either ROAi or TOBINSQi is significant in every model.  These findings are parallel to the results 
provided by previous studies on corporate social disclosures (for example, Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004; Ullmann, 1985).   
6.3 LIMITATIONS 
The limitations of this thesis should be considered when interpreting the findings.  All 
methodological approaches suffer from some kind of limitation that places restrictions on what 
method is most suitable.  The objective is to understand what these weaknesses are and how they 
can be addressed within the research process.  To improve the quality of the statistical analysis, an 
analysis of the psychometric issues has been addressed to improve reliability, validity, and reduce 
bias and error.   
The results are subject to threats to external validity.  First, this analysis only examines 
voluntary employee-related disclosures over a single period, for the year ending 30th June 2004.  
Other studies (for example, Guthrie and Parker, 1989) have shown that corporate social 
responsibility disclosure practices fluctuate over time, therefore, the conclusions reached by this 
study may have limited application across time or in other individual years.   
Second, generalisation in accounting research is something that needs to be considered 
carefully, as the social context of accounting changes over time and location.  This study was 
conducted using Australian publicly listed companies, therefore, it is unclear whether the 
explanations provided in this thesis still hold true in other cultures and societies, or whether the 
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results would be similar for companies in different countries trading on different markets.  Thus, 
future research investigating voluntary employee disclosures could focus on cultures and societies 
different from Australia.  
 Third, there is increased potential for bias because of reliance on the human instrument 
that defines the problem, does the sampling, designs the instruments, collects the data, analyses it, 
interprets it, and then writes it up.  Therefore, three independent researchers gathered information 
for the four dependent variables (for example, presence, quantity, nature and diversity) from each 
of the company’s 2004 annual reports.  The researchers collected the variables based on a 
criterion that was developed and discussed before the data collection process commenced and 
used their judgement to decide whether the information provided in the annual report was 
considered to be related to the company’s employees or not, whether it was positive or negative 
in nature and the number of sentences were physically counted for each company.  Any 
discrepancies were consulted upon and corrected. 
Other measures assigned to the study (EMPSHRi, EMPMISi, ADVPUBLi and individual 
corporate governance variables) are also subject to error.  The presence of an employee share 
ownership scheme and the individual corporate governance characteristics are determined from 
the information provided in the annual report.  The acknowledgement of employees in 
companies’ mission statements is sought from the annual reports or the company’s website.  The 
adverse publicity articles are extracted from the Factiva database.  The independent researchers 
physically counted the number of adverse publicity articles relating to the employees for the year 
prior to the 2004 balance date, which is also subject to human error.  This creates concern for 
experimenter bias, which occurs when the individuals who are conducting an experiment 
inadvertently affect the outcome by non-consciously behaving differently to members of control 
and experimental groups.  It is possible to eliminate the likelihood of experimenter bias through 
the use of double blind study designs.  This is where two or more people conduct the data 
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collection separately and then examine if differences are present in their results for a more 
accurate variable.  The time consuming nature of undertaking qualitative research and the 
associated costs involved are often greater than that which its quantitative counterpart incurs.  
Mainly because the latter often employs archival data and quantitative data is relatively easier to 
collect, analyse, and interpret.  In addition, the nature of qualitative data increases the difficulty in 
achieving validity and reliability. 
 There are several limitations in the use of content analysis (Gray et al., 1995; Milne and 
Adler, 1999; Unerman, 2000).  First, is the notion that content analysis captures the quantity of 
disclosure (in terms of frequency and volume of disclosure) rather than the quality characteristics.  
The subject matter being investigated (the narratives of employee-related disclosure) must be 
captured by the coding instruments (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000).  
Milne and Adler (1999) emphasise that in order for valid inferences to be drawn from content 
analysis, reliability of the data and the instrument must be achieved.  Second, there is an element 
of subjectivity involved in determining what constitutes a particular type of disclosure (Guthrie 
and Abeysekera, 2006; Zegal and Ahmed, 1990).  
While empirical research has addressed the quantity of voluntary disclosures, it has 
typically measured the quantity of disclosure as the number of words or sentences of information 
in the annual report.  The number of sentences of description in the annual report does not 
measure the quality of disclosures.  The number of separate employee categories based on the 
Global Reporting Index, along with the disclosures of good or bad news are used to address this 
issue by examining whether the stakeholder variables were attributable to the level of disclosure, 
and further the quality of the disclosure.  Investigating the type of information disclosed in a 
company’s annual report helps to determine the quality of the disclosure based on prior 
knowledge of publicity in the preceding years.  However, there are other factors that might 
explain both the quantity and quality of disclosure relating to the employees in annual reports that 
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have not been captured in the models.  
The sample was extracted from the population of publicly listed companies on the 
Australian Securities Exchange in 2004.  The study was confined to companies with a 30th June 
2004 balance date, which reduced the sample size from 152718
Another potential limitation of this study is that it ignores possible lag effects.  It has been 
suggested that management adjusts its employee disclosure policies on the basis of the publicity 
received by its company in the year leading up to the annual report studied.  Further, it has also 
been assumed that there is a time lag between the adverse publicity received and changes in 
community concern, however, the exact lag is unknown and could be significantly different for 
each company.  As the adverse publicity (ADVPUBL) variable was calculated for the year 30th 
June 2003- 30th June 2004, it is unknown whether the time lag effect relevant to the company is 
captured, and the adequate disclosure of employee-related information is present in the 2004 
 to 1046 companies.  The sample 
size was further reduced to 970 after all of the companies with zero employees were excluded.  
The applied study only focuses on employee-related disclosures in annual reports.  
However, these disclosures may exist via other channels (Kent and Ung, 2003).  In most cases, 
annual report disclosures constitute only one method of the company’s communication and the 
use of one channel may well affect the use and effectiveness of other channels.  Additionally, 
different channels may not be equally efficient or effective in accomplishing specific 
communication goals.  Employee-related information may exist via other channels of 
communication (Kent and Ung, 2003), such as on the company’s websites, intranets or special 
purpose employee reports.  Prior research revealed that companies with negative news tend to 
disclose that information earlier though their interim reports (Skinner, 1994).  Therefore, annual 
reports could omit information that is redundant, having already been disclosed through more 
timely information channels such as half yearly report and other continuous disclosure methods.  
                                                 
18 Number of companies listed on the ASX as at 30th June 2004 (ASX, 2010). 
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annual report (Brown and Deegan, 1998).  Some companies may elect to disclose this information 
via other channels before employing their annual report.  Future research could help resolve this 
issue by conducting a similar study using comparative years or even over a number of years. 
6.4 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Stakeholder theory offers researchers and society a way to critically evaluate social 
corporate responsibility disclosures.  However, the understanding and analysis of the theory must 
become more advanced, drawing on developments from both within the accounting literature and 
other disciplines.  
The limited knowledge with regard to employee-related disclosures suggests a number of 
areas of interest.  This study has focused on the motivations of management to supply the 
information for the annual reports.  The demand side of this issue, stakeholders’ need for 
information, is also an area for further study.  The type of information demanded by stakeholders, 
and in which situations, can be explored.  In knowing this, the supply and demand sides could be 
jointly investigated to determine if both needs are being met.   
There is a considerable amount of literature about how the media can affect society’s 
views but little focus on how annual report disclosures, especially voluntary social disclosures, 
impact the concerns of the community.  This is an opportunity for future research. 
Whilst this study focuses on the Australian context, other countries with varying legal, 
political and cultural settings could disclose employee-related information in quite a different 
manner.  It would be interesting to conduct a similar study in the context of another country, or 
even conduct a comparative country study using the stakeholder framework. 
Future research could look to examine employee-related disclosures over a longer period 
of time.  Other studies (Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and Parker, 1989) have shown that corporate 
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social responsibility disclosure practices fluctuate over time, therefore the conclusions may differ 
in other time periods or across time periods. 
Finally, research could also focus on particular categories of employee-related disclosure, 
such as occupational health and safety rather than employee-related disclosures in general. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this study provides evidence about voluntary employee-related disclosures 
for a sample of 2004 Australian annual company reports. Ullmann’s (1985) strategic framework 
was applied for social reporting comprising three dimensions, stakeholder power, strategic posture 
and economic performance.  Specifically, the companies’ provision and quality of voluntary 
employee-related disclosures was examined in relation to employee stakeholder power 
represented by employee share ownership and trade union membership.  Evidence in this study 
indicates that employee share ownership does empower employee stakeholders in relation to the 
quantity and quality of corporate employee-related disclosures.  In contrast, companies appear to 
use corporate employee-related disclosures to neutralise union power in their workplace as a 
regulatory risk management strategy.  The results also show that companies employ strong 
corporate governance best practice systems to strategically manage employees through provision 
and quality voluntary employee reporting.  Corporate mission statements recognising employees 
are also evidence of strategic posture, but only for the quality of employee-related disclosures.  
Economic performance represented in this study by return on assets and Tobin’s Q shows mixed 
results with ROA marginally associated with the quality of employee reporting, while Tobin’s Q 
is related to the quantity of information companies disclose relating to their employees. 
This research has progressed the understanding of what factors determine the quantity and 
quality of employee-related disclosures in Australian company’s annual reports.  The main 
findings of the study were that companies that have greater employee power, a more active 
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strategic posture and higher current economic performance disclose more employee-related 
information and of a higher quality than other companies without these attributes.  This 
substantiates that stakeholder theory, as applied in this research, is a theoretical framework that 
can be used to explain why companies voluntarily disclose employee-related information in their 
annual reports. 
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APPENDIX 1 
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF ULLMANN’S FRAMEWORK 
ROBERTS (1992) CHAN (1997); KENT and CHAN (2009) ELIJIDO-TEN (2005) 
Sample Measurement Results Sample Measurement Results Sample Measurement Results 
US companies investigated in 1984-86 by the CEP 102 largest Australian listed firms (BRW, 1995) Top 100 Australian companies ranked by ACF in 2002 
according to environmental performance 
Dependent Variables Dependent Variables Dependent Variables 
Social Disclosure CEP ratings Quality Questionnaire rated ACFR ACF ranking on company environmental 
performance Quantity Number of sentences 
Independent Variables (expected sign) Independent Variables (expected sign) Independent Variables (expected sign) 
Stakeholder Power Stakeholder Power Stakeholder Power 
Stockholders (-) % ownership  not sig.(-) Shareholder (+/-) % ownership  sig. (+) Shareholder (-) % ownership sig. (-) 
Creditor (+) Average D/E > 1981-84 sig. (+) 10%  Creditor (+) Average D/E not sig. Creditor (+) Average D/E not sig. 
Government or 
Regulators (+) 
Political contributions sig. (+)  5% Regulator (+) 1 = prosecuted; 0 = not not sig. Government 
Power (-) 
1 = high industry sensitivity; 
0 = low sensitivity 
sig. (-) 
Lobby Group (+) 1 = high sensitivity;  
0 = low sensitivity 
sig. (+) 
Strategic Posture Strategic Posture Strategic Posture 
Public Affairs (+) Average size of public affairs 
staff 1983-84 
sig. (+) 10%  Mission Statement (+) 1 = acknowledge sig. (+) Environmental 
Concern (+)  
1 = disclosure of environ 
activities on A/R &/or putting 
environ concern in mission 
s’ment; 0 = none 
sig. (+) 
0 = no acknowledge 
Philanthropic 
foundation (+) 
1 = PF; 0 = nil sig (+) 1%  Environmental 
Committee 
1 = committee;  sig. (+) 
0 = no committee 
Economic Performance Economic Performance Economic Performance 
Manager ROE (+) Average change in ROE 1981-
84 
sig (+) 5%  ROE 1994 (+) 1994 Return on Assets not sig. AROA (+) Average Return on Assets not sig. 
BETA (-) 1984 beta market model with 
60 month period 
sig. (-) 10%   ROE 1995 (+) 1995 Return on Assets not sig. Past ROA (+) 2001 ROA not sig. 
Average ROE (+) Average ROE not sig. Current ROA (+) 2002 ROA not sig. 
Control Variables Control Variables Control Variables 
AGE (+) Age in 1984 sig. (+) 1% RISK (+) Age since inception sig. (+) AGE Number of years since listed 
until 2002 
not sig. 
INDUSTRY (+) 1 = auto, airline, oil; 0  = others sig (+). 5% SIZE (+) Log market capitalisation sig. (+) LSIZE (+) Log market capitalisation not sig. 
SIZE (+/-) Average revenue 1981-84 not sig.  (-) 
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APPENDIX 2 
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE (2002) 
Labor Practices and Decent Work Performance Indicators Employee Categories  
Employment LA1
  
Total workforce by employment type, employment 
contract, and region. 
? Employee profiles  
 LA2 Total number and rate of employee turnover by age 
group, gender, and region. 
? Employee profiles  
 LA3 Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not 
provided to temporary or part-time employees, by major 
operations. 
? Employee assistance 
or benefits  
Labour/ 
Management 
Relations 
LA4 Percentage of employees covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. 
? Industrial relations  
 LA5 Minimum notice period(s) regarding significant 
operational changes, including whether it is specified in 
collective agreements. 
? Industrial relations  
Occupational 
Health and 
Safety 
LA6 Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint 
management-worker health and safety committees that 
help monitor and advise on occupational health and 
safety programs. 
? Health and safety  
 LA7 Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and 
absenteeism, and total number of work-related fatalities 
by region. 
? Health and safety  
 LA8 Education, training, 191ounselling, prevention, and risk-
control programs in place to assist workforce members, 
their families, or community members regarding serious 
diseases. 
? Health and safety  
? Employee training and 
development  
 LA9 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements 
with trade unions.  
? Health and safety  
 
? Industrial relations  
Training and 
Education 
LA10 Average hours of training per year per employee by 
employee category. 
? Employee training and 
development  
 LA11 Programs for skills management and lifelong learning that 
support the continued employability of employees and 
assist them in managing career endings. 
? Employee training and 
development  
 LA12 Percentage of employees receiving regular performance 
and career development reviews. 
? Employee training and 
development  
? Employee 
remuneration  
? Employee profiles  
Diversity and 
Equal 
Opportunity 
LA13 Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of 
employees per category according to gender, age group, 
minority group membership, and other indicators of 
diversity. 
? Employment of 
minorities or women  
 LA14 Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee 
category. 
? Employment of 
minorities or women  
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APPENDIX 3 
CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEE-RELATED DISCLOSURE USED BY OTHER 
RESEARCHERS 
Authors Types of Employee-related Disclosure 
1978 Ernst and Ernst  1. Human resources:  
2. employee health and safety  
3. employee training;  
4. other human resource disclosures; 
Clarkson (1988) 
 
1. communications with employees;  
2. training and development;  
3. career-planning;  
4. retirement and termination counselling;  
5. lay- offs, redundancies and plant closings;  
6. stress and mental health;  
7. absenteeism and turnover;  
8. health and safety;  
9. employment equity and discrimination;  
10. women in management;  
11. performance appraisal;  
12. day care 
Gray et al. (1995a)  
 
1. consultation with employees;  
2. employee share ownership;  
3. employment of disabled; 
4. employment data;  
5. pension commitments;  
6. value added statements; 
7. health and safety;  
8. employee other. 
Deegan et al. (2002) 1. employee health and safety;  
2. employment of minorities;  
3. employee training;  
4. employee remuneration;  
5. employee morale; 
6. industrial relations; 
7. other. 
Menassa (2010) 
 
1. employee morale;  
2. training and development;  
3. employee profile;  
4. employee share purchase schemes;  
5. employee health and safety;  
6. employee relations; 
7. employee remuneration;  
8. employee assistance benefit;  
9. equal opportunity practices;  
10. job creation. 
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APPENDIX 4 
CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEE-RELATED DISCLOSURES 
 
Categories Global Reporting Index 
1 Employee profiles LA1, LA2, LA12 
2 Employee assistance or benefits LA3 
3 Industrial relations LA4, LA5, LA9 
4 Health and safety LA6, LA7, LA8, LA9 
5 Employee training and development LA8, LA10, LA11, LA12 
6 Employee remuneration LA12 
7 Employment of minorities or women LA13, LA14 
8 Employee morale n/a 
9 Other n/a 
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APPENDIX 5 
EXAMPLES OF EMPLOYEE-RELATED  DISCLOSURES 
Disclosure 
Category 
Company Examples 
1 Employee 
profiles 
Brambles “In the past year, Brambles’ employees, particularly those in CHEP, have 
worked under tremendous strain to effect the business transformation. Their 
efforts have been tireless and are a credit to all those involved. The challenges 
facing the other businesses have been no less arduous, and their achievements 
are a testament to the professionalism, diligence and integrity of the 
employees throughout the entire group.” 
Collection 
House 
“Staff numbers were further reduced from 753 in 2002/03 to 692 at the end of 
2003/04. With staff numbers now stabilised, the focus has moved to improving 
efficiencies, streamlining operating procedures and developing programs for 
managing human resources issues.” 
Gribbles “Professor Ian Findlay is leading Gribbles’ charge to be at the forefront of 
developing and transforming leading edge molecular science research into 
improved medical testing. Ian pioneered the technique of DNA fingerprinting 
in single cells in 1994.” 
Suncorp “Late in 2003 we restructured the Company along business lines to make it 
less complicated, and so our people knew how they fitted into the 
organisation, and had clear lines of responsibility and accountability. We then 
looked at all the jobs in the Company and made sure we had the right people 
in the right jobs, with the appropriate job targets and proper financial 
incentives in place. We called that process the leadership framework, and it 
has had a marked effect in lifting morale and improving performance.” 
2 Employee 
assistance or 
benefits 
Boral “More than one-quarter of Boral’s Australian and US workforce are over the 
age of 50. We recognise that an aging workforce brings with it the need for 
greater focus on specific workplace health and safety issues, superannuation 
and retirement planning education, and the provision of workplace 
flexibilities. In addition, there is a greater focus on formal competency based 
“on-the-job” training to assist older workers to develop, cope with new 
technologies, gain recognition for competencies and share their knowledge 
within the workplace.” 
Peter Lehmann 
Wines 
“We recognise the importance of balancing work responsibilities with family 
and community interests. Vintage is a particularly busy time when employees 
work long hours and we strive to provide a family friendly work environment. 
Employees who have gone on maternity leave have been offered part time 
work if they choose not to return to work full time when the 12 month period 
following the birth of the child expires.” 
Qantas “Qantas also recognises that many staff balance a busy range of work and 
personal commitments. Qantas has committed $50 million over the next three 
years to initiatives that will assist staff to balance their work and family life. 
From August 2004, Qantas employees in Australia received: 
increased paid maternity leave from six to 10 weeks, with equivalent 
improvements for those staff groups that have special existing 
arrangements;10 weeks’ paid adoption leave consistent with maternity leave; 
one week paid paternity leave; and up to 10 days’ carer’s leave per annum; A 
“keep in touch“ program for staff on maternity and adoption leave will also be 
introduced”. Qantas is also building two new child care centres, one in 
Melbourne and one in Brisbane, and is evaluating child care needs for staff in 
other Australian cities where the Company has a significant presence. These 
will complement the child care centre opened at Qantas’ Sydney headquarters 
in May 2003. 
Warrnambool 
Cheese and 
Butter Factory  
“The Company remains committed to the professional development of its 
employees. During the year, we supported a number of staff in their pursuit of 
business-relevant tertiary studies, conducted a supervisor development 
program and put a number of production staff through specific dairy 
 Tamara Zunker   195 
processing programs. We also continued our internal leadership and workplace 
development program.” 
3 Industrial 
relations 
Boral “Boral’s industrial relations strategy is based on line management ownership, 
with a primary focus on the business unit needs and issues and an ongoing 
emphasis on constructive employer-employee relationships through 
participation and consultation. This approach is consistent with the diversified 
nature of our businesses which range from large manufacturing facilities down 
to one or two person operations across our 552 sites in Australia.” 
Coates Hire “Coates continued to maintain good relations with industry and employee 
representatives across the Group. There was no major industrial action during 
the period, and no material impact on any operations was recorded in 2004 as 
a result of any protracted or significant industrial relations or union action.” 
Fletcher 
Building 
“The constructive relationships we enjoy with labour unions are also a positive 
contributor to the employment climate within the company. That some 3,000 
employees and their families attend the annual company sports day in 
Auckland, that 1,000 employees participate in the Round The Bays run in 
Fletcher Building T-shirts, and that the company gymnasium and child care 
facility are so valued are all signs of a healthy employer-employee 
relationship. “ 
Virgin Blue “Operational economies are facilitated by our competitive and flexible 
workplace agreements. These agreements provide us with the latitude to cross-
train and multi-task our staff.” 
“Our ability to compete is reinforced by our workplace agreements, which 
have revolutionised workplace relations for airlines in Australia. The interests 
of over 85 percent of Virgin Blue staff are represented by just three unions, a 
fraction of the number covering the employees of traditional airlines.” 
4 Health and 
safety 
BHP Billiton “Despite this progress, we have failed to meet our most important target – zero 
fatalities. Tragically 17 employees or contractors lost their lives during the 
year, an outcome that is unacceptable by any measure. Management have 
refocused and redoubled their efforts to address this issue in line with the 
Group’s target of Zero Harm. We know this is achievable because we have 
many operations around the world where excellence in safety has been and is 
being consistently achieved.” 
Coles Myer “Safety RIGHT NOW program awareness rolled out to all Coles Myer team 
members” 
IAG “We developed the ‘besafe’ programme to encourage our staff to participate in 
keeping our work places healthy, safe and clean. To assist us in improving our 
safety performance we train our people in: • Prevention – creating safe and 
secure working environments and promoting safe behaviour to avoid harm; • 
Treatment – prompt reporting and early intervention to minimise harm; and • 
Rehabilitation – focusing on early recovery and return to work. 
Almost 500 employees have undertaken a St John Ambulance First Aid 
Training Course since December 2003, adding to the growing number of staff 
trained throughout the organisation.” 
Mayne Group “At Mayne, safety in the workplace is everyone’s responsibility. Providing our 
people with the training and resources to sustain health and safety practices 
underpins this philosophy. In the past financial year, a revised and extensive 
library of OH&S information and procedures was placed on the Company 
intranet to give employees better access. All employees with direct 
responsibility for OH&S participated in a coordination seminar and 
management responsibility training was conducted with executives, senior 
managers and line managers.” 
5 Employee 
training and 
development 
The 
Environmental 
Group (EGL) 
“The aim of our Staff Training Program is to provide 20 to 25 hours of 
training hours per employee per year in a range of skill based and personal 
development areas.” 
Southern Cross 
Broadcasting 
“A training record for all staff has been developed to ensure all staff obtain 
appropriate skills. Further innovative training and development programmes 
are being implemented, including an on-line training facility.” 
Transfield “Over the course of the year, 60 employees graduated from our leadership and 
management training programs. In addition, a further 24 new graduates were 
accepted into our internal graduate program and we launched a Fast-track 
Diploma of Management. In addition, our employee development initiatives 
were recognised with two external awards.” 
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Woolworths “All of our people, whether in stores or support functions, know our business 
extremely well. Our employees’ experience and knowledge of how our 
business operates is one of our most valuable assets and contributes to our 
ongoing success. Woolworths has a strong culture of developing and 
promoting people from within the business and encouraging outstanding 
performance from our existing employees at all levels. Training and 
development remains a key focus for Woolworths with the formation of the 
Woolworths Academy and a partnership with the Macquarie Graduate School 
of Management (MGSM).” 
6 Employee 
remuneration 
PBL “Crown has recently signed a new four-year agreement covering the majority 
of its operational employees. The agreement reflects improved working 
conditions and competitive wage rates within a framework that will allow the 
complex to continue profitable growth. It also provides for enhanced career 
opportunities for employees, particularly in the 
table games area.” 
One Steel “The company’s remuneration policy for senior executives aims to: 
• attract, develop and retain executives with the capabilities required to lead 
the company in the achievement of business objectives 
• have a significant proportion of executives’ pay at risk to ensure a focus on 
delivering annual financial, safety and business objectives 
• reward executives for maintaining sustained returns to shareholders.” 
Telstra “As part of the overall remuneration strategy and to encourage a longer term 
perspective, directors are required to receive a minimum of 20% of their 
remuneration by way of restricted Telstra shares through the DirectShare Plan. 
The shares are purchased on market and allocated to the participating director 
at market price. The shares are held in trust for a period of 5 years unless the 
participating director ceases earlier with the Telstra Group. In accordance with 
our policy, directors may state a preference to increase their participation in 
the DirectShare Plan. Where this occurs, we may provide a greater percentage 
of directors’ fees in Telstra shares.” 
Zinifex “We believe that people do indeed make a difference. To this end, we are 
progressively rolling out performance-based pay which will ultimately see 
each employee rewarded for achieving individual targets combined with the 
Company’s overall financial performance.” 
7 Employment 
of minorities 
or women 
Australian 
Agricultural Co. 
“As a large land holder and one of the biggest employers in rural and regional 
Australia, AACo recognises its special responsibility to the community and to 
the Indigenous population.” 
Brambles We are an equal opportunity employer. We are committed to developing a 
diverse workforce and providing a work environment in which everyone is 
treated fairly and with respect, irrespective of sex, race, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion or ethnic origin. Employment and advancement at 
Brambles are based on merit. Brambles employs disabled people and we work 
to develop and maintain active careers for them. If a Brambles’ employee 
becomes disabled while in our employment and, as a result, is unable to 
perform their duties, we make every effort to find them suitable alternative 
employment and provide retraining. Our Human Resources practices, 
including recruitment, selection, remuneration and training, are undertaken on 
a non-discriminatory basis, in line with our Code of Conduct.” 
Collection 
House 
“Collection House recruitment strategies were revised during the year to 
attract more female applicants. More than 55% of the Company workforce is 
now female and there is an increasing proportion of women in senior 
management positions in our Australasian operations. There is also a greater 
focus on work / life balance including more flexible working hours.” 
Kingsgate 
Consolidated 
“The company has a policy to improve the quality of life for women workers 
who comprise approximately 16% of the workforce. Although low by general 
industry standards, the number of women employed is relatively high for the 
mining industry. In 2004 the company was awarded a trophy and certificate by 
the Ministry of Labour for its “efforts on understanding the importance in 
improving the quality of life for women workers”.” 
8 Employee 
morale 
Flight Centre “Flight Centre actively promotes a set of values designed to assist all 
employees in their dealings with each other, competitors, customers and the 
community. The values endorsed include: honesty, integrity, fairness and 
respect. These values are incorporated into the company core philosophies 
and considered the equivalent of a Code of Conduct as it sets out the standards 
expected of all employees.” 
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Singapore 
Telecom. 
“The Group also recognises that one of its most important assets is its human 
capital. Whether in Singapore or Australia, employees work in a culture which 
encourages and rewards personal excellence and which provides training and 
development opportunities for individuals to achieve their best.” 
Strathfield 
Group 
“Life as a Strathfield Business Manager is exciting, inspiring and challenging. 
Leading a team of people to achieve financial and non-financial goals, and 
balancing this with excellence in customer service provides a rewarding 
challenge for our team. Our Business Managers are responsible for all aspects 
of managing a store from stock, to service to merchandise presentation. From 
Strathfield’s early days in Albert Rd. Strathfield we recognised the importance 
of people, their happiness at work and the impact this can have on our 
customers. Customer service is one of the platforms we have built the business 
on and our results are testimony to this fact.” 
Wesfarmers “… providing a fulfilling and safe working environment for employees, 
rewarding good performance and providing opportunities for advancement;” 
9 Other Coffey 
International 
“Coffey International Limited has some of the world’s most experienced and 
talented people in the engineering, scientific and international development 
fields. Professor Harry Poulos is just one example. He was voted 2003 Civil 
Engineer of the Year and the 2004 inaugural winner of the Geotechnical 
Practitioner of the Year.” 
CSL “CSL’s biennial Global Employee Opinion Survey conducted late in 2003 
revealed strengths in customer focus, organisational commitment and the 
effectiveness of immediate supervisors, as well as an overall 75% level in job 
satisfaction.” 
Kingsgate 
Consolidated 
“For the second year running the company was awarded the Prime Minister’s 
“Best Practice Award for Employee Welfare” and in 2004 the Governor of 
Phichit Province and several of his officers visited the site to see at first hand 
some of the initiatives the mine has undertaken to win this award. During the 
visit, the officials were introduced to several of the site’s employee relations 
policies including work practices, employee benefits, dispute and harassment, 
promotion of women and recent initiatives in the health and safety area 
including drug and alcohol use, health hygiene and sexual transmitted 
diseases. The visitors met key employees and conversed with a wide selection 
of the work force exchanging ideas for further development both at the mine 
site and in local communities.” 
Wesfarmers “I would like to acknowledge the important role played by all employees in 
the achievement of the 2003/04 result. Their skill, loyalty and commitment 
represents one of the major strengths of the Wesfarmers group. On behalf of 
the Board, I thank them for their dedication and excellent performance.” 
 Tamara Zunker  198 
APPENDIX 6 
EXAMPLES OF MISSION STATEMENTS MENTIONING EMPLOYEES 
Company Mission Statement 
BHP Billiton At BHP Billiton our objective is to be the company of choice - creating sustainable value for our shareholders, employees, 
contractors, suppliers, customers, business partners and host 
communities....We aspire to Zero Harm to people, our host 
communities and the environment and strive to achieve leading 
industry practice. Sound principles to govern safety, business 
conduct, social, environmental and economic activities are integral 
to the way we do business 
Billabong Billabong International's values remain consistent with its foundation objectives, which include a commitment to brand 
protection and enhancement, the manufacture of design-relevant 
and functional products, marketing in the core boardsports 
channels, the professional development of staff and ongoing 
attention to customer service and relationships. 
Bluescope Steel Our customers are our partners. Our people are our strength. Our shareholders are our foundations. Our communities are our homes. 
Coles Myer Coles Myer will create benefits for its stakeholders—its customers, 
staff, suppliers and shareholders—by being the best retailer in every 
market in which the company operates’. 
Emperor Mines 
Limited 
By utilising our employees' expertise, innovation and teamwork, we 
seek to generate maximum value for our shareholders through the 
discovery of new deposits, increased production, operational 
expertise and balanced exposure to gold price movement. 
National Foods We will be the company of choice for our employees, our customers 
and our suppliers. We will deliver above average returns to our 
shareholders. We will meet or exceed our consumers' needs by 
delivering innovative new branded products of superior quality. We 
will acquire other businesses where this will deliver improved 
shareholder value. We will strive to maintain our position as the 
most efficient company in our industry. We will achieve our vision 
while operating in strict conformity with our company values. 
Pacific Brands Unity - work as one winning team, collaborate. Commitment - do it 
wholeheartedly or not at all. Innovation - to lead the way, explore, 
dare to try. Speed - be there first, do it, don't wait. Accountability - 
do what you say, take responsibility. 
Telstra We build technology and content solutions that are simple, easy to 
use and valued by our customers. We strive to serve and know our 
customers better than anyone else. 
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APPENDIX 7 
TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP BY INDUSTRY 
Industry % Trade Union Members 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.7 
Property and business services 6.7 
Wholesale trade 7.8 
Accommodation and food services 8.1 
Retail trade 16.6 
Mining 17.3 
Finance and insurance services 17.4 
Cultural and recreational services 17.6 
Construction 23.4 
Manufacturing 26.0 
Communication services 28.6 
Health and community services 29.0 
Personal and other services 29.6 
Transport, postal and warehousing 36.1 
Government administration and defence 37.5 
Education 44.2 
Electricity, gas, water and waste services 52.3 
Average  22.7 
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APPENDIX 8 
EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP SCHEME PARTICIPATION BY INDUSTRY 
 
Industry 
% employee 
participation in share 
ownership scheme 
Education 0.1 
Accommodation and food services 0.7 
Other services 1.1 
Health care and social assistance 1.6 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.1 
Construction 4.6 
Electricity, gas, water and waste services 4.7 
Arts and recreation services 4.9 
Property and business services 6.3 
Retail trade 6.4 
Wholesale trade 7.4 
Manufacturing 7.9 
Transport, postal and warehousing 9.2 
Communication services 16 
Mining 16.4 
Finance and insurance services 32.3 
Average 5.9 
 
